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CHAPTER I
FORMALISM AND KANT’S TABLE OF LOGICAL FUNCTIONS
§ 1 - On the Character of Kant’s Logic of Judgments
Kant’s general logic is a logic of judgments, rather than of
sentences or of propositions in the modern sense of hypostatized
meanings. A judgment, according to Kant, is a representation of
unity in a cognition. Judgment involves bringing concepts or other
judgments into a set of relations in order to represent how they
belong to one another in an objective unity. Therefore, in all cases
judgment is the mediate knowledge of one representation (a concept
or a judgment) by means of another. In a subject-predicate judgment,
for example, the knowledge of the subject is mediated by means of the
predicate. The relation through which this mediation takes place is
the form of the judgment.^
The form of the judgment rests upon what Kant calls the
logical function of the understanding involved in making the judgment.
In the "Transcendental Analytic’’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, ^ Kant
displays these logical functions, grouped under four headings, by

















A function is ”the unity of the act of bringing various
representations under one common representation" (B93). A function
then, much like a function in mathematics,^ is an operation ("act")
upon arguments (for Kant these arguments are either concepts or other
judgments) which is law-governed in uniquely determining a value for
those arguments. For Kant, this value is a unity of a specific kind
consisting in the relation which is thought between the arguments.
Each kind of unity is called a moment of unity.
For instance, the logical function of universal quantification
yields the moment of unity thought between two concepts by uniting
them in a universal judgment. This unity is expressed by the relation
of the predicate’s pertaining to the whole extension of the subject
without exception. Similarly, the logical functions of particular and
singular quantification yield, respectively, the unity of the predi-
cate’s pertaining to some of the extension of the subject (the
particular judgment) and that of the predicate’s pertaining to an
individual (the singular judgment).
The other logical functions yield unity in judgments in a
similar manner. The moment of unity of the affirmative judgment is
represented by the function of affirming the relation between the
subject and predicate; that of the negative judgment, by the function
of denying this relation; and tliat of the infinite judgment, by the
function of a negative predicate in an affirmative judgment. Tlie unity
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of the categorical judgment is represented by joining tnvo concepts
together in the relationship of subject and predicate by the copu-
lative function (the copula); that of the hypothetical, by joining
two judgments in a conditional relation by the function ’if. ..then
and that of the disjunctive, by joining two or more judgments by
the function ’either... or ’. (One should not think of these
last tv-70 functions as the corresponding truth-functional connec-
tives of the modem propositional calculus. Kant defines the functions
of the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments as yielding a specific
kind of unity in consciousness, a way of thinking the judgments to
be related, and not as yielding a truth-value.
) Finally, the unity
of the problematic judgment is represented by a function expressing
the possibility of the cognition; that of the assertoric, by a
function expressing the actuality (truth) of the cognition; and that
of the apodictic, by a function expressing the necessity of the
cognition.
A judgment is a unity constituted by the moments of unity
resulting from each logical function comprising the judgment. How
the unity of the whole judgment is constructed from these moments
will be, in a broad sense, the topic of this dissertation.
Kant believes that this set of logical functions corresponds
to the logical forms appropriate for a general, or formal, logic. The
table itself is based upon Kant’s own v7ork and lectures on general
logic. In presenting the table in the Critique
,
Kant claims that it
does not differ ”in any essential respects” from the classificatory
table of judgments commonly provided by logicians (695-96).“^ General
4
logic IS formal in the sense that it treats relationships between
concepts in a judgment or beliveen judgments themselves in inferences
irrespective of the content of that which is related. Kant says,
General logic . . . abstracts from all content of
knowledge . . and considers only the logical form in
the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge (B79).
Moreoever, general logic has universal applicability to all areas of
thought. In characterizing general logic, Kant maintains,
The sphere of logic is quite precisely delimited; its
sole concern is to give an exhaustive exposition and
a strict proof of the formal rules of all thought (Bix).
Thus, general logic deals in a precise manner with the
traditional question of logic, "What is correct reasoning?" Kant, in
following the practice of his own day, divides general logic into two
separate disciplines: the Analytic, which deals with the principles
of the formal assessment and criticism of all reasoning, and the
Dialectic, which exposes dialectical illusion (fallacy) in reasoning.
Hence, by the analytic of general logic Kant intends to mark off what
is considered today as the domain of elementary formal logic; namely,
the specification of logical forms and of the formal principles of
valid inference.
Hence, we can interpret each function as a logical constant of
a possible judgment.^ Where a modern logician would speak of trans-
lating a sentence into a symbolic notation to reveal what he wishes
to consider its logical form, Kant would speak of classifying a
judgment according to the table of logical functions. The point of
both procedures is to specify the logical constants of the sentence
or judgment. Although the point may be the same, tlie resulting
5
formulations will naturally differ owing to the special character of
a logic of judgments. Not only is the set of logical constants used
and defined in a different manner, but the forms into which a sentence
may be translated are more flexible than the forms by which a judgment
is to be interpreted. Various formulations of the logical form of a
sentence are compatible with others, depending upon the argument in
which the sentence occurs as premiss or conclusion; whereas, the form
of a judgment is determined by just those constants provided by the
analysis of judgment.
One notes the following difference between the Kantian
conception of what constitutes the investigation of a formal logic
with regard to judgments and the modern delimitation of formal logic.
Since the construction of judgments involves the employment of thought,
or reasoning, we can raise the question of what is correct reasoning
not only with regard to inference-making, as is done in modern logic,
but also with regard to the making of judgments themselves. To employ
reasoning correctly in a judgment is to construct a true judgment by
means of acts of the understanding. Hence, the Analytic, in the
investigation of logical constants, makes a distinctive contribution
to the notion of truth in judgment. The nature of this contribution
is indicated in the following passage from the ” Introduction” to the
Logik, as quoted by Norman Kemp-Smith,
Analytic discovers, by means of analysis, all the
activities of reason which we exercise in thought. It is
therefore an analytic of the form of understanding and of
Reason, and is justly called the Logic of Truth, since it
contains tlie necessary rules of all (formal) truth, with-
out wliicli truth our knowledge is untrue in itself, even
apart from its objects.
6
Because the Analytic is formal, it attempts to expose only those
forms and principles which are necessary conditions for the correct
employment of reason and understanding, those elements and principles
without which our understanding and reason would not truly be under-
standing or reason.
Thus, in classifying a judgment according to the table of
logical functions, the logician is, according to Kant, specifying
the forms necessary for the true employment of thought in tlie con-
struction of the judgment. The logician is not merely classifying the
judgment according to its possible use in an inference, but is telling
us something about the internal structure of the judgment itself as
regards the formal determination of its truth.
The modern reader may think that this extension of the study
of general logic into questions of truth will introduce unwanted
epistemological considerations into the logical analysis of judgment.
However, such a criticism misses the point of a formal analysis of
judgment, for formal considerations pertaining to truth legitimately
enter into the analysis of the correct use of reasoning in the con-
struction of a judgment. I hope to demonstrate, through presentation
of Kant’s theory of the unity of judgment, that Kant’s formal analysis
of judgment is conducted in a manner wholly appropriate to the logical
analysis of the structure of judgment.
§ 2 - Some Modern' Puzzles
Nevertheless, Kant’s set of constants presents perplexing
features, unneiving to the modern logician. The following problems
7
will be dealt with in this dissertation.
Although Kant lists three forms of Quantity and Quality, he
hastens to add that the singular and infinite forms are not "co-
ordinate” forms of judgment in general logic (B96-97). In the theory
of the syllogism in general logic, singular judgments "can be treated
like those that are universal," since in both the predicate pertains
to the whole or entirety of the subject. Also, the infinite judgment,
according to its logical form, is really affirmative, for "general
logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even though it be
negative)." Notice, however, that Kant does not question the existence
of singular quantification as a form of quantification or negative
predicates as a form of negation in general logic; he is specifying
how these forms are to be handled in the syllogism. Only in the
Critique does Kant argue that the treatment of these form.s in trans-
cendental logic requires them to be fundamentally distinct forms,
because they make a distinct contribution to the conception of an
object. A consideration of these arguments, however, is out of place
in this study of the general logic.
Nevertheless, in being a theory of valid argumentation, general
logic would seem to require just universal and particular quantifica-
tion with regard to Quantity and affirmative and negative quality
with regard to forms of Quality. Thus, it is unclear in V'jhat sense
there is singular quantification and infinite quality in general logic,
if these forms can be treated on a par with others in the syllogism.
What must be shown is the logical distinction belnveen these forms and
others under tlie respective headings, while their treatment in
8
syllogistic Inferences parallels that of other constants.
Secondly, the copula, which expresses the relationship between
subaect and predicate in the categorical judgment, has proven to be a
useless logical constant in modern logical theory. I am reminded here
of Frege's confession in the Begriffsschrlft that in an early draft
of the work he had attempted to distinguish between the subject and
predicate of a judgment only to find that it was "obstructive of [his]
special purpose and merely led to useless prolixity Indeed, the
employment of the copula as a logical constant has stood in the way of
stating the logical form of propositions involving relations and
multiple quantification. It is safe to say that modern logic has been
able to extend the theory of validity far beyond what was ever accom-
plished in the subject-predicate logic of categorical propositions
by seeing that the categoricals do not contain one common internal
structure ^namely, the copula—^but, in fact, differ with regard to
the function representing the grammatical copula just as much as they
differ with regard to their quantification. But we shall see (II. 2,
i.e.. Chapter II, § 2) that Kant utilizes a conception of judgment for
which the copulative function is necessary.
What this conception of judgment is and what counts for or
against its use in logical theory can only be answered by looking at
Kant’s conception of eacli logical function which is alleged to charac-
terize some formal aspect of judgment. Unfortunately, where they count
most, Kant’s definitions of these functions obfuscate matters rather
than illuminate them. One gets this feeling first in Kant’s definition
of tlie copula as expressing the relationship beti\;een the subject and
9
predicate: What, after all, is the relationship expressed and why
is it necessary to have a function to express it? But consider
especially the definition of the modal forms. These forms are the
most important of the Kantian t^velve in contributing to Kant’s con-
ception of judgment (see IV. 1). Kant says that modality concerns
only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general”
(BlOO). At least one commentator has maintained that this definition
of modality is ’’almost meaningless.’’^ What does ’value’ mean here?
What has ’’the value of the copula” to do with the logical form of a
judgment? And what has this value of the copula to do with modality
and modal concepts? Even the meaning that could be given to these
forms through their association with the modal categories of possi-
bility, existence, and necessity in the metaphysical deduction is
obscured by this definition.
Failure to come to grips with these problems has resulted
in the modal forms being the least understood of the Kantian forms
of judgment. Jonathan Bennett contends ’’the concepts associated with
the modal features are supposed to be pretty much our ordinary con-
cepts of possibility and necessity.”^ If Bennett means by ”our
ordinary concepts of possibility and necessity” ’^’ and ’Q’, then we
cannot associate these concepts, as formalized in modem modal logic,
with the problematic and apodictic forms of judgment (see IV. 3). More-
over, Bennett’s attempt to establish a relation between Kant’s modal
forms and ”our ordinary concepts” is bound to break down over any
association of the assertoric form with the concept of existence
expressed as an existential quantifier, for Kant distinguislies the
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quantification of a Judgment from the assertoric form which is
associated with the concept of existence.
Bennett’s interpretive procedure here is wrong-headed: One
cannot approach the modal fomis of judgment from a preconceived notion
of modal logic. Indeed, Kant’s modal logic-the logic of possibility,
existence, and necessity—can be understood only in terms of the logic
of the modal forms of judgment which must be acquired through the
general logic itself.
The misrepresentation of the modal forms is lamentable, for
Kant’s theory of the logical forms of judgment culminates in the theory
of the modal forms, since these forms take on a major role in defining
the nature of judgment and in distinguishing a logic of judgments from
a sentential logic (see IV. 1). Kant, too, I believe, would have consi-
dered his most distinctive contribution to the theory of the forms of
judgment to lie in his theory of the modal functions. Against the
prevailing division of judgments into those that are modal, or ’’impure”,
and those that are non-modal, or ’’pure”, Kant comments that without
modality no judgment is possible (N 3111).^*^ Furthermore, Kant’s most
fi'uitful and interesting thinking concerning the logic form of judg-
ments occurs in his theory of modality. For these reasons my study of
the modal forms. Chapters IV and V, will be the most extended in this
monograph
.
Finally, there is an inherent shortcoming in displaying the
forms of judgment in an array on a ta1)le: The table does not inform
us of hov^; the forms relate to one another in a judgment. A mere array
of logical constants tells nothing about the grammar or syntax of
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these constants in constructing a well-formed judgment. Perhaps Kant
assumed that his readers would know how quantifiers and negation fit
into a judgment, but, as a matter of fact, the logical grammar of
these constants is not obvious to the modern reader. In The Develop -
rnent of Logic, William and Martha Kneale contend, ”[Kant] apparently
holds . . . that each division under one heading can be combined with
each division under each of the others. They go on to point out
that the hypothetical judgment cannot combine with negation, for then
the judgment would no longer by hypothetical. But this obvious fact
should indicate that Kant does not hold the belief that any function
can combine with any other function of the- others headings. However,
Kant’s method of presenting the forms by means of an array provides
no rules for their syntax.
Whenever questions like these are raised in the current
literature, they are dismissed with the implication that Kant’s table
of logical functions is v\?rong to begin with and tliat the existence of
such problems only shows Kant’s failure to develop the logical theory
he employs. The feeling is that the table plays a specious role in
Kantian thought by being artificially introduced at a point where Kant
did not know how to proceed, that it was introduced for the misguided
purpose of proving the finality of a list of categories, and that it
is of little philosophical importance in these days of mathematical
logic. For such reasons little serious work has been done in English
on Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment general logic.
Yet in view of tlie recent rise in Kantian literature,
especially on the Transcendental Analytic, the absence of such a study
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represents a serious lack in Kantian scholarship. Kant claims that
his distinctive contribution to categorlal analysis is the systemization
of the categories in relation to each other, which is accomplished
through their association with the logical constants of general logic
(B106). He believes that forms of general logic supply the logic
of the categorial forms. But this logic is not readily discernible
by a modem reader to whom the general logic itself is a mystery.
Hence
j
a study of Kant’s general logic is in order as, at least, a
necessary prolegomenon to Kant's categorial analysis and, thus, to
assessing the importance of Kant’s philosophy to philosophical problems
today.
In this monograph, therefore, I shall examine Kant’s set of
logical constants with an eye toward developing logical syntax or
grammar for these constants. By a logical grammar I shall mean the
rules by which these constants define a well-formed judgment and the
formal operations that are possible by means of the constants. The
latter problem concerns the grammatical interrelations of the constants
to each other and pertains to the doctrine of immediate inference. A
consideration of Kant’s syllogistic will be provided only in so far
as it pertains to issues raised with regard to the grammar of the
logical constants. I shall show how Kant lays down a gramm-ar for these
constants by which he spells out the formal mechanisms of judgment
—
how the unity of the whole arises from the unity of the parts—and of
its logic.
In conclusion, I shall say something about Kant’s conception
of logical tlieory (VI. 2).
13
§ 3 - A Method of Investigation
It ^ ipp^ossible ^ understand Kant^s general logic if one 's
9Hly. ?^r_ce is Critique of Pure Reason . There he defines general
logic only to distinguish it from his main concern of transcendental
logic and considers the logical functions mostly in terms of their
treatment in transcendental logic. Instead, we must turn to Kant's
writings outside of the Critique . Unfortunately, little of the
pertinent material is presently available in English.
The most important such source in volume 16 of the Prussian
Academy edition of Kant's complete works. The volume contains notes
Kant made to Meier's Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, which Kant used as
his text for his lectures on general logic. These notes have been
numbered, and it is customary to refer to the passages by the notation
'N' followed by the appropriate number. The volume is also published
with Meier's Auszug and I shall make reference to this work where
Meier helps to explain Kant or where Kant's theories significantly
differ from Meier's. The notes themselves, often mere jottings, were
written over a period of some dozen years and show the development of
Kant's thinking on logical theory during this period. I shall use
only those notes which represents Kant's final thinking in his so-
called critical period. It is interesting to note that Kant continued
to write and think about general logic well after the publication of
the Critique .
A second, and perhaps better known, source is the Logik, a
compendium of tlie lecture notes compiled in 1800 by Kant's student
Gottlob Jasche, and published in volume 9 of the Academy edition.
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According to Jasche’s own preface, the compilation was made to present
Kant’s thinking in a field which he would not have othen^ise prepared
for publication with the required clarity and systematization. Al-
though having Kant’s blessings to carry out the project (Kant gave
Jasche his own lecture notes for the purpose and assured Jasche of
the latter’s competency to handle the task), Jasche was evidently
given a free hand in his treatment of the notes. Thus it is diffi-
cult to determine whetlier those passages which are original in the
reflect Kant’s own communications to Jasche in 1800 or are
Jasche’s own interpolations. Care must be taken, therefore, in
accepting this work as Kantian. Only the "Introduction", which is the
most obscure part of the work and the most remote from contemporary
logical tlieory, is available in English.
A third source for Kant’s logic is volume 24 of the Academy
edition. This volume contains student notes taken during Kant’s
lectures on general logic from about 1771 until after 1792. These
notes include the pre-critical Blomberg (1771) and Philippi (1772)
notes, as well as those falling within the critical period, Politz
(1789), Busolt (1790), Dohna-Wundlacken (1792), and the Wiener Logik
compiled by a group of students probably sometime after 1792 . I shall
refer to these notes by means of the student’s name from whose notes
I am quoting. Although there is no way to determine the faithfulness
of these notes to Kant’s lectures, the notes themselves are impressive
in their coherency. They are helpful in explaining the short, some-
times cryptic, passages of volume 16 and in shov^/ing how Kant’s ov\?n
notes are organized and developed in lecture form.
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But a philosophically secure understanding of Kant's general
logic requires a philosophical analysis of the material itself in
addition to an extensive investigation into Kant’s notes and lectures.
For this purpose I propose to utilize a technique of modem analysis
formalization. By a formalization I mean^^ the construction of an
artificial language system consisting in precise rules over a set of
symbols for the rigorous study of an area of discourse. Such a
language system is called a formalism. In the formalization of a dis-
course the choice of expressions or symbols and the rules for their
use are governed by the meaning of the expressions in the area being
formalized. One renders this meaning as clearly as possible by means
of formal rules governing symbolic expressions in the formalism.
Areas which have recently undergone formalization are arithmetic
(by Frege, in Principia Mathematica
, and by Quine), semantics (by
Tarski), pragmatics (by R. M. Martin), and the traditional syllogistic
(by -fcukasiewicz ). But in these formalisms the constructed language-
system has always been that of first-order quantification theory with
additional operators and predicates. First-order quantification theory
is the basic formalization of elementary formal logic. In formalizing
Kant's logic, on the other hand, I shall construct a special language-
system designed to render the particular mechanisms of a totally
different elementary logical system. Instead of employing an already
existing formalism to study Kant's general logic, I am proposing the
radical procedure for developing a special formalism. Thus, my
procedure is analogous to the translation of arithmatic into a for-
malism, since Kant's general logic is an area presented without
16
formalization; but it is also analogous to the more fundamental
treatment of elementary logic by means of a special set of symbols
and rules.
Kant's general logic is formalj but has never been stated as
a foriTialism. In developing a formalism for Kant's general logic, I
shall introduce a special symbol for each logical constant in Kant's
theory of judgment. Since Kant defines a logical constant as a
function yielding a unity, we may take the expression
(F) 0p(x, y ) rz Up
as representing the general form of a logical constant. Here '0p'
is the symbol for a logical function with arguments x and y, 'Up' is
the moment of unity which is uniquely determined by this function 0p.
We may express this moment of unity in ordinary English, or as close
to ordinary as possible: Up tells us how the arguments x and y are
thought to be related in the judgment. Thus, Up will be a proposition
(sentence) involving a two-place relation. To complete the construc-
tion of the formalism we require the grammar, in the sense defined
above, of each 0p introduced. Here the procedure will be to set
forth a formal counterpart to what Kant says infonnally about the
grammar of each constant.
This kind of philosophical theory -building to explain another's
theory may be called constructive explication . Tlie acute analysis that
the theory undergoes by being incorporated into a formal language
-
system provides a philosophical explication of tlie concepts of that
theory. Explication is not meant here in the Mooreian sense in which
being a male sibling serves as an explication of being a brother, but
17
in the sense in which philosophers speah of rational reeonstrcotion.
In such explication of a discourse a given subject is transformed
into a language-system which is clear and precise and technical.
(F) above, for Instance, serves as a helpful, if rudimentary, expli-
cation of Kant's somewhat obscure definition of 'function'.
Brevity, clarity and exactness are, therefore, natural
by-products of the systematization brought about in such constructive
explication. But herein lies both the problems and the insights of
such explication. Making a theory precise through formalism will
naturally involve some distortion of the original material where that
mBtoirisl is itsGlf not dtpptqo tt-i/-* tr precise. The general question of what to do
about inexactness in one’s material and distortion in one’s theory is
far too broad for a complete discussion here.l^ p,,- succinctly in
terms of the problems to be encountered in the forthcoming study,
inexactness must be mirrored as problems in constructing a desired
formalism. Attempts, of course, must be made to construct an adequate
formalism to do justice as far as possible to one’s material.
Distortion, thus, must be kept to a minimum and recognized and assessed
where it necessarily occurs.
But here we find the great insight afforded by formalistic
analysis: The method provides a concrete means of expressing v^hat may
be inexact or problematic in one’s material. In short, constructive
explication gives us an objective point of reference for the philoso-
phical exploration of a theory. By means of the rigor of a formal
language-system, problems of a philosophical nature can be uncovered
and explicitly formulated. Indeed, constructive explication may be
18
able to express clearly what was previously believed unclear or
uncover problems hitherto unacknowledged.
Constructive explication, then, constitutes philosophical
analysis in the dual sense of rational reconstruction and critique.
The presentation of the logical grammar of Kant's logical
functions will parallel that of the svntar-i-Tnti-irn cyntactical or axiomatic statements
of modern logic. The syntax and formal operations of the logical
constants will be given as an uninterpreted system of logic. No formal
semantics in terms of a domain and truth predicate will be provided
for the Kantian conception of judgment. Such considerations belong to
the transcendental logic of judgments, rather than to formal logic.
The intended meanings for these symbols will be provided through the
unity which each function specifies. Such an interpretation will
consist in the association of the logical functions with such concepts
as 'all', 'not', etc. This presentation of Kant's logical functions
is in keeping with Kant's own statement of his general logic, for he
himself develops an Interpretation for these logical constants only
through the unities which they specify In thought. All other consi-
derations in general logic pertain to what I have called tile logical
grammar of the constants.
Fina.llVj I add that the guiding principle of constructive
explication, and the principle upon which its value as a successful
piece of analysis is judged, is: faithfulness to the material.
Constructive explication of the kind envisioned for this study involves,
foremost, scliolarship in order to preserve the philosopher's meaning
witliout misrepresentation of the material. In constructing a suitable
19
formalism, the theorist is expressing his own understanding and
analysis of the material and is to be held responsible on this account
lor his construction.
CHAPTER II
THE LOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL
CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS
Traditional, or Aristotelian, logic specifies the logical
form of categorical (subject-predicate) judgments along the two axes
of Quantity and Quality. According to Quantity, a judgment may be
either universal, if something is said about the entire membership of
Its subject (S), or particular, if something is said about only some
of Its members. And according to Quality, a judgment may be either
affirmative, if the predicate (P) is affirmed of the subject, or
negative, if the predicate is denied of the subject. These two axes






Universal Affirmative All S is P "A"
Universal Negative No S is P "E"
Particular Affirmative Some S is P TI Jtt
Particular Negative Some S is not P ”0"
(To tills classification is sometimes added the singular
judgment, n is P whore ’n’ is a proper name, whose logical form, it
was thought, was to be construed in terms of the axes involved in the
categorical judgments. Traditional logicians often regarded the
singular judgment as universal with respect to quantification.
)
Kant fosters a misconception of his own logic when he claims
20
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that no significant additions have been made to logic since Aristotle
(Bviii). However, his judgment is based upon inadequate historical
sources : It is doubtful that the important medieval work in logic
was even available for Kant’s study. Moreover, from a formalistic
perspective, the difference between Kantian and Aristotelian logic
could not be more significant. Standard foimalizations of Aristotle’s
logic^ employ four two-place predicate-constants whose variables
range over terras. These constants express the Quantity -Quality rela-
tion in each of the A, E, I, 0 categoricals . But this method of
formalizing a logic of the categoricals is insufficient to express the
logical complexity of Kant’s theory of the logic of the categoricals.
It is helpful to think of the Kantian theory as an attempt to
display the internal structure of the four constants used in Aristo-
telian logic. Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment attempts to
take apart the categoricals into their constituent logical particles,
to separate their quantity and quality into different logical constants
in order to exhibit more of the categorical’s internal, logical
structure.
§ 1 - The Universal and Particular Quantifiers
Whereas traditional logic recognized only two forms of
quantification, Kant recognizes three: universal, particular, and
singular. Kant defines these three forms of quantification as follows:
In universal judgments the spliaera ^extension] of a
concept is comprised entirely V'^ithin tlie sphaera of
another; in particular judgments a part of the first is
comprised under the sphaera of the other; and in the indi-
vidual, a concept which has no sphaera is comprised merely
as a part under tlie sphaera of tlie other (N 3068).^
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ThuSj the three forms
concepts in which the
of quantification deal with a comparison of
extension of one concept is related to another
either entirely or only partially, or, in the case that the concept
lacks an extension, only singlely. U-hen no extension is involved in
the comparison, we have what may be called the limit of the quantita
tive comparison of one concept with another. One can do no more
than to compare the concept in one instance with this other concept.
Howeverj Kant maintains that this case can be treated like
those of the first in syllogistic inferences (see 1.2), because in
both cases the relation is maintained without exception.
for, since [the latter case has] no extension at all the
predicate cannot relate to part only of that which is con-
tained in the concept of the subject, and be excluded from
the rest. The predicate is valid of that concept, without
exception, just as if it were a general concept and had an
extension to the whole of which the predicate applied (B96).
We are, therefore, im.mediately confronted with the question of whether
to introduce two quantifiers or three.
The exact nature of Kant's claim must be understood. He is
maintaining only that the syllogistic rules governing a singular
quantifier in inferences correspond to those rules governing the uni-
versal quantifier. Such a claim is compatible with a conceptual
difference between the universal and singular judgments which would
show up in other areas of the logical investigation of these forms of
judgment. Indeed, the singular judgment includes aspects of the meaning
of both the universal and particular judgments, for in it a concept is
included entirely (universal quantity) as a part (particular quantity)
in the extension of a concept. Yet, because a singular judgment lacks
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an extension it cannot be identified logically with either a complete
universal or particular judgment. While a universal judgment has a
contrary, a singular has none; and while a particular has a subcon-
trary, a singular has none. Nor can a singular judgment be contraposed
as a universal affirmative or particular negative can be. The failure
of contrariety and subcontrariety to hold for singular judgments can
be explained directly by tbe fact that a singular judgment takes no
thought of an extension, for, as we shall see in II. 3, these relation-
ships are valid in Kant's logic because of his conception of the
extension of a concept and how general quantification (universal and
particular quantification) functions with respect to extensions.
Hence, oneness or singularity is a quantitative comparison that is
logically distinguishable from the other quantitative comparisons.
Thus, the forms of quantification can be said to rest upon
different acts of the understanding (W^ p. 929 );^ that is, to involve
*^iffsrent logical functions. Kant's argument, quoted above, concerns
only how these functions are to be treated with respect to syllogistic
inference, and here Kant maintains that the singular, which is differ-
ent from the universal in other respects as a form of quantification,
can be treated or thought of as universal. Thus, let us adopt two dis-
tinct functors 'y' and 'y' as representing the logical functions of
the universal and singular judgments respectively. For the particular
quantifier I shall employ the symbol 'C|'
.
The topic for tliis section is the syntax of the universal and
particular quantifiers. The logic of singular quantification will be
investigated in III.l.
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In medieval logic, quantifiers, or syncategoreraatic words,
were thought to express the manner of supposition (see II. 3) of the
subject in a judgment. Quantifiers, on this view, operate in gram-
matical relation to only the subject of the judgment. Albert of
Saxony formulated the following view of quantification:
To further exemplify syncategorematic terms, let us
consider the following proposition: "Every man is
running." "Man" is the subject. "Every" is neither
the subject nor predicate, nor is it part of either
subject or predicate. Rather, it is a modification of
the subject and signifies the manner of supposition of
the subject itself.^
This theory of quantification, and the correlative theory of supposition
has been formalized by P. T. Geach in Chapter 3 of Reference and
Generality . Following Geach, we can give the syntax of the medieval
conception of quantifiers as
:
B(VA),
where A and are variables which take the names of concepts as
substituends.
However, Kant views quantifiers as functions which take both
the subject and predicate of a judgment as their arguments. This view
follows from Kant’s general conception of the role of logical functions
in a judgment (I.l). To speak of quantification as a form of judgment
is for Kant to speak of a specific kind of connection between the
subject and predicate (N 3084).^ Thus, following the schema (F) (1.3)





The unity which these functions determine concerns how one
concept IS compared with the extension of the other. Hence,
II. 1.1. UNITY OF QUANTIFICATION
V(A, B) = D is compared with all of the extension of A
S(A, BJ = B IS compared with some of the extension of A.
Specifying the manner of this comparison is the role of the other
logical functions of the categorical judgment (II. 2). In this sense
the quantifiers themselves fail to yield a complete thought in a
judgment.
In an early Kantstudien article,^ Professor 0. Sickenberger
reports that Kant’s conception of quantifiers as expressing a relation-
ship bet^^;een concepts is entirely new in the history of logic (p. 92).
Sickenberger, argues, moreover, that this conception of quantification
is mistaken and that something like the traditional view of the grammar
of quantifiers is correct. Sickenberger contends that quantification
is not a form of judgment but only the form of a subject in a judgment,
because "the additions of ’one’, ’some’, ’all’ limit and determine the
subject judged" (p. 96).
It is easy to rephrase the Sickenberger argument in terms of
the formulations of the unity yielded by quantifiers in II. 1.1. In
universal and particular judgments, the relation of comparing remains
the same and only the terms i^ relation differ. Since the role
of the other logical functions is to specify the nature of this
comparison, quantification concerns only tlie subject in this relation.
However, Sickenberger ’s point is really quite artificial. In
the relations ’x is compared witli all/some of the extension of it
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is just as plausible to view ’all’ and ’some’ as belonging with the
(common) relation ’is compared with’. The result is, of course, two
distinct relations— ’is compared with all’, and ’is compared with
some in which the common relation is absorbed as a syntactical part
of each relation and is not expressed independently of its occurring
in the relation. A practical point is gained, moreover, in that these
quantitative relations take as values of their variables the same
things; namely, general concepts. Otherwise, one is forced into the
un-Kantian position that the other forms of judgment take as their
arguments a concept and a quantified concept (see III.l).
Sickenberger himself acknowledges that the forms of
quantification can be relationally expressed by presenting such formu-
lations of universal, particular, and singular quantification wherein
the subject is an unquantified general concept:
Men are all capable of being educated.
Insects, in part, are designed for communal life.
The trench, in the case of one man, have surpassed other nations.
But he dismisses these formulations as not being the ’’ordinary sense”
of quantification (p. 96). However, he fails to show any logical
incoherency in viewing the structure of quantification in the A, E, I,
0 categoricals in this Kantian manner. Furthermore, the relational
view of quantification provides a formally adequate explication of the
structure of categorical judgments as the following sections will
demonstrate. Thus, there is not good reason for maintaining that this
view is to be dismissed as a theory of quantification for categoricals.
Kant states only one formal rule of immediate inference
governing llic use of quantifiers: the rule of subalternation. As a
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general schema for expressing immediate inferences, I shall employ
(S) 0p(x, y) >Kp(-^ y ),
where ' 0^' and ’0p’ are logical functions „ The arrow, ' can be
read as ’implies' to distinguish it from the truth -functional connec-
tive ’=)’
;
its antecedent is everything written to its left, its
consequent, everything written to its right.
The rule of subalternation which states that a judgment of
particular quantity follows from one universal quantity
( Logilc, § 46:
—9P^. ^hlgemeinen gilt der Schluss auf da
s
Resondere”
) can be expressed
(Subal.
) V(A, B) >c^(A, B).
Furthermore, in his own notes Kant writes.
All the particular and singular judgments are contained
under the universal; however, not all the singular judg-
ments are contained under the particular (N 3171). "7
Here Kant lays down rules concerning the logic of quantification which
incorporate all three kinds of quantifiers. According to Kant, a
singular judgment follows from the universal but not in general from
the particular. This logic should be intuitively clear: from ’All
men are mortal’ it follows that ’n is mortal’, where ’n’ is the name
of any man, whereas such a judgment will not logically follow from a
particularly quantified judgment, ’Some men are intelligent’. The failure
of the singular to follow from the particular can be seen as a species
of the failure of the particular to imply in general a universal:
partiality does not imply exclusiveness. But particular quantification
is compatible with universal quantification, for the pax’ticular judg-
8
ment does not exclude tlie truth of the corresj)onding universal.
Kant fails to state tlie inference from singular judgments to
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one of particular quantification. But this inference can be
countenanced as valid by considering singular judgments in such
inferences as universal, as Kant claims singular judgments are to be
treated with regard to the theory of inference. Thus, the inference
from the singular to the particular is a species of subalternation.
Quantification, therefore, specifies the following formal relationships:
A. ) Universal and Singular: Exclusiveness - through the presence
of an extension
- through the abscence
of an extension
1.
) From the universal singularity follows
2. ) From a singular judgment one of universal quantification
can be expressed (N 3080: ”Gott ist ohne fehler. Alles.
Gott ist, ist ohne fehler.!')
^
B. ) Particular : Partiality
1. ) From exclusiveness partiality follows
(Partiality, therefore, means at least one and possibly all)
2.
) From partiality no form of exclusiveness logically follows.
II. 3 and III.l will present further development of the Kantian theory
of quantification.
§ 2 - Quality and the Copula
In the meantime, it is necessary to develop Kant's theory of
the logical functions of Quality and the copula to complete the theory
of the traditional categorical judgments. My procedure will be to
present these functions as discrete logical functions and then to
show how they are to be incorporated into the formal representation
of a complete judgment.
Only the affirmative and negative forms of Quality need to be
considered; infinite quality will be considered in III. 2. To represent
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these fo^s I shall use and >~^-the former being the sign of
affirmation; the latter, the sign of negation which must be distin-
guished, as we shall see, from the truth -functional tilde of the
modern, propositional calculus. The unities of these functions are:
II. 2.1. UNITY OF QUALITY
-(A, B) = B is affirmed of A
~(A, B) = B is denied of A.
§ 22 of the Logik presents Kant’s definition of affirmation and denial:
In the affirmative judgment the subject is thought under
the sphere of the predicate, in the negative it is posited
outside of the sphere of the predicate.^
Thus the thought of affirmation is the inclusion of the subject under
the predicate. On the other hand, denial is the exclusion of the
subject from the predicate. Affirmative quality, then, provides a
means of conceiving of the subject by locating it within the sphere,
or extension, of another concept. In this sense affirming one concept
of another provides a determination of the second concept. Thus,
affirmation is a means of specifying in some detenninate manner by
means of a concept the knowledge that can be had of another concept.
Negative quality provides the opposite thought: no determination of
the subject is made, for the thought of negation is the placing of the
subject outside of the sphere of the predicate.
In a judgment quality must function with respect to a
quantitative relationship between the subject and predicate, for the
logical functions of Quality yield the thouglit of wliether the quanti-
tative comparison is made affirmatively or negatively. Thus the grammar




where is a quantifier.
However, to express the unity which results, Kant’s logic
requires a copula, for it is only by means of the copula that rela-
tionships between concepts can be expressed at all in a categorical
judgment.
In the categorical judgment the subject and predicate
constitute the matter of the judgment; the form, through
which the relation (of agreement or opposition) between
the subject and predicate is expressed and determined
is the copula
( Logik, § 24). 10
’
As the copulative function I shall use the functor ’(is)’. The copula
makes the distinction between subject and predicate in a judgment:
the expression ’(is)(A, B)’ is meant to designate A as the subject
and B as the predicate of a comparison.
Tables II. 1.1 and II. 2.1 take the liberty of expressing the
unities of the respective functors by means of a subject - predicate
relcitionship . Technically, though, no thought of copulation is taken
with regard to these functions in Kant’s logic. For Kant, copulation
in the categorical judgment is a special thought, not included in
Quantity and Quality, which must be yielded by its own logical functor.
The problem is. What is this special thought added by the copula? What
more is added to the quantitative/qualitative comparison by the copu-
lative functor?
P. T. Geach, following Frege’s theory of predication, maintains
tliat the copula is not a separate piece of logical apparatus but really
a grammatical part of tlie predicate. But how we consider the copula
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in logic depends upon our theory of predication. Frege imbedded the
copula into the predicate in order to explain predication as a
function whose domain is objects and whose range is a truth-value.
In this theory, the predicate is expressed by means of an "empty
space" so as to require completion of its sense by an argument
referiing to elements in the range; for example, ’...is red’, however,
another theory of predication would require of different means of
treating the copula. If concepts are considered terras, as they are
in Kant’s logic, then one might wish to follow J. S. Mill in callinc.
the copula "the sign of Predication’’13 in v^hich case it becomes part
of the logical apparatus of the judgment.
The principal difficulty of this alternative is that of
defining the relation of predication. Those who hold that the copula
is not a logical constant, will argue that the copula "has no special
content" (Geach, p. 34) and thus fails to express any relation at all.
Mill himself leaves us unsatisfied on this point. Since we have only
one copula, the same relation of predication should occur in both sin-
gular and generally quantified judgments. Yet Mill’s view of conno-
tative concepts (names that denote objects and imply an attribute) lays
the foundation for distinguishing "direct predication" in a singular
judgment from "indirect predication" in generally quantified judg-
ments.^'^ Predication in a singular judgment means that the individual
denoted by the subject possesses the attribute connoted by the pre-
dicate; whereas predication in generally quantified judgments is a
formal relationship between two connotative concepts in which it is
said that objects possess an attribute only in virtue of their
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possession of another attribute.
Nevertheless, I believe we can find a hint in Kant as to the
thought that is expressed by the copula of any Judgment. In the
Critique (B626) Kant writes.
Being
. . . is merel^^ the positing of a thing or of
certain determination as existing fas such]. Logically
It IS merely the copula of a judgment.
® ^
The small word ’is’ . . . only serves to posit the
predicate in its relation to the subject.
We may think of the positing expressed by the copula as a unifying act
which places concepts in subject-predicate relation in the conscious-
ness of the judger. Hence, we may define copulation as:
II. 2. 2. UNITY OF THE COPULA
(is)(A, B) = A as subject—B as predicate is posited
(Tlie double hyphen, ’ ’, shall be used to express the unity of
judgments under Relation. The meaning of the resulting relation will
be contained in the explanation of how the elements of the judgment
are posited. ) The copulative unity of positing concepts in a subject-
predicate relation is the act of thinking them in a relation of agree-
ment or opposition. To posit Ball as subject—^Red as predicate is to
think of these concepts in agreement or opposition with regard to a
possible object of a cognition.
Positing in a judgment must conform to logical principles of
the agreement or opposition among concepts. In his formal logic, Kant
lays down three such principles
.
(1) The Principle of Contradiction: no positing (or
cognition) can contain that which is self-
contradictory.
33
Compliance with this principle determines the logical possibility, or
possihjjn^ of the truth, of a subject-predicate relation; no
positing is even logically possible which contains an agreement or
opposition that is self-contradictory. If the connection between the
concepts in a cognition is possible, then there is at least the
formal possibility of the truth or correspondence of the cognition
with its object. Secondly,
(2) The Principle of Sufficient Reason: logically a
cognition is actual (true) if, and only if, (a) it
rests upon grounds and (b ) it has no false conse-
quences.
This piinciple concerns the reasonableness of the cognition in its
connection with other cognitions and with its own consequences.
According to Kant, we can reason from the truth of a hypothetical
ground to the truth of the cognition as its consequent. However, we
cannot reason conversely; rather, we can reason from the falsity of a
cognition to the falsity of its ground. Compliance with this principle
determines the logical actuality, or forma 1 truth, of the positing of
t\^7o concepts in its logical relationship to other cognitions. This
principle determines the truth of the comparison only from a formal
or logical perspective, but not necessarily from the perspective of
its correspondence with its object. It says only that on the basis
of certain hypotheses we are justified in positing the two concepts
in a subject -predicate relation.
Finally,
(3) The Principle of the Excluded Middle: necessarily
a cognition is true if, and only if, its contradictory
is false.
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This principle dictates that the positing of concepts is necessary
if the contradiction of this agreement or opposition is (hnown to he)
false. Through this principle the truth of the posited agreement or
opposition is provon
:
The third principle is the excluded middle: since throughtne talsity of the opposite truth is proven (N 2178). 16
Thus, by this principle we establish the formal necessity of the truth
of the cognition and of its actual truth or correspondence with its
object.
The copula, thus, is the function through which the conformity
of a connection of concepts with logical principles of agreement or
opposition is expressed. Copulation means that at least the connection
contains nothing self-contradictory; though we may later determine that
the connection is logically actual (conforms to the principle of
sufficient reason) or even necessary (conforms to the principle of
the excluded middle). It is obvious, moreover, that positing concepts
in a subject—predicate relation takes place with regard to quantitative/
qualitative comparison of these concepts. The copula itself, though,
is most intimately connected with functions of Quality, for in virtue
of affirmation agreement in a quantitative comparison of a subject and
predicate is determined; and in virtue of negation (denial) opposition
in a quantitative comparison is determined. Hence, we may speak of
an affirmative copula or a negative copula, and represent their
grammar as
(is)0(/(A, B)),
where ’0’ is a function of Quality and ’0’, as above, is a quantifier.
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We can now formulate explicitly the distinct logical role of
copulation in a judgment: Copulation can be thought of in a manner
parallel to the process of changing a propositional function into a
proposition in the predicate calculus. A propositional function is
neither true nor false but becomes a proposition (an expression that
may be either true or false) through quantification. Copulation
provides an analogous role in Kant’s logic, for when a quantitative
qualitative comparison is posited in accordance with the formal
principles of agreement or opposition, we can speak of the possibility
of its truth (correspondence with its object) or falsity. A mere
quantitative/qualitative comparison cannot.be thought of as true or
false unless it is at least posited in accordance with the formal
principle of possibility.
These five logical functions combine to provide the following
analysis of the traditional A, E, I, 0 categorical judgments.
II. 2. 3. UNITY OF THE CATEGORICALS
A: (is)-(y(A, B)) = B is affirmed of all of the extension of A
(All A ’ s are B ’s
)
E: (is)~(V(A, B)) = B is denied of all of the extension of A
(No A ’s are B ’s )
I: (is)-(^(A, B)) = B is affirmed of some of the extension of A
(Some A ’s are B 's )
0: (is)~(^(A, B)) = B is denied of some of the extension of A
(Some A’s are not B’s)
One notes that each of the A, E, I, 0 categoricals contains the logical
function it is alleged to possess in virtue of its traditional classi-
fication. For instance, the universal affirmative is constructed from
the universal quantifier and affirmative copula; tlie particular nega-
tive, from tile particular quantifier and negative copula.
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Witli regard to the subject-predicate relation that is posited
in these judgments, the immediate inferences of conversion, or the
interchange of subject and predicate, becomes po sible. In §§ 51-53
of the Logik, these inferences are presented in their traditional
form which may be formalized as follows
:
(^. si^cito 1) (is)~(V(A, B))—>(is)~(V(B, A))
(Conv. simpliciter 2) (is)-(q(A, B)) >(is)-(<^(B, A))
(Conv. per a ccidens
) (is)-(y(A^ B)) >(is)-(<q(B, A)).
Furthermore, we can state the relations of the traditional
Square of Opposition for the A, E, I, 0 categoricals (Logik, §§ 47-50).
II. 2.4. SQUARE OF OPPOSITION
(is)-(^(A, B))— subcontraries —-(is )~(C|(A, B)).
Kant restores the distinctly Aristotelian notion of opposition
developed in ^ Interpretatione . Opposition concerns the way in
which truth and falsity can be opposed to each other v^ith regard to
tvs?o proposition in virtue of their formal relations. Boethius added
the vertical lines, the lines representing subalternation, to the
Square of Opposition. But subalternation is not a relation of oppo-
sition in the Aristotelian-Kantian sense, for subaltemation pertains
to two true judgments.
These relations give rise to the following immediate inferences
with respect to the trutli and falsity of tlie categorical judgments:
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(a) from the truth of one contrar'
the other;
y one can infer the falsity of
(b) from the falsity of one subcontrary
of the other;
one can infer the truth
(c) from the truth or falsity of one contra
the opposite truth value for the other.
dictory one can infer
Kant s theoiy of logical functions allows us to state the formal
relations of opposition in a purely syntactical manner
(ii) Subcontrary judgments result through interchanging the
function of Quality in particular judgments;
(iii) Contradictory judgments result through interchanging both
the quantifier and the function of Quality in judgments.
From this formulation of the Square of Opposition we see that
for Kant negation is not truth-functional, for with regard to universal
judgments it produces only a contrary and with regard to particular
judgments it produces only a subcontrary. This, of course, is not to
say that the sign of negation functions ambiguously, for in both
instances the meaning of negation is similar (11.2,1), The nontruth
functional character of negation derives from Kant’s use of negation
in a sense which attaches to the copula. Aristotle once noted that
by affixing negation to the copula one does not produce the contra-
dictory of a universal proposition, but only its contrary (De Interp .,
7, 17^ 26-36). Frege once contended, on the other hand, that negation
properly applies to the quantifier; however, lie had in mind proposi-
tional or truth-functional negation. Kant’s meaning of negation as
merely exclusion is a non -propositional sense of negation that provides
an explication of how negation functions within the internal structure
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of E and 0 categoricals.
The truth-functional sense of negation is attained by Kant
only through a change of both Quality and Quantity in a judgment.
We now turn to the problem of whether the immediate inferences
presented in II. 1 and .2 are valid for the Kantian logical functions.
The mere correspondence of these functions with such words as 'all’,
’is’, and ’not’ cannot serve to justify the validity of these infer-
ences. As modern logic amply makes clear, these inferences can fail
for another set of logical constants which are associated with the
same words. Take, for instance, subalternation: According to the
modern theory of quantification, one cannot infer an existential
proposition of the fonn (Ex) (Ax & Bx) from a universal proposition,
(x)(Axx:Bx). Similar failures can be observed with regard to con-
trariety and subcontrariety on the Square of Opposition. Since these
failuies can be traced to modern logic’s theory of quantification, the
investigation of this problem will, not surprisingly, involve Kant’s
conception of quantification.
§ 3 — The Meaning of Quantification and the Theory of Extension
Kant’s theoiy of quantification cannot be identified with
either the theory of distribution or the medieval theory of supposition.
Tlie theory of distribution is not even a theory of quantification; it
is a theory about the nature of temns in a proposition. In this sense
the tlieory is about the matter a content of a judgment rather than
about the relation or form bet\s?een the judgment’s terms.
A consideration of tlie difference between Kant’s theory of
I
quantification and the medieval theory of supposition is more important
owing to the reawakened interest in the medieval doctrine. According
to this doctrine, 19 supposition concerns how one verifies that the
predicate is true of the subject in a proposition. The quantification
of the proposition is alleged to indicate the mode of supposition.
For instance^
B(some A) is true if, and only if, B(ai) v B(a,) v B(a,) v
. . . j
where is the name of an object which is A.
’B(some A)’ is said to "descend to" a series of disjuncts in virtue
of the quantifier ’some'. This mode of supposition was called
determinate supposition." Other modes can be defined for B(any A),
which descends to a series of conjuncts, and, as Geach shows, for the
quantifiers 'a' and ’every’ which descend to a single proposition
containing a list of disjoined and conjoined names respectively.
Because Kant recognizes only two quantifiers, his logic lacks
the sensitivity and subtle analysis which characterizes the logic of
the medievals. We fail to find in Kant the variety of subtle delin-
eation of quantification present in the medieval theory of supposition.
Furthermore, Kant would deny that a particular judgment is about aU
the objects falling within the extension of the subject. A particular
judgment would not "descend to" a list of singular propositions
employing the names of all those things comprising the extension of
the subject, for the particular judgment relates the predicate to only
some of this extension.
Finally, Kant’s theory of quantification cannot be compared
to a theory of reference, in terms of which Geach has understood the
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medieval theory. Kant’s theory concerns only the ’’comparison” of
concepts in a judgment.
Kant himself never explicitly stated a theory of the nature
of this comparison. We must reconstruct his theory of quantification
from contexts involving related notions, most importantly from his
theory of extension. One formal requirement is placed upon such a
reconstruction: It must provide for the validity of such immediate
inferences as subalternation, syllogistic inferences, and the relations
of Opposition.
When combined in a judgment with a function of Quality,
quantification places the whole or part of the extension of the
subject within/without the extension of the predicate. Kant’s terms
for extension’ are ’ Sphare ’ and ’ Umfang ’ . The former may be trans-
lated as ’sphere’ or ’domain’; the latter, literally as ’compass’.
We m.ay think of the compass of a concept on the analogy of an enclosed
area defined by the concept. Kant was aware of the Euler method of
diagramming A, E, I, 0 categoricals, in which concepts are represented
by circles, and in N 3215 he presents such diagrams:
The problem remains, though, of making Kant’s notion of the




Each concept, as a par^ concept
, is encompassed in therepresentation of things; ar^l^und of cognition, that
s as a m^ [notaj, these things are encompassed under
I
• first respect, each concept has a content; inthe second, a compass.
Content and compass of a concept stand in inverse relation-the more a concept encompassed under itself the .less it
encompassed within itself, and conversely
’
COMMLl^T. The universality of concepts rests upon the
concept’s being a ground of cognition rather than a
partial concept . 20
This succinct passage is not easy to understand. Kant
associates two sets of concepts with every concept. The first, called
the concept’s content, consists of all those concepts which make up
and define the given concept itself. These concepts may he thought
of as the concepts of a species -differentia definition. The second
set, or compass, of a concept consists of all those concepts which
have the given concept in common; that is, whose content contains the
given concept. Kant speaks of these concepts as being encompassed
under the given concept. By being contained within the concepts under
it, the given concept is considered a partial concept
; it is partial
in the sense that it makes up part of the conceptual wholeness of
those concepts in its compass.
The concept Man is a partial concept of a number of other
conceptual representations, for example, of Caucasian and Negro. The
concept Man, thus, is encompassed within these concepts as part of
their content. The concept Man itself, on the other hand, has as
its content the concepts Rational and Animal. Furthermore, those
concepts in \\?hich tlie concept Man is encompassed—Caucasian and Negro
—
are said to be encompassed under the concept Man, or to fall within
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the compass of the concept Man,
The following diagram illustrates these relationships:
C B
In this diagram the balloons represent the compass of a concept, while
’=df' specifies the content of each concept. Thus, v^hen concepts
D, E, and F encompass a common concept, A, as part of their content,
they themselves are encompassed under that common concept. In terras
of the previous example, A is tlic concept Man, B and C are the concepts
Animal and Rational, and D and E are concepts Caucasian and Negro.
It is easy to see that tliis ordering takes place in accordance
with species and genera: Man (A) is a genus to the species D, E, and
F, while itself being a species to the genus B. According to Kant,
the species of a concept are encompassed under a concept as members
of that concept’s compass. This theory gives rise to a hierarchical
ordering of concepts and their extensions. Within this ordering, the
encompassing concept (the genus'' is called the higher concept with
respect to those falling witliin its extension, while the encompassed
concepts are lower concepts with respect to the given concept (Logik,
§9). A concept can be called liigher only with regard to those falling
under it, for it would be absurd to attempt to order hierarcliically
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two concepts which have nothing in common.
The "Comment” of I^g ik
,
§ 7 makes the point that in being a
ground of cognition, that is, in having an extension, a concept is
universal or general. The representation of many representations
under one representation constitutes the generality of a concept.
Indeed, according to Kant it is this very generality that makes some
representations conceptual representations rather than singular repre-
sentations or intuitions (l^ p. 904 ). 21 Thus, all representations
which are conceptual are common to a number of other representations.
It is, in other words, impossible to have a concept which is not at
the same time a genus to further concepts. Therefore, all conceptual
representations determine a compass.
The important notions in the preceding discussion can be
summarized through the following definitions and equivalences:
(Def. font.) the content of A =df. P(P is encompassed within A),
(Def. Ext.) the compass of A =df. f(P is encompassed under A),
B is encompassed under A = A is encompassed within B,
and finally,
B falls under A = B e ?(P is encompassed under A).
(To speak of a concept as falling under another is to say that the
former is a lower concept with respect to the former, or, conversely,
that the former is a lower concept with respect to the latter.
)
Furthermore, because of Kant's conception of the generality
of concepts, it is possible to guarantee that every concept has an
extension. This point, is explicitly stated in the student notes.




With all concepts we indicate the compass (Pol., p. 569).^^
Thus, we may state as an axiom of the Kantian theory of extension that,
|*”(A)(EP)(P is encompassed under A).
Before employing this theory of the extension of a concept
to elucidate the meaning of quantification, some points of contrast
between the modern theory of extension and the Kantian should be
noted. In the modern theory, the extension of a concept consists of
all those objects of which the concept is true. Kant on occasion,
apparently piesented a theory of extension that corresponds to the
modern theory. In the student notes one can find such definitions as
An extension is the compass of concepts and concerns the
set of things which are comprised under the concept ('WL
p. 911). 24
^ ’
To speak of a set of things is to move toward a modern
conception of extension. However, I believe this move is only apparent
two factor’s of Kant’s general philosophy prohibit it. First, Kant’s
conception of general logic as dealing with acts of the understanding
restricts the scope of logic to the level of conceptualization. Kant ’s
distinction between the understanding and intuition draws a gap between
concepts and the means by which an object is given in experience such
that a general logic can treat only the means of relating one concept
to another rather than the means of relating concepts to objects
themselves. The investigation of this step in cognition is a concern
of transcendental logic. Secondly, the notion of Object ( Ding )
required for its validity transcendental acts of syntliesis involving
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both conceptualization and a given manifold of Intuition from which
an object corresponding to the concept is synthesized. But such acts
are not treated by general logic. Hence, general logic cannot employ
that concept Object which, to do so, would be to presuppose trans-
cendental logic. Therefore, those passages in Kant which defines an
extension as a set of things must be read as meaning that an extension
is a set of conceptual representations of things.
The importance of this view upon the structure of quantification
IS that one cannot speak of ontological commitment with respect to
quantification. For Kant, the meaning of quantification is not
explicated in terms of what exists in a domain of objects as is com-
monly done in the modern theory of quantification. The Kantian
understanding of the nature of quantification is neutral as regards
questions of existence.
The Kantian theory, on the other hand concerns how the
predicate is "compared" with the concepts in the extension of the
subject. Kant formulated his understanding of quantification as ear]y
as the pre-critical period:
A Judgment is either:
a. Universal, where the predicate is compared with
all concepts which belong to the extension of the
subject; or
b. Where it is compared with only some, this is a
particular judgment (Phil., § SOl).^^
Consider the universal judgment that all cats are intelligent. To
compare the predicate to all concepts within the extension of tlie sub-
ject is to say that
All X’s are intelligent, where X can be any concept encompassed
under Cat.
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•All cate are intelligent' means 'All Siamese cats are intelligent,
all Persian cats are Intelligent, etc.' Particular quantification
can be similarly explained as,
’Some A is B’ means 'Some X's are B, where X is a conceptencompassed under B'. i
u r
In particular quantification the comparison is made with at least one
concept falling under the subject.
However, these explanations are imprecise. The required
precision is provided by reconstructing the Kantian theory of quanti-
fication in terms of a tl.eory of the truth-conditions for categorical
judgments employing quantification. Truth-conditions make explicit
the exact necessary and sufficient conditions under which a judgment
is counted as true. Kant's interest in the theory of truth of a
judgment lies in his theories of the copula and of modality (see IV. 1).
Perhaps he felt that his formulation of the theory of quantification
is sufficient to indicate the conditions under which the presence of
quantification makes a categorical true. The precise explication of
these conditions is, therefore, of crucial importance in explaining
what is being maintained when one constructs a true judgment employing
quantifiers
.
For convenience in formulating this reconstruction I shall
use a raeta -language whose names name sentences expressing tlie content
of a categorical judgment. The content of the judgment that all A's
are B's is expressed by tlie sentence 'All A's are B's'. I shall
restate the Kantian theory of quantification os a theory about the
truth-conditions of sentences which express the content of a categorical.
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To formulate this theory I require the following expression:
Sp
Spy sentence which results from replacing 'X' wherever it
occurs in the sentence
p^^
with the linguistic expression for (tile
concept) X. ’x’ in this expression is considered a variable open
to quantification.
By means of (T) we can formulate the meaning of quantification
in eacli of the categoricals as follows
:
II. 3.1. ANALYSIS OF QUANTIFICATION
’All A’s are B’s’ is true =
(x)(x is encompassed under A 3
’All X’s are B’s’
’No A’s are B’s’ is true =
(x)(x is encompassed under A
’Some A’s are B’s’ is true =




• w XJ LJ \j> xo Ci c
(Ex)(x is encompassed under A & C- is true)
t c
'
’Some A’s are not B’s’ is true =
(Ex)(x is encompassed under A &
1 1
Some X’s are B’s’
is true).
'Some X’s are not B’s’
Kant’s imprecise notion of comparison can be reconstructed as
a meta-linguistic theory of the possible kinds of substitutions that
can be made in sentences expression judgments. What matters in the
analysis is the kind of quantification that occurs with respect to the
possible substituends in the sentence. In this senssj universal
quantification is about all the concepts falling under the subject;
particular quantification is about a concept (at least one) falling
under this concept. This reconstruction reveals that quantification,
for Kant, is concerned with the limits to which substitutions can be
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made with respect to the original, afflntative or negative judgment
suoli tliat the judgment remains true. If all substitutions of the
linguistic expressions of concepts in the extension of the subject
can be made, the judgment is universal; if at least one can be made,
the judgment is particular.
The formal adequacy of this analysis of quantification can he
shov^n by proving the validity of the given immediate and syllogistic
inferences. The following proofs are abbreviated in the sense that
where similar reasoning applies mutandis rnutandi to negative judgments,
these proofs are omitted. In these proofs an insight into the truth
and falsity of judgments with regard to their Quality is presupposed.
(1) Subalternation. If all A’s are B's—that is, if the
linguistic expression for any concept falling under A can be substi-
tuted for 'X' in ’All X’s are B’s’, then it is obvious that the
linguistic expiession for ^ concept falling under A can be substituted.
But this is to say that some A’s are B’s. Hence, from the judgment
that all A’s are B’s we can infer that some A’s are B’s.
(2) Opposition. (a) Contrariety; if all A’s are B’s then
it is false thac no A’s are B’s, for if the linguistic expression for
any concept falling under A can be substituted for ’X’ in ’All X’s are
B’s’, then these same substitutions would make ’No X’s are B’s’ false.
Hence, from the truth of an A categorical we can infer the falsity
of the corresponding E. However, ’All A’s are B’s’ and ’No A’s are
B’s’ may both be false, for there it might occur that a concept
falling under A would make hotii ’All X’s are B’s’ and ’No X’s are
B’s’ hotli false wlien substituted for ’X’.
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(b) Subcontrariety: if it is false that some A's are B’s,
then there is a linguistic expression for a concept falling under A
which when substituted for ’X’ in ’Some X’s are B’s’ makes this
sentence false. This falsity may occur in either of two ways: first,
because there is at least one linguistic expression for a concept
falling under A which cannot be substituted, or because every
linguistic expression for concepts falling under A cannot be substi-
tuted. In the first case, this linguistic expression would make the
sentence ’Some X’s are not B’s’ true when substituted for ’X’; in
the second, ’No A’s are B’s’ is true from which it follows that some
A s aie not B’s by subalternation. It is obvious, moreover, that
both ’Some A’s are B’s’ and ’Some A’s are not B’s’ can be true at the
same time.
(c) Contradiction (I shall consider only the contradictory
relation between A and 0 categoricals ) : if all A’s are B’s then the
linguistic expression for any concept falling under A can be substi-
tuted for ’X’, which is to say that it is false that there is a
linguistic expression for a concept falling under A which cannot be
substituted for ’X’. But this is to say that it is false that some
A is not B. Similarly, if it is false that all A’s are B’s then it
follows that there is at least one (and perhaps all) linguistic expres-
sions for concepts falling under A which can be substituted for ’X’.
And this is to say that it is true that some A is not B. Furthermore,
it is easy to verify that the contradictory relationsliip between A
and 0 con be proven if we begin with the 0 categorical.
(3) The Syllogism. A proof of all syllogistic inferences need
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not be given, for it is known that the inferences countenanced by the
traditional doctrine of the syllogism are valid if the assumption is
made that the extension of the concepts occurring within tlie Inference
has members. This assumption, as we have seen (Ax. ) is part of the
Kantian theory of extension.
CHAPTER III
SINGULAR QUANTITY, INFINITE QUALITY, AND "COMPLEX" JUDGMENTS
^ 1 Logic of Singular Quantification
In II. 1, I introduced 'y' as a symbol for a singular quantifier,
but omitted a formal treatment of singular quantification. I presented
only the logical grounds for distinguishing the quantitative compari-
sons of generally quantified and singular judgments and an informal
statement of the logic of singular quantification with respect to
universal and particular quantification.
1. Singular Quantification . Kant defines the special
connection in a singular judgment as one in which "a concept which has
no extension is included as a part within the extension of the predi-
cate (see II. 1). A concept is used in a judgment without an extension
when it is not related to any concepts \^?hich may fall under it. This
use occurs when it refers to just one object, an individual. Judgments
of singular quantification, then, can include those expressed by means
of a proper name or those which use a general concept to refer to just
one individual instance of that concept. Judgments expressed by
sentences containing a proper name comply with the definition of sin-
gular quantification, for proper names do not encompass an extension
in the Kantian sense but refer to an individual (Ij^, p. 931).^





^ concept can be singular. For what holdsvalid of many things can be applied in an individual
case. I think to myself a man in individuo, that is
I use the concept Man in order to hi^^TT-single entity.
In my judgment I can compare the thing with all someand one individual thing (WL, p. 908).^
^ ^
One may employ the (general) concepts A and B to form the following
judgments: All A is B, Some A is B, or, An/This A is B. In the last
case, we encompass by our judgment only an individual instance of A
rather than referring to the compass of A either in whole or in part
Some recent commentators have noted that for Kant singular judgments
may take the form of 'Tliis A is B’ or ’An A is B’.^
However, ’a' and ’an’ present a formal difficulty as singular
quantifiers. in Kant’s logic. Kant denies (see II. 1) that singular
judgments follow from particular judgments, yet ’An A is B’ legiti-
mately follows from ’Some A is B’. The point is this: Kant cannot
consistently maintain that singular judgments are to be treated as
universal in inferences and maintain that ’a’ and ’an’ are singular
quantifiers. Universal judgments do not follovv? from particular judg-
ments but ’an’ does follow from ’some’. Since ’a’ and ’an’ mean
’’any one of a class", it seems plausible to treat ’An A is B’ as
particular in quantification.
On the other hand, ’this’ can carry tlie burden of this formal
requirement of singular quantification, for while following from a
universal judgment, ’This A is B ' does not logically follow from the
particular. Indeed, in N 3173 Kant gives "Diese Welt ist die beste"
as an example of a singular judgment.
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A logical grammar for judgments of the form ’This A is B’
parallels the grammar already developed for quantifiers in II. 1:
7(A, B).
Although 'this’ IS generally understood as a demonstrative rather
than as a quantifier, v;e can construe the judgment that this A is
B as containing the quantitative comparison: x is compared with this
one y. This relation is a comparison of singular quantification, for
no thought of an extension of y is taken. Moreover, in this compari-
son, since x is compared with y in only one instance, y is included
in X only as a part of the whole extension with which x may be quanti-
tatively compared. Hence, the unity of singular quantification is
111. 1.1. UNITY OF SINGULAR QUANTIFICATION
*7 (A, B) = B is compared with this one A.
Since singular quantification does not involve the tliought of
an extension, the kind of analysis appropriate for generally quantified
judgments (II. 3.1) fails to apply to this form. Singular judgments
are fundamental in the sense that the predicate is compared with no
further concepts within the extension of the subject. Thus, an
analysis of singular quantification would have to restrict the possible
substituends for the subject in the sentence which expresses the judg-
ment to just that subject itself.
111. 1.2. ANALYSIS OF SINGULAR QUANTIFICATION
’This A is B’ is true = (x)(x = A 3 Q v„,-u . ^ r, , is true)
(This analysis allows for the possible substitution of linguistic
expressions for concepts definitional equivalent to A. ) The formal
adequacy of this analysis is shown in that III. 1.2 serves to prove
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the difference ln_ auantlflcatlon that we observed with regard to
Kant’s three quantifiers in the relationships of opposition, for




the immediate inferences governing ’y’, stated only
informally in II. 1, may now receive their formial statement.
All singulars are contained under the universal (N 3171 )•
V(A, B) >7(A, B);
Suhalternation when the singular is taken as a universal;
7 (A, B) >q(A, B).
2. Tl^ Problem of Proper Names . However, most of Kant’s
examples of singular judgments employ proper names^ rather than the
demonstrative ’this’. For Kant, proper names express individual
concepts. But the formal representation of judgments containing
individual concepts involve a problem concerning the relationship
betw’een the singular quantifier and individual concepts.
Ihe problem begins when v^e attempt to account for the immediate
inferences that a logic of singular judgments should be able to treat.
A singular follows from the universal and implies a particular:
All men are mortal >Socrates is mortal.
Socrates is wise >Some men are wise.
Moreover, we must prohibit the inference
Socrates is wise >A11 men are wise,
while maintaining that ’Socrates is wise’ can be interpreted
as the universal judgment that everytliing which is Socrates
is wise.
The question is, How does an individual concept function grammatically
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in a judgment? I shall argue that Kant falls to provide a satisfactory
treatment of singular quantification and individual concepts which
permits the formalization of these inferences.
Throughout his lectures, Kant speaks of an individual concept
as a c oncept^ singularly or singular concept. This association, while
being ohvious, is paradoxical, for concepts by nature possess an
extension (II. 3); that is, they represent that which is common to many
representations. But a singular concept cannot be common to many
representations. Kant vjas not unaware of this paradox, for in the
Politz notes we find,
It is an error in logic when one supposes general, particular,
and individual concepts, for there are no such things. How-
^
ever, the use of concepts can be so divided. Accordingly, we
shall not divide concept but rather judgments in this way,
because they are relations of concepts, for I can compare^a
concept with another entirely, or only in some part, or only
in one individual part. However, this error is already so
widespread that we cannot avoid it (Pol.
, p. 567).
^
Technically there is no such thing as an individual concept; rather,
a concept can be individual only within a judgment of singular quanti-
fication. The question is, therefore. Can a logic of singular
quantification account for the logical peculiarities of an individual
concept? Only if this question is answered affirmatively can Kant
legitimately maintain that there is no need for singular concepts as
independent elements in logic, and that it is an error to consider them
as such.
To reconstruct a theory of individual concepts in terms of
singular quantification let us construe the singular quantifier as a
function \N?liich takes concepts singularly as arguments and yields the
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thought involved in an individual concept. (This liberty, since
speaking of individual concepts is an "unavoidable error.")
Singularity, then, as applied to a concept is supposed to yield the
thought of one and only one;
(1) (7A) the one and only A.
However, treating concepts as individual in this manner fails, for
the thought of the one and only thing which A does not necessarily
constitute an individual concept. Consider the concept Natural Satel-
lite of the Earth, NS. ’(7NS)’ is the concept of the one and only
natural satellite of the Earth, which is the thought of a general con-
cept VN'hich happens to be exemplified by just one object. For this
reason it is not an individual concept of that object, for an individual
concept is essentially true of one and only one object.
The problem does not lie in the functor of (1), but in its
argument. In (I ), the burden of essentially being true of only one
object must be carried by the concept A itself: The concept A must
be such that it describes only one object in virtue of its own content.
Quine recognizes this point when, in speaking of singular tenns of the
form ’(9x)Fx’, he says that tlie predicate which stands in tlie place of
’F’ "very frequently needs supplementary clauses to narrow it down to
the point of being true of only one object."^
Quine’s point makes the fundamental and independent character
of individual concepts clear. If ’A’ is "narrowed dovv’n" in its content
to the point of being true of only one object, then it already functions
as an individual concept; and thus it becomes superfluous to incorporate
singular quantification on its behalf to make it singular. If, on the
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other hand, concepts are not so "narrowed down", then no amount of
treating general concepts with singular quantification will provide
an individual concept. Thus, the "unavoidable error" of considering
concepts to be singular apart from their position in a (singular)
judgment turns out to be more unavoidable than it is an error.
To account for singular judgments employing an individual
concept, these concepts must be introduced as items of the logic. For
this purpose we shall use the small, Roman letters, ’a’, ’b’, ’c’,
etc. ihe singular judgment would be represented by:
(2) 7(a, B
)
- B is compared with (this one) a.
The plirase 'this one’ is superfluous, for there is only one thing
named by ’a’. Nevertheless, it would be too hasty to conclude that
the singular quantifier itself is superfluous. Because a singular
concept has no extension, the quantitative comparison betv'^een a general
concept and an individual concept is just that the individual concept
is compared a^ a part with the general concept. It is included in the
extension of the predicate as a part of it. Hence, singular judgments
containing individual concepts still involve a quantitative comparison
expressed by . As we have seen, "part" does not mean the same as
particularity in a generally quantified judgment, for subcontrariety
cannot be defined for it.
But, the problem with (2) is that it fails to reveal the
intimate connection between a judgment employing an individual concept
and singular quantification. This intimate relation bet^^^een individual
concepts and singular quantification reveals itself in the formal logic
of singular/immediate inferences.
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Singular-immediate inferences become possible through treating
the individual concept in relation with the general concepts under
which the name may be said to fall. For instance, the inference from
'Socrates is wise' to ’Some men are wise’ can be accounted for on the
grounds that by including the individual concept expressed ’Socrates’
as a part within the compass of the concept Wise, we include m part
the concept Man under which this individual concept is encompassed.
On similar grounds, any singular judgment containing an individual
concept falling under a given general concept can be inferred from a
universal judgment employing that concept as its subject. Finally,
the inference from 'Socrates is wise' to 'All men are wise' is pro-
hibited, for the concept Man is not included iii^ its entiretv within
the compass of Wise in virtue of only the individual concept of
Socrates's inclusion in this compass.
Ihe point is that the formal logic of singular judgments
employing an individual concept involves more than simply an operation
with quantifying functions themselves. The logical function of singu-
lar quantification itself in such a judgment operates intimately with
the individual concept employed in the judgment. A judgment employing
an individual concept can be nothing but a singular judgment; whereas
a judgment employing general concepts can be universal, particular or
singular. But Kant's treatment of the singular quantifier in the same
manner that quantifiers are treated in generally quantified judgments
obscures this aspect of formal logic of singular judgments.
I have argued in this section that Kant cannot maintain that
individual concepts can be treated adequately by means of (general)
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concepts and a function of singular quantification within a singular
judgment, that individual concepts are fundamental In logic. However,
once individual concepts are Introduced, then to account for the
special, formal logic of singular judgments one must use more than
a function which serves to represent singular judgments employing
general concepts.
3 . T1i£ Injterrelationship of Universal and Singular Judgments .
Although Kant distinguishes beti^een universal and singular quantifi-
cation as logical functions of judgments, he claims that certain
interrelationships exist hetiveen the judgments that they yield. This
point is independent of the problems Kant incurs with respect to
singular-immediate inferences of judgments employing individual concepts
for these interrelationship depend upon the analysis of universal and
singular quantification, II. 3.1 and III. 1.2.
In his notes, Kant writes.
The singular judgment can be considered the same as the
universal, and conversely, a universal judgment can be
considered as a singular judgment in respect to its sphere.
Many, considered in itself, is a unity, a one-ness (N 3068 ).’^
The importance of this passage lies in this: Although singular and
universal quantification are logically distinct forms of quantification,
in certain respects it is possible to characterize the one in terms of
the distinct, independent definition, or analysis, of the other. What
makes this reciprocal characterization possible is the common element
of exclusiveness involved in the unities of eacli judgment. While
exclusiveness is involved in the analysis of universal and singular
quantification, it differs in the two judgments. The exclusiveness of
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the universal (II. 3.1) allows no linguistic expression for a concept
falling under the subject to bo omitted as a possible substituond in
’All X is B’, while the exclusiveness of the singular (III. .1.2)
consists in the suhstitutahility of just the linguistic expression
for the subject itself in the sentence expressing the judgment.
We can show the adequacy of our analyses of singular and
universal quantification by mirroring Kant's proposed inter-
characterization of the two forms in terms of these analyses. The
proof that the universal can be considered as singular with respect
to its (the subject’s) compass should be obvious. By universal
quantification we mean that the predicate B is compared with any
concept X falling under the subject A. In this way we take into the
comparison the totality of what is A. But if we considerj as Kant
suggests, A as a unity, then that totality of A is just A itself.
Hence, we may think of the universal judgment as comparing B with A
itself, which is the analysis of singular quantification.
On the other hand, Kant maintains that for the treatment of
singular judgments in syllogistic inferences, the singular judgment
is to be treated as universal to account for valid syllogistic
inferences. Why must singular judgments be considered as anything
other than singular in an inference? The answer to this question is
that syllogistic inference concerns the quantitative/qualitative
comparison of three extensions in order to determine the validity of
the inference to the conclusion. But the singular judgment eliminates
the extension of its subject. Thus, in order to corporate singular
judgments into syllogistic inferences, tlie singular judgment must be
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treated as if it possessed an extension.
Kant claims that the singular judgment can he compared to the
universal in this respect, because in both judgments the predicate
IS compared with the subject in such a way that no exception is
permitted or is possible (B96, & p. 931). In the universal the
predicate is compared with the entire extension of the subject, hence
no exception to this comparison is permitted, and in the singular the
predicate is compared with just the subject itself, where an exception
would be impossible. We can mirror this characterization of the
singular judgment in terras of the universal through the reverse steps
of the argument presented above. Since the linguistic expression for
A is the only permitted substituend for X in 'This X is B', we can
consider A only with respect to its totality in the singular judgment.
But this totality of A is the compass of A in its entirety. Thus, in
so far as we consider the singular judgment as possessing an extension,
it seems legitimate to consider it as universal. I shall return to
this argument in concluding this section.
Kant's thesis is that when a singular judgment appears in a
syllogism we count the singular quantifier as a universal. If a
valid syllogism results thought this substitution, then the original,
singular inference is also valid.
Quine has asserted that considering singular judgments as
universals if "artificial but not incorrect" (p. 78). It is
interesting to note, in defense of Quine’s contention, that the argu-
ment for considering singular judgments to have an extension for
their treatment in tlie syllogism could support the opposite conclusion;
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namely, that singular inferences belong to a class by themselves,
because of the special features of a singular judgment. Indeed, these
special features originally dictated the introduction of a distinct
logical function of judgment to express the logical form of singular
judgments. The view that singular judgments singular inferences
deserve special treatment was taken by the sixteenth-century logician
Peter Ramus. ^ Thus, Kant might have pursued even further the con-
sequences of the logical distinction between universal and singular
judgments, which he perceived and formulated, to the point of
recognizing a fundamental difference in the character of singular-
syllogistic inference. Nevertheless, this further step is not
logically necessary, for the treatment of singulars as universals
is a defensible procedure. However, the question is. How crucia] is
this consideration for a theory of singular-syllogistic inference?
The procedure turns out to be trivial for those syllogisms
which immediately come to mind; namely, those syllogistic inferences
employing singular judgments as minor premiss and conclusion, as in.
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.
Since proper names cannot appear as the predicate of any judgment,
this kind of inference can occur only in the first and second figures
of the syllogism
:







But now consider the valid moods of tliese figures:
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Figure: AAA, EAE, All, EIO
2nd Figure: EAE, AEE, EIO, AOO.
If we consider singular judgments as universal, that is, as A and
E categoricals, then the first ti^o moods of these figures represent
valid singular inferences. But if we consider singular judgments
ds I and 0, that is as particular, then the last ti^o moods will
represent valid singular inferences. Thus, the claim that singular
judgments function as universals serves no purpose, for one attains
the same results by considering them to be particular.
No other singular inferences are possible with regard to tlie





for the proper name would have to occur once as the predicate no matter
whether it is the major, minor or middle term.
The only place where it is important to consider singulars as




Here singular inference can occur only if the middle term is a proper
name, as in the medieval syllogismus expositorious :
Socrates is running.
Socrates is white.
.•. A white thing is running.
Here the premisses must be considered as universal, for no syllogism
is valid witli two particular premisses. Previously we have seen that
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’a’ Is to be considered particular; thus, this Inference becomes AAI,
3 vsXid mood in ihis figurG,
However, Kant’s logic of singular quantification is designed
best to reveal the logical form of the judgment that this A is B.
If we consider judgments of this type, an interesting paradox arises.
Kant’s thesis countenances some further possible singular inferences
in the Third Figure which are, it turns out, invalid.
Some cats are intelligent.
This cat is sly.
Some sly things are intelligent.
This cat is intelligent.
Some cats are sly.
Some sly things are intelligent.
These inferences become, respectively, lAI and All, both valid moods
of this figure. But consider the first argument. Boots may be a cat
who is sly but not intelligent. And it is certainly true that some
cats are intelligent. But from these t\^o premisses the conclusion
does not necessarily follov^7. Hence, the thesis that singulars can
be treated as universals is acceptable with respect to judgments
expressed by proper names, but these judgments are not adequately
treated as regards their form by Kant’s theory of singular quantifi-
cation. On the other hand, this same thesis is unacceptable with
respect to those judgments which are most easily treated by the theory
of singular quantification.
Kant’s argument that singular judgments can be treated as
universals is valid only for singular judgments expressed by proper
names. Even though tlie subject concept of all singular judgments is
considered witliout an extension, and tlius tlieir quantification is
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exclusive, the singular judgment still refers to an individual. In
singular judgments expressed by a proper name one and only one indi-
vidual is referred to; however, in judgments of the form ’This A is
K’, there are many other individuals which are A than the one referred
to. Thus, an exclusiveness with regard to reference occurs in the
former which is absent from the latter. Moreover the validity of
treating singular judgments as universals depends upon this referential
exclusiveness, for the comparison of the singular judgment to the
universal can take place only if there is a true exclusiveness with
regard to v.’hether the judgment is about an extension or an individual.
Kant s error lies in his overlooking that exclusiveness in judgments
is not just a matter of the presence or abscence of an extension of
conceptual representations (see II. 1 & *3), but is also a matter of
what is ultimately referred to by the judgment. In this matter,
judgments of the form ’This A is B’ are best compared to particular
judgments.
To summarize: Kant provides a logically successful account
of the difference in logical form between generally and singularly
quantified judgments only in the sense that he can explicate grounds
for introducing a singular quantifier. These grounds for maintaining
that a different quantitative relation in universal and singular
judgments lie in distinguishing these judgments in the relations of
opposition. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that Kant penetrated deep
enough into the differences in logical form between singular judgments,
especially those expressed by means of a proper name, and generally
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quantified judgments. In the first place, Kant fails to account
adequately for the unique logic of singular judgments with respect to
generally quantified judgments. Secondly, Kant’s account of singular-
syllogistic inference is paradoxical. Undoubtedly, Kant’s analyses
of universal and singular quantification is sufficient to justify
the interrelationships he claims to exist between these forms of
quantification, but his analyses falls too short for them to be of
value in his treatment of syllogistic inference.
§ 2 - The Infinite Judgment: An Alleged Subtlety in General Logic
1. The Unity ^ Infinite Judgment . Kant classifies as
infinite judgments those containing an affirmative copula and a
negative predicate, as ’All souls are non—mortal’. The special
characteristic of this kind of judgment is that negation affects only
the predicate.^
In the Critique Kant characterizes the unity of the infinite
judgment as follows,
These judgments, though infinite in respect to their logical
extension, are, thus, in respect of the content of their
knowledge, limitative only (B98).
This dual characterization of the infinite judgment as infinite in one
respect and limitative in another is, to my knowledge, original with
Kant. In classifying judgments as infinite, both Kant and Meier have
in mind judgments which Aristotle referred to as containing ’’inde-
finite terms”, or negative terms. Boethius was tlie first to introduce
the term ’infinite’ for these terms, but tiiis was probably as a
mistranslation of Aristotle. Kant, in liis tlieory of the infinite
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judgment, apparently wants to find some truth in Boethius' terminology
while keeping close to the Aristotelian notion of Indefiniteness.
Infinite judgments are "Infinite in respect to their logical exten-
sion", but their limitative character can be associated with a kind
of indefiniteness.
But Kant’s conception of what counts as an infinite judgment
raises t\<io questions.
(I ) does Kant restrict this classification of judgment
— a subclass of judgments containing negative terms? Neither Kant
nor Meier consider judgments with negative terms and a negative copula
as infinite judgments. But Meier classified judgments with negative
subjects^ or negative subjects and predicates, as infinite (Meier,
§ 294). Kant’s restriction of the infinite judgments to those in
which negation affects only the predicate is curious, for his own
logic requires the other t}^pes of judgment recognized by Meier. The
rule of conversion could lead to judgments with negative subjects:
conversion per accidens of the infinite judgment ’All A is non-B’ is,
for example, ’Some non-B is A ’ . Indeed, Kant himself gives examples
of such judgments throughout his lectures, but never while discussing
the infinite judgment .
(II ) Why does the infinite judgment constitute a^ qualitative
form
,
that is, a special qualitative relationship beti'^een concepts ?
Since forms in Kant’s general logic concern only the relationship
between the content of the judgment and since negation in the infinite
judgment does not affect this relationship but only the predicate,
Kant claims that in general logic infinite judgments are classified
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as affirmative (B97). This claim cuts deeper than the apparently
similar claim about singular quantification, for while it can be shown
how singular quantification constitutes a specific kind of quantitative
comparison, it is difficult to imagine forms of qualitative comparison
other than affirmation and denial. Kant does not speak merely of how
the infinite form is to be treated
, but of how judgments with negative
predicates are to be classified, that is, how their logical constants
are to be identified in general logic. Thus, grounds for introducing
a special function of infinite quality seem superfluous in general
logic
.
The solutions to these problems are not unrelated; an answer
to the second will provide a basis for answering the first. In the
Wiener Log ik
,
the claim is made that the elevation of the infinite
judgment to a form of judgment is a mere subtlety in general logic,
which becomes important only in metaphysics (WL^ p. 930).^^ The
answer to (II) lies in the nature of this subtlety and the reasons for
introducing it.
In being affirmative, the infinite judgment yields a
determination of the subject; it conceives the subject as laying
within an extension (see II. 2). Yet in virtue of the negative pre-
dicate, we can expect that there is a special kind of determination
of this subject. In his logic notes Kant says,
r In an infinite judgment] the determination of the [subject]
concept is through the limit of the Ipredicate] concept
(N 3066). 12
The determination which is made of the subject in the infinite judgment
merely places a limit on what the subject is by saying what it is not.
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To say that A is non-B is to limit what A is with respect to its
being B. Kant calls a negative concept of the form non-B a limitation
or the limit of the concept B.
By placing a limitation upon the subject, we do two things.
First, we exclude the subject from the extension of the predicate, B.
Moreover, we make a special kind of determination of A by placing it
within that which is not B. In the Wiener Logik, the following account
is given of the infinite judgment ’The soul is non-^nortal’:
If I say that the soul is non-mortal, then I say not merely
that the soul contains nothing mortal but that it is also
contained in the extension of all that which is not mortal.
Hereby sometliing special is maintained, namely, that I
exclude a concept not merely from the extension of another,
but that I also think the concept under the entire remaining
extension which does not belong under the concept which is
excluded (WL, p. 930).-^'^
The special character of this determination is revealed by
the logic of negative terms. However, we must recognize that the
logic of negative terms is part of the theory of the logic of
judgments, for it does not concern the possible connection of concepts.
The logic of negative terms belongs to the logic of concepts. Thus,
it must be remembered that negative terms may function along with
positive terms in judgments other than what Kant classifies as
"Infinite”.
TTie symbolic representation of a negative term is, obviously,
(3) ~P.
In II. 2.1, we defined the sign of negation when applied to two terms
in a judgment. But in (3) negation takes a single argument. This
fact raises tlie question of whether there is one common meaning to
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negation or whether negation is an ambiguous concept in Kant's logic.
The common meaning lies in the notion of exclusion, for in each use
of negation the logical function yields a thought of one thing from
another.
In denying a quantitative comparison of concepts by means of
judgmental negation, we exclude the extension of the subject from
that of the predicate. In applying negation to a single concept, P,
we exclude all that which is P from the extension of the new concept
~P. Thus, we may formulate the extension of a negative term as
follows,
(Def. Nega-Ext) the compass of ~P =df. Q(It is false that Q is
encompassed under P).
With regard to (Def. Nega-Ext), we must exercise care, a care which
is implicitly maintained by Kant. The failure of a concept to fall
under another could arise if the first is itself encompassed within
the second; namely, if the concept is part of the definition or con-
tent of the given concept. This possibility is undesirable. The
concept Non-man does not include, as part of its extension, the concept
Animal, for men themselves are animals. The sentence 'All non-men are
less than rational', would othenvise employ (II. 3.1) 'All animals are
less than rational', which in turn implies 'All men are less than
rational'. Thus, the compass of ~P will not include any concepts which
are already encompassed within P itself. This restriction is observed
informally by Kant, for in excluding P from all that is, one is not
only excluding the compass of P from the new extension but P itself,
tliat is, the content of P. Thus, membership in the compass of a
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negative concept must be formulated as
It is^false that Q is encompassed v^ithin P r)
Q e S(S is encompassed under ^P) = it is false that Q is
encompassed under P]
Moreover, Kant contends that the extension of ~P is infinite.
• In the logic notes, Kant writes,
The remainder is infinite, if one takes away from the infinite
a determined part (N 3069). 14
And in discussing the infinite judgment 'The soul is non-mortal’ in
the Critique, Kant says.
The infinite sphere of all that is possible is thereby only
so limited that the mortal is excluded from it .... But
even allowing for such an exclusion, this extension still
^
remains infinite (B97-98).
The cogency of Kant's argument is easily determined: By "removing"
any number from the infinite series of natural numbers, the total set
®1111 remains (denumberably
) infinite. Since the terms of a logic are
denuraberably infinite, this same argument applies mutandis mutandi to
Kant's conception of extension.
This infinite structure of a negative term can be expressed by
comparing what is involved in a negative term with what is involved in
a (positive) concept. A concept has a determinate extension; anything
falling under the concept falls within one of a determinate list of
possible other concepts. This notion can be expressed through a
finite list of disjoined concepts which are encompassed under the given
concept
:
P = (Sp V S2 V...V Sj^ ) where each Sj’ is encompassed under P.
On tlie other liand, the infinite extension of the negative concept
involves an unending or infinite list of disjoined concepts:
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(4) ~P - V Qj V...V Q„ V... ) where each Qj is neither
encompassed under nor within P.
This consideration of negative terms would dictate that tlie
proper formulation of the grammar of the infinite judgment is,
m.2.1. UNITY OF THE INFINITE JUDGMENT (I)
(is )-0^(A,~B) = A is conceived within the compass of ~B.
Alternatively, this unity may he expressed by an equivalence with the
affirmative copula and the meaning of negative terras (4),
III. 2. 2. A FORMULATION OF THE INFINITE JUDGMENT
(is )-(^(A,~B ) = (is)~0:^?(A, (Qp v Qp v...))) where each Qp
is neither encompassed under nor within B.
To say that A is conceived within the compass of ~B is to place
it within the infini lie extension of all that which is not B, Moreover,
to do this is to allow the concept A to float, metaphorically, as if
it were in an empty space. One cannot say where in the infinite
extension A does lie, for even excluding A from other concepts falling
under ~B will not serve to delimit the position of A with respect to
the infinitely disjoined concepts in the extension of ~B. This point
is made in the Wiener Logik :
[These] judgments are called infinite because they are
unbounded '"un-deliraited] . They say only what is not, and
I can make such predicates innumerably, for the sphere of
the predicate, affected by 'non’, which can be said of a
subject, is infinite (l^, pp. 930-931). ^-5
Hence, we see the legitimacy of Kant's dual characterization
of the infinite judgment: In placing a limit on a concept, we place
it in an infinite extension wliich yields an indefinite determinatic>n of
vHiat the subject is.
2. The "Subtlety" of tlie Infinite .Judgment . But this tliought
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is something special, for the relationship bet^veen the subject and
the positive predicate B is different from that which exists between
a subject and positive predicate in an ordinary affirmative judgment.
In the infinite judgment the (affirmative) relation between the sub-
ject and positive predicate is modified in a special way by including
the subject within an infinite extension. Here is the heart of the
subtlety of the infinite judgment as a special form of judgment. By
calling it a subtlety Kant means that the use of a special function
to express infinite quality is gratuitous in the sense that the unity
yielded by the infinite judgment may be accounted for by mechanisms
already present within the logic. But, if we consider the relation-
ship that is yielded bet\v/een the subject and the given, positive
predicate, we see that the affirmative relationship is modified in a
unique and distinct manner. According to Kant, this special modi-
fication involves a limitation, or limitative comparison between the
subject and the given, positive predicate. This limitative compari-
son constitutes the third form of qualitative comparison in a judgment.
We may express the infinite judgment by means of , two concepts,
A and B, and a special relationship bet\-v»een them in which the subject
A is compared in a limitative manner with the predicate B. As the
qualitative function to represent this limitative comparison I shall
introduce the star, or the sign of limitation. Its grammar with
a subject consisting of a subject and predicate is the same as that
of the other qualitative functions.
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III. 2.3. THE SYNTAX OF LIMITATION
(is>v(K(A, B)).
Kant often speaks of the infinite judgment in terns of a comparison
involving a positive predicate, for instance in N 3065:
The infinite judgment indicates that [a subject] is
somewhere outside the sphere of the predicate in the
infinite sphere; consequently, it represents the sphere
oI the predicate as limited. io
In Kant’s metaphysics, where tliis special relationship becomes
important because of the special knowledge of the subject yielded by
such a judgment, Kant defines a limitation as a "negation which
contains realit}A' . Or, to put this definition into the logical
terms of a comparison of two concepts, a limitation is an affirmation
which contains a negation. A limitation is an exclusion of one concept
from all that is, thus determining an infinite extension to which the
subject is affirmatively related. Hence, the comparison yielded by a
function of limitation can be expressed by the relation x is affirma-
tively compared with the (infinite) limit of y. The unity of the
infinite judgment is, therefore,
III. 2.4. THE UNITY OF THE INFINITE JUDGMENT (II)
(is)*()I(A, B)) = A is affirmatively compared with the limit of B.
The subtlety of the function of limitation is revealed through
a comparison of it with III. 2.1. III. 2.1 employed the standard quali-
tative comparison which may be expressed by ’x is affirmatively compared
with In the case of the infinite judgment, the becomes a nega-
tive concept. But in the case of III. 2.4 the notion of being negative
is absorbed by the function itself and is expressed as a syntactical
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part of the relation.
Finally, the special kind of comparison between a subject and
predicate which is expressed in an infinite judgment, in virtue of
which a function of judgment may be introduced, provides grounds for
answering question (I), Why does Kant restrict this classification of
judgment to just those in which the predicate is negatively expressed?
It IS only in these kinds of judgments that an interesting or
special kind of quality results. In the other types of judgments
containing negative terms, no special qualitative relationship exists
between the given subject and the predicate of the judgment. Consider
an affirmative judgment with a negative subject. The unity yielded
by such a judgment is just that of affirmation; namely, the determi-
nation or location of the subject is within the extension of the
predicate. Within such a judgment, affirmative determination takes
place and that is all: one does not have a special qualitative
relationship of locating the subject under the predicate. A negative
judgment with negative terms is still a negative judgment, for it
yields a thought of the exclusion of ti-;o extensions from each other.
Again, there is no special way in which the subject is conceived in
such a judgment. Finally, a judgment wherein both subject and predi-
cate are negative and the copula is affirmative is an infinite judgment,
but is so only in virtue of the negative predicate.
3. ^ Assessment of This Subtlety : the Logical Importance
of the Infinite Judgment . In this section, I shall argue that Kant
himself did not fully appreciate the logical differences between the
unity of the affirmative and infinite judgments. If he had developed
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logic of the qualitative forms of judgment more completely, he
might not have referred to the infinite form as just a mere subtlety
in general logic, but would l.ave realized its special character, and
hence treatment, even in general logic. The distinctive character
of this function shows up v^hen we consider its logic in inferences.
Since limitation as a logical function is a true species of
affirmative quality and since general logic does not concern itself
with the negative character of terms in a syllogism, ’ can be
thought of as a function of affirmative quality in syllogistic infer-
ences. However, a special logic of limitation can be developed with
regard to immediate inferences. The special combination of affir-
mation and denial wliich is brought together by the function of
limitation effects special inferences which are not reducible to the
immediate inferences covering the other functions of Quality.
Uufortunatel.y
,
Kant himself did not develop a logic of
qualitative inference. Therefore, what follows is a reconstruction
of such a logic for Kant, based upon the meaning of the functions
involved
.
The formal relationship of infinite judgment to other judgments
of different Quality has been called obversion in traditional logic.
Obversion is an immediate inference which allows the interchange of
negative and affirmative categorical judgment by dint of operation
with negative terms. According to what I shall call the full theory
of obversion, an equivalent categorical judgment results from a given
categorical judgment by changing the quality and making the predicate
negative, while keeping the quantity the same. ’All men are mortal'
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is said to be equivalent to ^No men are nonHT>ortal^ and 'No men are
mortal’ is said to be equivalent to 'All men are non-mortal'.
Obversion in the full sense is said to be valid for all categorical
judgments.
However, there are two traditions concerning obversion in the
history of logic. While the standard theory of traditional logic is
the full theory of obversion, it is well known that Aristotle pro-
hibited inferences from negative to affirmative, possibly infinite,
judgments. For Aristotle, (i) 'No men are mortal' is not equivalent
to (ii) 'All men are non-mortal’, though one could infer (i) from (ii).
Interestingly, neither Meier nor Kant makes explicit use
of the term ’obversion’ with regard to immediate inferences of Quality.
Nevertheless, formulations of obversion can be found in these logics.
Meier, for instance, foimulates tlie full theory of obversion:
One can change all negative judgments into affirmative ones,
if one posits the negation from the copula to the predicate^
(Meier, § 294).19
Here Meier explicitly is recognizing the inference denied by Aristotle
from negative judgments to affirmative, infinite judgments.
However, one can reconstruct evidence' which seems to indicate
that Kant would have accepted only the strictly Aristotelian conception
of obversion. In the Politz notes, for instance, we find.
Through the infinite judgment one thinks more than through
the negative judgment (Pol., p. 578).^^
Negation serves only to exclude a concept from the compass of another,
but an infinite judgment also involves affirmation or the inclusion of
a concept within a compass of a (limited) concept. Inclusion is
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something more than what is thought in the mere exclusion of a
negative judgment. Hence, an infinite judgment cannot be entailed
by the less complex negative judgment. On the other hand, an infinite
judgment can entail a negative judgment with the same subject and
predicate, for in the infinite judgment, we exclude the subject from
the compass of the predicate.
III. 2.5. THE LOGIC OF LIMITATION
(is)*(^(A, B))—>(is)-QI(A, B)).
The reason why Kant apparently omits obversion in his general
logic is that the general logic of judgments concerns only the
relationship between concepts, and obversion arises through operation
with negative terms . However, had Kant more fully recognized the
infinite judgment as a part of general logic, he \-jould have realized
that as a function of judgment it was not a mere subtlety but required
a logic of Quality to relate it to the other forms under this heading.
While this realization would not have provided a full theory of
obversion, its inclusion in general logic is necessary and interesting
in treating the formal relationships, which rest upon qualitative
comparisons, between judgments. Thus, there is more to the logic of
limitation in general logic itself than its being a mere ’’subtlety”.
I shall return to the importance of obversion in VI. 1.
§ 3 - The H}^potlietical and Disjunctive Judgments
Kant’s classification of judgments under Relation is often
criticized for overlooking that hypothetical and disjunctive judgments,
along with copulative judgments (judgments with two subjects and two
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predicates), are species of complex judgments . 21 It is argued that
a correct classification of judgments under Relation is;
Simple judgments: Categorical judgments
Complex judgments: Hypothetical judgments
Disjunctive judgments
Copulative judgments.
(Ihis criticism usually is made to provide the commentator with a
reason for maintaining that Kant cannot derive the three categories
of Relation from the logical forms of judgments of Relation or that it
IS the Table of Categories that Influences the Table of Logical
Functions.
)
But the preceding classification of judgments is spurious for
Kant's purposes in formulating a table of logical functions, for the
simple/complex classification is merely grammatical rather than logical.
Complexity is not a logical constant of a judgment, but merely a
grammatical classification of a judgment which employs other judgments
as constitutive parts. There is no specific unity that is yielded in
thinking judgments to he related in a complex manner. On the other
hand, the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments do contain special
logical constants which yield distinct ways of relating judgments in
consciousness. Moreover, since logic abstracts from the content of
judgment, the so-called copulative judgment (see III. 4) may be classi-
fied as categorical. In N 3089, Kant himself considers the copulative
judgment to be a (grammatically) complex judgment arising througli
copulation.
Thus, Kant is justified in dismissing this simple/complex
division of judgments under Relation as gratuitous in general logic.
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To represent the functions of the hypothetical and disjunctive
judgments, I shall introduce the variables ’a’ and ' wliich take the
formulations of judgments as suhstituends. The functions of the two
judgments themselves will be respectively represented by the functions
’
(0) ^ and ’ (fU') ’ . Thus :
The form of the hypothetical judgment: (0)(a, b)
The form of the disjunctive judgment: (fcPKa, B, . . . )•
(0) provides the analysis of judgments involving ’If... then ’
(Wenn . .
.
so ). Hence, we may call it the sign of conditionality which
expresses the relation of Consequenz (Logik , § 25).^^ Similarly (^j^)
will be called the sign of disjunction that provides the analysis of
judgments involving ’Either... or ’. Disjunctive judgments may con-
sist of two or more judgments.
There are at least two reasons for guarding against thinking
that these functions have the same meaning as the horseshoe and wedge
of the modern propositional calculus simply because they provide the
analysis of the ostensibly same kinds of judgments or propositions.
First, Kant’s functions are not truth-functional; they do not yield a
unique truth-value given the truth-values of the component judgments.
And, as we shall see, the relationships that the functions express
cannot be expressed by truth-functional concepts.
Secondly, because these are functions involved in the analysis
of judgment, Kant makes no distinction betv;een true hypothetical or
disjunctive judgments and the well-formed use of ’(^)’ and ’(OP)’. A
true hypothetical or disjunctive judgment is identical to a well-formed
hypothetical judgment or disjunctive judgment, and a false hypothetical
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or disjunctive judgment is one which is ill-formed. In Kantian logic,
we can speak of the well-formed use of and ’(v)’ insofar as they
can yield a hypothetical or disjunctive thought, or unity, between
the constitutive judgments. But this unity can occur onl3^ when the
constitutive judgments can enter into such a relation, or, in other
words, only when a true hypothetical and disjunctive judgment can
occur. If the constitutive judgments fail to form a hypothetical or
disjunctive unity, then the judgment is false, and indeed, cannot be
counted as a well-formed hypothetical or disjunctive. On the other
hand, in modern logic one can distinguish between the well-formed use
of and ’v’, which may be either true or false depending upon the
truth-values of the constitutive propositions, and the ill-formed use,
for example, ’pq=^% which has no truth-value.
1. The Hypothetical Judgment . In the Logik
,
we are told that
the hypothetical judgment rests upon the "way of combining" the con-
stituent judgments so that the principles of modus ponens and modus
tollens obtain (§ 26).^'^ Thus the hypothetical judgment is counted
as well-formed in yielding a hypothetical relation between judgments
when, and only when, the truth of the consequent follows from the truth
of the antecedent, and only when the falsity of the antecedent follows
from the falsity of the consequent. Hence, the truth or falsity of
the constituent judgments does not matter in the hypothetical judg-
ment; only the relation between the t\<Jo judgments is of logical
importance. However, this notion of "following from" is vague and
requires explication.
In the unity of the hypotlietical judgment, a is conceived of
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as the ground (antecedent), Grand
, for the consequent or Folge, b
(Pol., p. 578 ). 24 Hence, the unity of the hypothetical judgment can
be formulated on the model of the unity of the copula, II. 2. 2.
III. 3.1. UNITY OF CONDITIONALITY
(®(a, 6 ) = c is the ground — 3 is the consequent.
Just as copulation posits the relationship of the subject and predicate
in a judgment, ’(O' posits judgments in the relationship of ground to
consequent.
In the Vorlesungen uber d ie Metaphy sih
, V’jhich is a compilation
of Kant s notes on metaphysics, much as the Logik is a compilation of
the logic notes, we find the following explanation of the notion of
ground
:
The ground is that wherefrom something follows in an
entirely necessary way; or, the ground is that where-
from something follows according to a universal rule
(P. 30).
25
Thus, in the hypothetical judgment, if the first judgment is accepted,
then the second necessarily follows. Kant also characterizes this
relation of ground to consequent as one of dependency (D-IV, p. 763 ),
for the truth of the consequent depends upon the truth of the ground.
Formal evidence, relating to the possible inferences in which
’($)’ can function, indicates that the unity of the hypothetical
judgment is to be correlated with a concept of causal conditionality.
Transitivity, for instance, fails to hold for the notion of causal
consitionality
,
that is, if ^ causes b and b causes 0^ it does not
follow that a causes c. 2^ There is no evidence that Kant would accept
the validity of transitivity for '
,
for he makes no mention of
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transitivity in laying out the rules of the hypothetical syllogism.
Kant mentions only n^dus ponens and modus tollens as valid hypothetical
syllogisms. Furthermore, these are the only two inferences which are
valid for causal conditionality. Finally, contraposition is invalid
for causal conditionality and Kant does not admit contraposition for
’(0)’ (see IV. 4 for tlie theory of contraposition).
However, there is only a formal correspondence or analogy
between the unity of the hypothetical judgment and causal condition-
ality and not an identity. Causality is not a relation between
judgments, but a relation between temporally successive events. Thus,
Kant's metaphysical theories concerning the concept of cause can be
only a clue to the relationship expressed bet\^/een judgments in the
unity yielded by
In the Vorlesungen /Metaphysik . Kant divides grounds into two
kinds depending upon the two ways in which one cognition can, of
necessity, follow from another: grounds are either logical or real.
Kant says.
The logical ground is that through which something is
posited or denied according to the principle of identity.
The real ground, however, is that through which something
is posited according to the principle of contradiction.
The first is analytic, and the other is synthetic ....
The logical connection, to he sure, can also be conceived
according to the principle of identity. I derive the
concept from the other, according to derivation, which
occurs through analysis. The consequent lies, therefore,
in the ground, and is implicated in and for itself with
it, hut not explicitly. Consequently, the difference is
not real, but only according to the form. A real ground
is that whose consequent is a real consequent (pp. 31-32).^”^
The relationship bet\v'een judgments involving a logical ground is
analytic; thus, wo can speak of it as logical entailment. However, in
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the real groundj the relationship is far more complex.
Kant’s reference to the principle of contradiction in this
context is perplexing. Its use, I believe, lies in the fact that
causation represents a necessary order. Thus, to posit a real ground
and to deny its real consequent v.;ould be to deny that which is neces-
sary. The problem here is to explain how necessity enters into our
conception of causal relations. The explanation here lies in trans-
cendental logic and especially in the proof of the principle of
sufficient reason ( zureichende Grund ). In the section of the Critique
on the second analogy, Kant argues
But in the perception of an event there is always a rule
that makes this order in which the perceptions
follow upon one another a necessary order (B278).
Ihis rule turns out to be nothing other than the principle of sufficient
reason in its empirical application, which is the only application of
the principle which can be subject to a transcendental proof;
This rule, by which we determine something according to
succession of time, is that the condition under which an
event invariably and necessarily follows is to be found
in what precedes the event. The principle of sufficient
reason is thus the ground of possible experience (B246).
A necessary connection between events becomes- possible in a succession
of time only through the principle of sufficient reason in determining
the consequent moment of time on the basis of the antecedent one.
A judgment which expresses such a causal relationship must be
hypothetical in form, for the antecedent event is thought of as the
ground for the succeeding one. Thus, to mediately represent a causal
connection in a judgment, the judgment that tliese events exist must be
joined by tlie function of conditionality.
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In being concerned with whether one judgment follows from
another, the hypothetical judgment expresses a relationship which
may be either logical or the representation of a real connection. The
real relationship rests upon a causal connection which itself is
necessary in virtue of the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, the
hypothetical judgment expresses a formal relationship of ground to
consequent. Tliis relationship can occur in various ways in a
judgment.
The tivo inferences Vv'hich are common to the relationship of
ground to consequent are modus ponens and modus tollens
. (In the
following, will express propositional negation.
)
(MP) 3), a >3
(MT) (GHa, 3), ~3 >-a
2. The Disjunctive Judgment . The peculiar characteristic of
a disjunctive judgment is that the members of the disjunction have a
common subject. Thus, each member refers to the same extension. One
notes the example of a disjunctive judgment which Kant gives in the
Critique : ”The world exists either through blind chance, or through
inner necessity, or through an external cause- (B99, see N 3093).
Therefore, the disjunctive judgment must be expressed as a
series of categorical judgments having the same subject:
III. 3. 2. THE SYNTAX OF THE DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENT
(V)^(is)-(V(A, B)), (is)-(V(A, C)), (is)-(V(A, D))J.
Tlie example from the Critique indicates that we may abbreviate the
formulation of the disjunctive judgment by relating the list of predi-
cates to one subject. This may be done as follows:
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('V')^is)-(V(A, (B, C, D)))]
The role of the affirmative copula in (III. 3. 2a) is to place the
(entire) extension of A within the predicates (B, C, D); however, in
virtue of the sign of disjunction, these predicates are thought in
a special way, namely, disjunctively.
Kant expresses the unity of disjunction in the Critique as.
Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation
of logical opposition, insofar as the sphere of the one
member excludes the sphere of the other and yet at the
same time community, insofar as the propositions taken
together occupy the whole sphere of the knowledge in
question (B99).
“
According to Kant, the judgments making up the disjunctive judgment
are thought of as parts making up a whole; each is part of the total
knowledge of the extension of the subject. These judgments constitute
a logical division of the subject (^, p. 933 ).“® Such a division
occurs when the relation between the judgments is one of contradictory
opposition
;
The disjunctive judgment consists of two or more judgments,
which have the relation of opposition, which must be con-
tradictory; however, together they must diversely be equal
to the concept (Bus., p. 666).^^
By this notion of logical division, then, Kant means that the members
of the disjunctive judgment are mutually exclusive, i.e. no more than
one can be true at the same time, and exhaustive, i.e. nothing more
can be said about the extension of the subject than what is contained
in the disjuncts themselves.
Thus, we may formulate the unity of the disjunctive judgment as
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III. 3. 3. UNITY OF DISJUNCTION
III. 3. 2a = B--C—D are posited in a relation of logical division
with respect to A.
Closely associated with ’either... or ’ is ’neither.
. .nor ’
The propositional calculus expresses ’Neither p nor q’ as a negation
of a disjunction, ~(pvq ), or a conjunction of negative conjuncts,
'^•~q. But these propositional connectives are not available for use
in reconstructing a Kantian theory of ’neither. . .nor ’. Instead, we
must interpret this idiom by means of the logical functions provided
by Kant: What kind of acts of the understanding are involved in
making a judgment of the form ’neither. . .nor '? The problem is
a grammatical one of representing ’neither. . .nor ’ with the special
Kantian logical functions of judgment.
Kant never defines negation with regard to disjunction. We
have seen tiv-o uses to which negation can be legitimately put in Kant’s
logic: termal negation (III. 2) and judgmental negation (II. 2). In
both uses, negation means the exclusion of one thing from another
(III. 2). But what can negation mean when applied to the unity of
disjunction (III. 3. 2)? Were it to mean that the concepts B, C, D are
not a logical division of A, this would neither include any sense of
exclusion nor render the ordinary meaning of judgments expressed with
’neither. . .nor ’. And to say ’(<\/')~’ yields a unity in which A is
excluded from the logical division B, C, D is nonsense, for then A
would be nothing. A logical division, by definition, constitutes all
the possibilities for what A may be.
Moreover, the members in a ’neitlier. . .nor ’ judgment do not
r
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constitute a complete logical division. In a negative disjunction,
there is always at least one other possibility which is the case.
To say that it is neither raining nor snowing is to leave open the
possibility tliat some other weather condition is the case. Hence,
the members are not mutually exhaustive; negative disjunction is not
even a proper disjunctive thought for Kant. Thus, in terms of the
theories developed for negation and disjunction in Kantian logic,
these functions cannot combine to render the sense of ’neither...
nor How we are to understand this idiom in Kant’s logic must
be gleaned from the context in which it functions for Kant; namely,
in his theory of the disjunctive syllogism.
Since the disjunctive judgment is defined as representing a
logical division, two syllogistic inferences become possible. These
are modus ponendo tollens (MPT) and modus tollendo ponens (MTP):
All members of the disjunction, except one, taken together
constitute the contradictory opposite of that one. A
dichotomy occurs here according to which if one of the two
is true, the other must be false and conversely (Logik, § 77
Anm . no. 1).30
’
These inferences may be expressed in terms of the judgmental variables
a and 8 :
(MPT) ('I/') (a, 3 ), a ^3
(MTP) (V)(c, 3), ~a >3.
Where ’a’ is ’A is B’ and ’ 3 ’ is ’A is C’, to assert that A is included
in one member of its logical division (A is B) is to exclude it from
the otlier; that is, to entail the negative judgment tliat A is not C.
Similarly, to say that A is not included in one member of its division
(A is not B ) is to say that it is included in the other (A is C).
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Neitlier. . .nor ^ enters when the disjunction consists of
more than two component judgments. In this case MPT and MTP take
the form
(Logik, § 77):^^
(MPT) A is B or C or D (MTP) A is B or C or D
— A is neither B nor C
A is neither C nor D a"
In the Logik, these inferences are called polysyllogistic (8 77, Anm .
no. 2), by which it is meant that these inferen • -s proceed in a series
of syllogistic steps. MPT may be rendered as tlie derivation of two
conclusions
:
A is B or C or D
A is B
A is not C
A is not D,
for by including A in one member, we exclude it from each of the
remaining members, so that two negative judgments follow in the dis-
junctive syllogism. A parallel rendering of MTP should be obvious.
Thus, ’neither. . .nor ’ can be understood as a set of negative
judgments .
(^^PT) (T/')(a, 3, y,,..), a >{~3j ~y<>}
(^*
TP) ('l/')(a, 3> Yj***)? ~3...} >y.
A set of judgments is a conjunction of judgments. Unfortunately,
Kant does not provide a function of conjunction. To conclude this
chapter, I wish to say something about the status of conjunction in
Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment.
§ 4 - On Conjunction
Kant probably omits a conjunctive classification of judgments
because one does not add any special relationship bet\\?een t\^o judgments
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by thinking them in a conjunction. We have seen that, for Kant,
logical functions involved in relating judgments to one another yield
the thought of some specifiable, non-truth functional relationship
het;^;een these judgments. But no more is thought in relating judgments
in a conjunction than is thought in making each judgment separately.
Hence, conjunction fails to characterize a special act of understanding
Any function which attempts to define conjunction in Kantian logic is
vacuuous.
However, there are tliree areas in the analysis of judgment
where Kant himself employs, either implicitly or explicitly, the notion
of conjunction. The first of these is in the analysis of ’neither...
nor ', where its use is not explicitly recognized. Areas where use
of conjunction is explicit is in the analysis of copulative and (what
Kant calls) exponible judgments. The question is: What is the status
of conjunction in each of these cases and how important is its omission
from general logic? I shall consider exponible judgments first.
These judgments contain quantitative relations which require
for their explication two judgments of different quantification—one
affirmative, the other negative (Meier, § 310).^^ Such quantitative
relations are those expressed by ’alone’ (God alone is immortal),
’few’ or ’only’.^ Kant provides the follov^;ing analysis of ’Few men
are learned ’
:
(1) Some men are learned.
(2) Many men are not learned.
(While this is Kant’s favorite example, as evidenced by his use of it




wliicli itsolf must bo sn Gxponiblo (|U3ntifiGi‘, UowgvgiTj
thG SUCCGSS or failuro of any particular analysis is not at issue
here.) Exponible judgments, thus, essentially involve the notion of
the conjunction of judgments. Indeed, this conjunction is taken up
in a single act of the understanding as in the act of judging that
few men are learned.
Kant apparently holds that the job an analyzing exponible
judgmients belongs only to the empirical study of the grammar of a
language and not to the study of logical form. This idea appears in
the Logik and Politz notes, for instance, in the Logik the following
argument is given:
Since the nature of exponible propositions depends upon the
conditions of the language, according to which t\-Jo judgments
can be expressed in a short fonii as one, so there belongs in
our language judgment which must be analyzed not in logic
but rather in grammar (§ 31, Anm. ).34
It is purely an accident of German, or English, that it contains
judgments constructed from comparisons which require tnvo separate
parts for their analysis. The explication of these notions, hence,
must belong to the empirical study of the language v^hich contains them,
and in no way concerns a theory of the logical functions involved in
the making of any judgment.
Thus, the task of analyzing the role of conjunction in making
judgments seems to be assigned to a merely grammatical study of a
language, rather than being placed within a theory of the logical
functions underlying judgments expressed in that language. That judg-
ments may be combined conjunctively, Kant seems to be saying, is a mere
grammatical accident of the expression of judgments in a language.
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Moreover, this same type of reasoning also may serve to
explain Kant’s failure to provide a logical analysis of copulative
judgments. In N 3088, Kant presents the following examples of
such judgments:
God and the most liigh should he loved. (Two subjects)
God has created and rules all things. (Tv;o predicates).
We have seen at the beginning of III. 3 that Kant analyzes the logical
form of such judgments by means of the copula. With the copulative
judgment, we move from judgmental conjunction (conjoining t^^o or more
judgments) to the conjunction of terms within the internal structure
of a judgment. A conjunction of concepts A and B can he represented
as ’(A,B)’. Hence, copulative judgments can be expressed,
(is )-(J^((A,B ), G)) (Two subjects)
(is)-(^(A, (B,G))) (Two predicates ).
But Kant does not carry the analysis of such judgments further.
This lack of further analysis makes sense if we take judgmental con-
junction to belong to the grammar of language and not to logic, for
copulative judgments are equivalent to categorical judgments thought
conjunctively,
(is)-(K((A,B), G))< >(is)-((^(A, C)) and (is)-Q^(B, G)).
(There is a further possible reason consistent with the
presuppositions of Kantian logic for this lack. It is possible that
such an analysis has no place in general logic, for the conjunction
of subjects and of predicates would pertain only to the content of the
judgment rather than to its logical form. Such an analysis would
belong, therefore, to tlie logic of concepts. But this procedure would
obscure the important logical difference between the conjunction of
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subjects, on the one hand, and of predicates, on the other. The
grammatical conjunction of subjects represents the disjunction of
their classes rather than their union. In the copulative judgment
that apples and oranges are delicious, one does not place the class
of apple-oranges in the class of what is delicious, but says that
anything which is an apple or an orange is delicious. On the other
hand, the grammatical conjunction of two predicates represents a true
conjunction or union of two classes. Hence, assigning the analysis
of copulative judgments to the logic of concepts would obscure the
fact that such conjunctions operate differently in a judgment V'^hen
the}^ are in the subject and when they are in the predicate.
)
Kant employs a notion of conjunction in the analysis of
’neither. . .nor ’, exponible and copulative judgments, but, in most
likelihood, assigns such an analysis to the level of the grammatical
analysis of the language which expresses the judgment. However, I
find Kant’s omission of conjunction from general logic indefensible
when critically analyzed in terms of the demands of a general logic.
Consider, first, the need of conjunction in the analysis of
the complex forms of disjunctive syllogisms. ' Instead of being poly-
syllogistic, these inferences take the set of negative, categorical
judgments making up the second premiss or conclusion as a unity. In
MPT the conclusion follows as a unity from the premisses, and in MTP
the second premiss must be considered as a unity in arriving at the
conclusion. Thus, the construction of a complex disjunctive syllogism
requires an act of the understanding to conjoin the negative, cate-
gorical judgments into the formi of ’neither. . .nor ’, tliat is, into
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a conjunctive unity. This act is not an accidental feature of the
grammatical construction of the language in which the syllogism is
expressed, but is logically part of the argument hy expressing the
form of the premiss or conclusion of a complex disjunctive syllogism.
Furthermore, it seems possible to provide a logic for
copulative judgments which involves inferences not expressible in terms
of to separate judgments in Kant’s logic. For instance, from a copu-
lative judgment a truth-functional disjunction of judgments fo],lows.
(is)-0^((A,B), C)) >Either (is)-(f^(A, C)) or (is)-(^(B, C)).
(is)-O^(A, (B,C))) >Either (is)-(J^(A, B)) or (is)-(J^(A, C)).
Finally, the need for a special logic involving exponihle judgments
can he seen from the following example of a valid argument involving
an exponihle judgment.
Few cats are intelligent.
All cats are sly.
.T Some sly things are not intelligent.
This is an argument in the third figure; to consider it valid its major
premiss must be negative. While a negative judgment is always involved
in the analysis of an exponihle judgment, it is only one part of what
is involved in the judgment. It must be said that the negative
judgment follows from the given exponihle premiss in virtue of the
judgment’s form. Thus, conjunction functions as part of the logical
form of an exponihle judgment. Indeed, conjunction expresses the
exponihle judgment as affirmative, while it actually functions as a
negative judgment in the syllogism.
Hence, judgments involving conjunction constitute a special
classification of judgments. Conjunction is not mereJ.y an aspect of
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the grammatical structure of language, but has a place in the logical
analysis of judgments as they function in inferences. Kant’s failure
to treat the special features of judgment involving conjunction is a
logical deficiency of his system of general logic.
CHAPTER IV
THE LOGIC OF MODALITY
§ 1 — The Role of ijogical Modalities in Judgment
Kant s theory of the modal forms of judgments is the least
understood part of his theory of logical forms (1.2). Most commenta-
tors omit vHiat for Kant is the most crucial aspect of these forms,
namely, their relating the content of a judgment to the manner in
which the judger, who makes the judgment, is conscious of this content.
Judgments differ from sentences and propositions in that the latter
may he logically analyzed without reference to the manner in which
persons are related to them. But judgments essentially involve a
judger who stands in some relationship to that which he judges, to the
content of his judgment. This relationship is specified by ^ the
judger judges or maintains this content. Thus, the logical analysis
of judgment is incomplete unless an analysis is provided of how the
judger himself is related to the content of his judgment.
It is clearly Kant’s intention that the modal forms provide
this analysis. In the Logik, modality is defined as follows;
According to modality, through whose moments the relation
of the entire judgment to the capacity of cognition is
determined, judgments are problematic, assertoric, and
apodictic (§ 30).
The moments of modality indicate only the kind and manner
of how in judgment something is maintained or denied (§ 30,
Anm . , 1).^
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And in the Pb'litz notes, it is claimed that the word ’necessarily’
indicates the kind and manner of how something is maintained or
denied in tlie judgment ’All men are necessarily immortal’ (Pol.,
p. 597). Thus, the modal forms represent the modes of judgment, the
manner in which a judgment is made.
The relationship bet\7een a judger and what he judges may be
emotive. For example, he may judge rashly or timidly. Such rela-
tionships may be considered psychological and, hence, empirically
examinable. But these types of relationships are unimportant in the
logical analysis of judgment. To determine the nature of the logical
structure between a judger and what is judged we must ask what is
essential to judging itself. The manner of judging is of formal
interest only when it is essential to the conception of judgment.
Therefore, consider the following definitions of judgment
from Kant’s own lecture notes:
Judgment is the representation of unity of the relationships
of grounds of cognition to the possible cognition of an
object (N 3045).
Judgment is the representation of objective unity (in the
cognition of an object) in the consciousness of various
concepts. The objective unity (of consciousness) is
universally valid and necessary (N 3052).
Judgment: the representation of the way in \^;hich various
concepts belong objectively (for everyone) in a conscious-
ness; that is, in constituting the cognition of the object
(N 3055 ).
3
Judgment is a representation of unity in concepts producing that V'^liich
is objective or universally valid (valid for all judgers). Hence, the
logical relationship expressed by the modal forms deals with an aspect
of determining tlie objectivity, or objective validity, of a judgment.
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rather than v^?lth the psychological relationship involved in a
judgment.
This determination presents a problem which any theory of
judgment must attempt to solve. Unifying concepts in a judgment is
a subjective activity on the part of the judger himself. Here is the
problem: How is it possible for the determination of the content of
a judgment, being a subjective act of the judger, to be universally
valid, or true, such that any judger can make it? To make a contri-
bution to the solution of this problem a logic of judgments attempts
to disclose the forma involved in constituting the objectivity of
judgment. (A sentential logic, on the other hand, analyzes the forms
of that in which objectivity is expressed but without regard to how
this objectivity is constituted.)
According to Kant, the objectivity of judgment can be
constituted only through the judgment's conformity to a priori princi-
ples which are universally valid for constituting any representation
as objective. This point is made in § 19 of the Transcendental
Deduction in the Critique,
I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner in which
given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity
of apperception. This is what is intended by the copula
'is'. It is employed to distinguish the objective unity
of given representations from the subjective. It indicates
their relation to original apperception and its necessary
unity. It holds good even if the judgment is itself
empirical, and therefore contingent, as, for example, in
the judgment 'Bodies are heavy'. I do not here assert
that tliese representations necessaril}^ belong to one
anotlier in the empirical intuition, but that they belong
to one another virtue of the necessary unity of apper-
ception in the synthesis of intuition, that is, according
to principles of the objective determination of all repre-
sentations (B141-142).
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As we noted in II. 2, the role of the copula is to make possible the
truth or objectivity of a cognition by determining the unification of
concepts in accordance with principles. The three principles of
contradiction, sufficient reason, and excluded middle (II. 2) are
principles which pertain to the general logic of determining the
truth of a unification of concepts.
The modal forms, on the other hand, in treating the
relationship het\^?een the judger and this content which is determined
to be true, express the relationship to a judger bet^^een what he
judges and the foundation, or universal principles, upon which this
content rests for its truth and objectivity. Thus, the modal forms
are concerned with how, in the act of judging, the content is consi -
dered b£ true by the judger with respect to principles which make
objectivity possible. The three moments of modality, the problematic,
the assertoric and the apodictic, represent three fundamental ways in
which a judgment can be related to universal principles. A judger may
consider his judgment to be possibly true, actually true or necessarily
true.
It is obvious that without modality a judgment cannot fully
be considered objective (such that any judger can make it), for with-
out modal determination there would be no indication of how another
judger could make the same judgment with regard to its truth. Thus,
in order to lift his judgment from its inevitable subjectivity and to
consider it objective, a judger must take cognizance of its relation-
ship to principles upon which its truth is based and express his
judgment in the appropriate modal fasliion. Tlie objectivity of
100
judgment, therefore, cannot be expressed merely by the copula, but
must also include a determination of how the judger considers the
truth of what he judges.
That modality is concerned with this relationship between the
copula of a judgment and the principles upon which the determination
of truth rests explains the obscure definition of modality presented
in the Critique :
The modality of judgment is quite a peculiar function. Its
distinguishing characteristic is that it contributes nothing
to the content of judgment (for besides quantity, quality
and relation, tliere is nothing the constitutes the content
of a judgment), but concerns only the value of the copula
in relation to thought in general (B99-100).
Modality, according to this definition, is not a means of relating
concepts in a judgment—this is the role of tlie forms of Quantity,
Quality and Relation in constituting the content of the judgment—but
represents the relationship between "thought in general" and the copula.
By 'thought in general' Kant means the thought that is essential to
the nature of judgment, thought that is constitutive of objectivity.
Thought in general must be contrasted with the merely psychological or
emotive aspect of judgment. Undoubtedly, then, the "value of the
copula" is the degree and kind of objectivity (possible, actual or
necessary truth) that the content possesses with respect to thought in
general. Hence, the value of the copula, which is expressed by modal
forms, is liov'7 the copula is considered (by a judger) as confoirming
with the general principles of truth.
Finally, since the modal forms pertain to the consideration
of trutli with respcjct to tliought in general, the modal forms determim;
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the degree of certainty which the judger has in the truth of his
cognition. In determining how truth is considered in a judgment, the
modal forms yield the subjective validity of the judgment for a judger;
modal forms express the certainty that a judger can place in the truth
of tlie cognition as it is founded upon principles of the determination
of truth. The subjective certainty which a judger has, then, rests
upon logical structures between the judger and the content of his
judgment and, to this extent, would be valid for any other judger.
Thus, by judging in some manner in accordance with principles of truth
and expressing a judgment in some modal fashion, a judger becomes
subjectively certain of the degree of objectivity in his judgment.
Ibis chapter will deal with the logical grammar of the modal
forms, with their syntax and unity; the following chapter will take
up the topic of the certainty.
§ 2 - The Syntax of Modal Forms
To formalize the syntax of modal forms we must take as our
fundamental unit of analysis the act of judging as represented by
the relation:
S judged that (is)...,
which stands between a judger (S ) and the copula of his judgment. This
relation is to he represented by a function yielding the unity of
making a judgment. The symbolic representation of this relation is,
therefore,
S J (is)( ) = Uj
which v^;ill serve as the general pattern upon which to build tlie syntax
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of the modal forms. (In terms of (f, 1.3) the appropriate expression
would be J(S, (is)( )) = Uj'. However, the given formulation
represents a mere morphological variation of (F) and parallels the
natural reading (S judges that The relation ’xJy’ may be read
as ’x holds ^ to be true’, or as ’x entertains ^ as true'.
As we have seen, according to Kant, judging occurs in one of
three possible modes, each representing a determinable manner of how
the content of a judgment is considered as true by the judger. One
may judge the copula either problematically, assertorically, or apodic-
tically. Thus, the relation of judging must occur in a judgment in
one of these three modifications. We can understand the nature of
these modifications as adverbial modifiers of the act of judging.
This grammatical feature may be expressed as:
IV. 2 . 1 . THE SYNTAX OF MODAL FORMS
The problematic judgment: S Probj (is)(
)
The assertoric judgment: S Assj (is)( )
The apodictic judgment: S Apj (is)( ).
(According to Kant, the judgments making up a complex judgment
are themselves problematical, while the connection betv^een the judg-
ments is judged assertorically (BllO). Tlie full grammar of these forms
may be expressed as follows, where S is understood as being related to
the component judgments as well as the complex judgment as a whole:
Full form* of the hypothetical: S AsSj ((P)(Probj (is) a , Probj (is) 3)
Full form of the disjunctive: S Assj (<V*)(Probj'^ (is )-(V(A, (B, C, D)))).)
The unity that each function yields with regard to a universal,
affirmative categorical judgment is
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IV. 2. 2. THE UNITY OF MODALITY
S Probj (is)-(V(A, B)) = S problematically judges that B is
affii-med of all A
Assj (is)-(V(A, B)) = S assertorically judges that B is
affirmed of all A
S Apj (is)-(V(A, B)) = S apodictically judges that B is
affirmed of all A.
Similar readings can be obtained for the other categorical judgments
by substituting 'some’ and 'denied' in an appropriate manner.
Kant defines these unities in terms of the traditional modal
concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity. Immediately fol-
lowing his definition of modality in the Critique, Kant explains.
Problematic judgments are those in which affirmation or
negation is taken as merely possible (optional). In the
assertoric judgments, affirmation or negation is viewed as
[actual^ (true), and in apodeidictic judgments as necessary
And from the Logik
,
The problematic [judgment] is accompanied by the consciousness
of mere possibility, the assertoric with the consciousness
of actuality, the apodeictic, finally, with the consciousness
of the necessity of the judgment
( Logik, § 30 ).^
Before going on to study the meaning of possibility, actuality and
necessity as expressed by the modal forms, I wish to explore some
consequences of the proposed formal representation of the grammar of
these forms.
We can understand Kant's theory as providing a canonical
analysis of judgments employing such modifiers as 'can be', and 'must
be', or of judgments expressed by 'possibly', 'actually', or 'neces-
sarily'. Kant's theory draws the important distinction between surface
grammar—the language in which a judgment is expressed—and the depth
grammar or logical analysis which lays bare the acts of the
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understanding involved in making the judgment,
are analyzed in the following manner:
Thus, modal judgments
IV. 2. 3. Surface Grammar
S judges tliat — can (may) he —
S judges that — is —




S Ass. (is)( )
SAp/(ls)(' ).
Arthur Lovejoy tias argued that Kant has taken over an earlier
theory of the modal analysis of Judgment proposed by Lambert and
merely changed the names of the modal forms/' According to Lambert,





A can (or may) be B
A is B
A must be B.
But to say that Kant merely introduces a new terminology is to miss the
oiiginal contribution which Kant makes to the logical analysis of these
judgments tlirough the distinction between surface and depth grammars.
Lambert's analysis reveals no awareness that the modality of
judgment, its expression as possible, actual or necessary, concerns
how tlie copula is expressed ^ a judger . Lamljort defines modality
simply as an addition to the copula
:
One lias still anotlier division of propositions, which originates
from certain very general deteriTiinations, which one adds to
tlie copula. riiese determinations rest upon tlie differences
of possibility, actuality, and necessity."^
Lambert’s tlieory of modality concerns only tlie copula itself rather
than tlie mode in which tlie judgment is made by the judger. According
to Kant, the verbs 'can bo', 'is', and 'must be' are to be analyzed
with respect to ho^^^ a judger mak(?s the objective? determination of the
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copula. Thus, Kant’s new terminology is far from being ’’both
unnecessary and misleading”, as Loveooy avers; it is intended to make
a significant addition to the logical analysis of judgments. This
addition is that an operator like ’S judges that... can be ’ is a
unit of logical analysis wherein the ’can he’ functions as representing
an adverbial modifier of the act of judging the copula with respect to
thought in general.
In providing this distinctive kind of analysis of modal
judgments, Kant brings modal logic under the purview of a formalized
theory of pragmatics. The modal junctions of judgment occupy the
same grammatical position as pragmatic predicates in recent formalized
studies in the pragmatics of a language.® Pragmatics is the study of
the relationship beti';een users of a language and expressions v;ithin
that language. In its formalized structure pragmatics involves rela-
tions, persons, propositions (perhaps understood as sentences) and
usually times. R. M. Martin has developed formal systems for the
primitive pragmatic relations of preference and acceptance,
S Prfr p, q, t: S prefers p to q at (time) t,
S Ac p, t, a: S accepts p at (time) t to degree a.
Other concepts in modern logic have been formalized in a
manner formally analogous to pragmatic relations. Consider, for
instance, the primitives of epistemic logic (Hintikka):^
S K p: S knows that p,
S B p; S believes that p;
or that of assertoric logic (resche!r )
:^^
S A p: S assorts that p.
These logics involve operators v\/hich, in their formal representation.
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are characterized as relations beU^een persons and propositions (or
sentences) which they entertain in some manner in consciousness.
Reseller defines the goal of a logic of assertion as the attempt ”to
systematize the theory of the logical relationship between assertors
and the propositions they assert” (p. 250). Thus, there are formal
grounds for considering these logics as also pragmatic in structure.
(G. H. von Wright refers to epistemic and assertion logics as
modal logics, rather than as pragmatic logics. Von Wright bases his
terminology upon a formal analogy bet^veen traditional modal concepts,
or alethic modalities, and epistemic, deontic and existential concepts^^
that reveals important insights into common decision procedures in
these logics. However, von Wright’s use of the term ’modal logic’
cannot preclude drawing other formal analogies that provide insights
into similarities and differences in grammatical structure. For
clarity in dealing with Kant’s logic, I feel it is best to reserve the
title Modal Logic” to the logic of alethic modalities, possibility,
actuality and necessity, and to use the term ’pragmatic logic ’ to
describe those logics employing relationships between persons and the
propositions they entertain.
)
Traditionally, modal logic has developed an unpragmatic analysis
of the operators ’It is possible that’ and ’It is necessary that’.
Lewis’ formalization of these operators by means of ’^’ and ’g’ is
unpragmatic in this sense. In contrast to Lewis’, Kant’s position is
that an adequate analysis of alethic modalities as employed in a judg-
ment must bring the judger and his relationship to what he judges into
modal logic. The possibility or necessity of a judgment can only be
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constituted with regard to liow the cognition relates to the principles
of thought in general, the principles of objectivity, for the judger
making the judgment. Thus, Kant wishes to construct the formal study
of modal logic as part of a pragmatic logic.
These various kinds of logic, and their relationships, may be















However, we must he careful hov\? we compare Kantian modal logic with
contemporary formal systems of pragmatic logics.
Only Thomas K. Swing among recent commentators has recognized
that Kant’s modal logic falls into what I have called a pragmatic logic.
To explain Kant's peculiar usage of modal terms, we will
employ G. H. von Wright's classification of modal functions.
. . . Tlius Kant replaces the traditional modes with his
epistemic modes. Whereas the former have been given the
illegitimate function of characterizing the content of know-
ledge, lie means to maintain, the latter will be given the
only legitimate modal function of characterizing the modes
of knowledge.
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Kant recognizes three episteraic modes: the problematic
the assertoric, and the apodeictic (p. 17 ).
But Swing’s identification of Kantian modal logic with an
epistemic logic is grossly inadequate and marred by confusions. Swing
offers only one sentence to explain the meaning of the modal forms:
The problematic judgment is one whose truth is unknown or
undetermined
j
the assertoric judgment is one whose truth
IS known or verified; and the apodeictic judgment is one
whose truth is guaranteed by the laws of thought alone
(p. 18).
Ihese definitions omit how each modal form expressed a relationsliip of
the copula to principles of objectivity. In this respect the modal
forms are concerned with the possibility, actuality and necessity of
truth, tliat is, with the alethic modalities. Thus, that truth is
either undetermined, verified or guaranteed (the modes of knowledge)
is only part of what is expressed by the modal forms. Swing’s concep-
tion of Kant’s modal functions as merely epistemic modalities fails
to incorporate Kant’s proposed theory of the alethic modalities. For
Kant, the modes of knowledge would be expressed by the modal forms
only in virtue of their expression of the alethic modalities.
Hence, Swing cannot criticize Kant for illegitimately
"converting” an intrapositional function, one which characterizes the
content of knowledge as do the traditional modal operators, into
extrapropositional functions wliich are not "constituents of propo-
sitions" (p. 19). According to Swing, Kant, in replacing modal
operators with epistemic ones, overlooks that he is converting a func-
tion of judgment wliich characterizes the content of judgment into a
function which does not pertain as sucli to the content of judgment.
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However, Kant is not replacing modal concepts with epistemic ones,
but is proposing to analyze possibility, actuality and necessity in
judgments in a new and incisive manner, which Swing takes no pains
to assess. Moreover, in arguing that Kant’s modal operators are not
constituents of propositions. Swing is using the notion of a propo-
sition in a totally un-Kantian sense (see IV. 3).
The lelationship between Kantian modal logic and contemporary
logic IS this: While Kant’s modal functions are grammatically
analogous to pragmatic predicates, Kant’s conception of what consti-
tutes a modal logic differs significantly from the modern conception.
A formal system includes a predicate or set of predicates taken as
primitive, a set of definitions and axioms developed from these
primitives. Such a logic may be called an external logic, for this
kind of logic presents only the formal properties of a function, which
is taken as primitive, with respect to its operation in inferences.
Kant’s system of modal logic in this regard is exhausted by the theory
of immediate inference and syllogistic inference (see IV. 4).
On the other hand, Kant develops what can be called an internal
logic for the modal functions, for his logic concerns what is thought
in making a problematic, assertoric or apodictic judgment. In this
way, Kantian modal logic is concerned with the contribution that the
modal forms to the possibility of tlie objectivity of the judgment.
This internal logic can be expressed by means of the unity which is
yielded by each modal function. Thus, to formulate Kant’s modal logic
we must define those unities upon which the possibility, actuality and
necessity of a cognition depends.
no
Nevertheless, we shall see in the following section that we
can provide a set of formal axioms for Kant's three modal functions.
§ 3 - Tlie Unities of the Modal Forms
In biinging modal logic under the purview of a pragmatic
logic, Kant precludes any attempt to define, without violence, his
modal functions by means of or ’q’
.
It is simply wrong-headed to
define a pragmatic concept by a semantical one, as in
S Apj (is)(
) =df. Dp,
(where ’p' is the content represented by ’(is)( )'). This im.possi-
bility might suggest the following means of relating the two systems
of modal logic :
S Probj (is)( ) =:df. S judges that^p
S Assj (is)( ) =df. S judges that p
S Apj (is)( ) =df. S judges that Dp.
But how are we to construe the grammatical role of the alethic modal
operators in each definiens?
If and ’q’ attach themselves to the propositional variables
such that ’S judges that...' is a distinct syntactical part of each
definiens, then the relationship of judgment is similar in all these
cases. Recall that with regard to quantifiers (II. 1), the relationship
'is compared v%’ith' would have been empty unless its meanings could be
distinguished according to the relations 'is compared with all' or
'is compared with some'. Thus, if 'S judges that...' is the same in
all these cases, then problematic, assertoric, or apodictic judgment
would not define any modification of the act of judging.
if, on the other liand, the modal operators are viewed as
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syntactical parts of the relation itself, as, for example, in 'S
judges thatO...', then the meaning of judging would be completely
determined by the semantical concepts of possibility, truth (actuality),
and necessity. But this conception of the modal forms is un-Kantlan.
The semantical determination of the truth of a judgment pertains to
just the content of tlie judgment. However, modal forms pertain to
how that which is possibly, actually, or necessarily true is considered
to be true by a judger. Thus, Kant’s modal functions cannot be defined
simply as judging that which is possibly, actually, or necessarily
true with respect to the semantical determination of the content of
a judgment.
To define Kant’s modal functions we must evolve a new and
oiiginal conception of how the modal concepts of possihilityj actualityj
and necessity are involved in judgment. These concepts m.ust be defined
in terms of what is possible, actual, or necessar^^ for a judger to judge
with respect to thought in general. A problematic judgment expresses
the unity that the cognition is possible for a judger to entertain
with respect to .laws of objectivity; the assertoric, that the cognition
is actual with respect to these laws; and the apodictic, that the
objectivity of the cognition is guaranteed by these very laws them-
selves.
1. Th£ Problematic Judgment . In the Critique
,
Kant defines
the unity of the problematic judgment as follows:
The problematic proposition is therefore that which expresses
only logical (whicli is not objective) possibility—a free
choice of admitting such a proposition, and a purely optional
admission of it into the understanding (BlOl).
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This definition combines the t;.;o central aspects of problematical
Judging: (1) problematical Judging expresses formal or logical
possibility and (2) it represents an "arbitrary” or "optional" taking
up of a cognition into the understanding. This arbitrary taking up
cannot be understood psychologically or as a mere guess as to what is
the case. The optional character of the cognition must be understood
with respect to that which is objective or empirically possible.
Kant’s First Postulate of Empirical Thought in General is:
That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience
that is, with the conditions of intuition and of concepts
is possible (B265 ).
’
Here Kant is speaking of objective possibility as that which agrees
with the formal conditions of intuition and of concepts in that it
can be given in experience. The concept of the objectively possible
contains a synthesis which belongs to possible experience.
Flowever, it is Kant’s point in this discussion that mere
logical possibility in the concept of a thing is not sufficient to
determine the objective reality of the concept (B268-269). Thus, many
conceptions are logically possible, but their mere logical possibility
does not guarantee their representation of a possible synthesis of
experience. It is precisely in this sense that one expresses an
arbitrary taking up of a cognition in a problematic Judgment: the
cognition is arbitrary with respect to what is objectively possible.
Thus, in problematical Judging, the Judger has a free choice because
he is not concerned with the objective possibility of what he Judges.
This logical possibility of the cognition, while being
arbitrary witli respect to what constitutes objectivity, must conform
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to a rule in virtue of which it is logically possible. This rule is
the principle of non-contradiction (see II.2):
A judgment is logically possible if, and only if it
contains nothing v^hich is self-contradictory.
’
In N 3099, Kant himself v;rites,
Problematic judgments are those whose material is given
with the possible relationship bet\N?een the predicate
and subject.
Thus, in problematical judging, the judger considers his cognition as
logically possible, an act which represents a free admission of the
cognition into the understanding regardless of what may be objectively
possible.
The unity of the problematic judgment is defined in terms of
logical possibility in the following manner:
S Probj (is)(
)
= S entertains (is)(
) as (only) logically
possible
; i.e., (is)( ) is thought of only
in terms of its not containing a contradiction
in the relationship of subject and predicate.
In judging problematically, the judger is entertaining in his conscious
ness the cognition in such a way that any other judger may make this
same judgment, but only as that which can be entertained as possible.
Hence, the contribution that the function of problematic judging makes
to the objectivity of the judgment is the minimum requirement that any
judger be able to accept the judgment into the understanding.
Although Kantian modal logic is concerned with defining the
unity of modal forms as elements in the constitution of the objecti-
vity of judgment, it is by no means an uninteresting endeavor to
provide a system of formal axioms for the modal forms. In what follows
’p' stands for the unity ’(is)( )'; this move facilitates the
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statement of the axiom as well as provides an easy means to express
negation. (Axioms prefaced by ’ are true for any of the three
modal functions.
)
First, since problematical judging rests upon a principle of
logical possibility which excludes anything self-contradictory
,
cogni-
tion problematically judged possesses a content which is logically
possible.
S Probj p > () p.
From this it follows that
~^p > ~S Prohj p,
or that problematical judging must conform to that which is logically
possible. In general,
p< > ^ S Probj p
.
Moreover, since problematical judging represents an act which
can be made by any judger, we have
* (Objectivity) S Probj p >(x)^(x Probj p).
Furthermore, every judger must make at least one problematic judgment:
(S)(Ep)(S Probj p);
and every judgment that a judger makes must be (at least) problemati-
cally judged:
(p)(S judges that p >S Probj p).
Finally, it is possible V'/ith regard to any proposition for a
judger to judge it or its contradictory as possible; hence,
^ ( S Probj p V S Probj ~p )
;
but, since a problematical judgment must be consistent, a judger cannot
judge a cognition and its contradictory at the same time.
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* (Consistency) Probj (p & ~p).
2. llie Assertoric Judgn^. This form of judgment expresses
what IS formally involved in making an assertion. Assertion can be
taken in a sense in which it is possible to assert either what is
true (a true assertion) or what is false (a false assertion). In
general, contemporary logics of assertion treat assertion independently
of the actual truth or falsity of what is asserted. Kant's treatment
of assertion must be constrasted with this conception of a logic of
assertion. Owing to Kant's concern in his modal logic with the inter-
nal logic of assertion and with what is required to constitute the
objectivity or universal validity of a judgment, the logic of assertion,
for Kant, is a theory of what is formally necessary in any act of true
asseiting. Kant's sense of assertion, then, is a sense in which it
can be said that a judger asserts what indeed is the case.
In the "Canon", Kant says,
I cannot assert anything, that is, declare it to be a judgment
necessarily valid for everyone, save as it gives rise to
conviction. Persuasion I can hold to on my own account, if
it so pleases me, but I cannot, and ought not, to profess
to impose it as binding on anyone but myself (B849-B850).
What is asserted is universally valid for everyone else to assert as
well (see the Axiom of Objectivity). The possibility of the objectivity
of an assertion arises through its compliance in a specific manner with
the laws of thought in general. For Kant, the determination of the
specific relation that guarantees the objectivity of making an asser-
tion is the subject matter of a modal logic of assertion.
According to Kant, the assertoric judgment indicates that the
affirmation or denial of the cognition is posited in conformity with
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the laws of the understanding. This principle emerges from BlOl of
the Critic
]^^ though Kemp-Smith mistranslates the appropriate passage
so as to obscure the priraciple of assertoric judging. I shall trans-
late the passage correctly.
Ihe assertoric proposition deals with logical actuality ortruth—for instance, in a hypothetical syllogism the ante-
cedent is problematic in the major premiss, assertoric in
the minor—and what the assertoric proposition shows is
that it Itself is already bound up with the laws of the
understanding (BlOl).-^^
Theie are two distinguishable principles of actuality in Kant.
The principle which comes immediately to mind is the Second Postulate
concerning the positing of the existence of things:
That which is bound up with the material conditions of
experience, that is, with sensation, is actual (B266).
In his discussion of this postulate, Kant argues that the existence
of an object can be known only through its connection with some actual
perception in accordance with the analogies of experience "which
define all real connection in an experience in general" (B272). Kant's
point is that positing an object as existing must proceed in accordance
with the principles of empirical reasoning.
The second form of positing is logical rather than material
and is expressed by the function of the assertoric judgment. We may
rephrase the Second Postulate to correspond to the principle given
in BlOl:
That which is bound up with the formal conditions of the
understanding is logically actual.




) as logically actual,
i.e., or being in accordance with forint
’
laws of understanding and reason.
To be in accordance with formal laws is to fulfil that which
IS formally demanded by the understanding or reason for a cognition to
be actual, and hence valid for any other judger to assert. If the
cognition is empirical then it must be bound up with logical laws
concerning the empirical employment of the understanding. In parti-
cular, it must be in accordance with already accepted cognition as
their ground and consequent. Asserting, thus, is a procedure which in
its formal aspects involves the entertaining of truth in virtue of its
conformity to the formal requirements of understanding. Such a judg-
ment would be valid for everyone to assert.
By means of assertoric judgment, we leave the realm of merely
relating concepts to that of making proposition (Satz), or the
positing of the cognition.
A
judgment is the relationship of one
representation to another; all that is said is that the validity of
one concept depends upon the validity of the other. However, since a
judgment as such is concerned only with the relationship of these
representations, nothing is said concerning the actual validity of
the second representation. Thus, judgment as such can be only
problematic
.
But through assertion, and the objectivity that is thereby
accomplished through conformity to the laws of understanding, we posit
the cognition as objectively valid, and hence move from the conception
of a mere possible object to the conception of that which is actual.
Tlius, conformity to tlie laws of tlie understanding makes
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objective reference possible. Kant's theory of the assertorio
judgment can be understood as a theory of how objective reference
becomes possible, and of how this reference can be formally represented
in logic. Thus, the formal theory of the assertoric form of judgment
IS the study of the meclianisms of reference insofar as a general or
purely formal logic may consider them. In the Vorlesungen /Metapliyslk.
Kant characterizes the assertoric judgment as involving the thought
of existential import:
In the assertoric judgment I add a predicate to the object
outside of me, and not in thought (p. 39 ). 15
What is said to distinguish the problematic judgment from the
assertoric is that in the problematic judgment I conceive of the predi-
cate belonging to the object merely in thought (logical possibility),
while in the assertoric the predicate is conceived to belong to an
object "outside of me" (actuality).
An assertoric judgment must be also problematic. Thus, an
axiom characterizing Kant’s conception of assertion is
S Assj p >S Probj p.
Unlike problematic judgment, though, assertoric judgment is not possible
with regard to any (logically possible) content. Not everything capable
of being judged can be asserted or declared to be a judgment necessarily
valid for everyone. Hence,
~(p) S Ass p.
J
Reseller, in his system of assertion logic, A 2 (PP- 251-252),





Pf~q, then S asserts p^S asserts q.~p >(ES)~S asserts p.
The Axiom of Commitment specifies that any assertor asserts all logical
consequences of his assertions. Commitment defines Reseller’s notion
of assertion as ^licit ration^ assertion : one asserts all logical
consequences of what he asserts even if these consequences are not
consciously entertained. I do not believe Kant would accept this
axiom for
>
tor him, assertion is the conscious .judging with
respect to laws of the understanding. Lincoln’s Axiom, on the other
hand, states that every falsehood is avoided by at least one assertor.
This axiom may be strengthened to include a universal quantifier:
~p >(S)~S Assj p,
whicli says that if p is false, then no judger asserts it to be true.
From this axiom, it follows that
(ES)(S Assj p) >p.
This axiom states that if one judger asserts a proposition, that
judgment is true. This point corresponds to Kant’s contention that an
assertion carries existential import and is necessarily valid for
everyone to assert. It is an interesting question whether these axioms
can be strengthened further to include modal notions as follows
:
~p >(S)~^ Assj p,
(no judger can assert what is false), and
(ES)^(S Assj p) >p.
3. The Apodictic Judgment . The apodictic judgment is one in
which the judger conceives of the affirmation or denial as necessary.
Again, in BlOl of the Critique, Kant puts forth tlie principle of the
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apodictic judgment:
The apodeictic proposition thinks the assertoric as
eterained by the laws of the understanding, and therefore
as a firming a priori
; and in this manner it expresses
logical necessity.
The apodictic judgment is defined in terms of its relationship to the
assertoric: the apodictic judgment takes up the objectivity of the
cognition provided by the assertoric judgment and maintains this objec-
tivity on the basis of a p_riori laws alone. Kant often metaphorically
describes such a cognition as ’’inseparably” united with the under-
standing itself. Thus, in an apodictic judgment, objectivity or
universal validity follows directly from the universal laws of the
understanding itself, and hence, expresses the logical necessity of
the cognition.
Again, we may compare the thought of logical necessity in the
apodictic judgment with empirical or material necessity expressed in
the Third Postulate of Empirical Thought:
That which in its connection with the actual is determined
in accordance with universal conditions of experience is
(that is, exists as) necessary (B266).
In the same manner, that which is determined by the universal logical
laws of understanding is apodictic. Nevertheless, empirical necessity
reveals a marked distinction from logical necessity. The former can
be only ’’comparatively a priori, relative to some other previous given
existence” (B279), in accordance with the empirical laws of causality.
Logical necessity occurs in connection of given concepts determined
merely by the logical laws of the understanding. Such laws include
not only the laws of formal logic (for example, the principle of tlie
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excluded middle In virtue of which the formal necessity of the copula
is determined) but also the laws of transcendental logic.
Ibus, the unit3^ of the apodictic judgment is
s Apj (is)(
) = s entertains (is)(
) as logically necessary.
i.e., as constituted from the a priori laws of
the understanding.
Kant’s conception of the apodictic judgment allows empirical
propositions to be apodictically judged, if they can be constituted on
the basis of the laws of tlie understanding. Scientific laws, while not
being wholly constituted a priori, contain an a priori element in their
conception in that they can be known or verified on the basis of the
laws of the understanding alone. I shall provide an example of such
a law in V.2. Hence, the objectivity constituted through apodictic
judging is known to be universally valid through the logical laws of
the understanding.
Since the apodictic judgment takes up the assertoric, all
apodictic judgments are also assertoric.
S Apj p—>S Assj p.
Moreover,
S Apj p >~S Ass^ ~p.
To develop a system of axioms for ’Apj’ further, we note that
because of the inseparableness of the apodictic judgment from the under-
standing, it is impossible to judge tlie opposite of that wliich is
apodictic. On this basis, we can introduce the following axioms:
p< > Apj ~p,
~p< > ~^S Apj p.




However, the entailment cannot proceed from right to left because it
IS possible for S to apodictically judge a scientific law, p, for
which It IS false that Dp. Thus, Kant's notion of apodictically judging
is broader than the logical notion ofQ.
§ 4 Negative Modalities and Contraposition
This final section will deal with the problem of expressing
judgments of the negative categorical modalities—impossibility
,
non-
actuality, and contingency—within the grammar of Kant’s modal logic
and with the rule of immediate inference belonging to the modal forms,
which Kant alleges to be contraposition.
f • Judgments of Negative Modality . In the Table of Categories
in the Critique, Kant associates a dual listing of modal categories
with each modal form of judgment:
With the problematic judgment: Possibility—Impossibility
With the assertoric judgment: Existence—Non-existence
With the apodictic judgment: Necessity—Contingency.
T. K. Swing claims that this dual listing is procedurally incorrect.
Kant derives possibility and impossibility from the
problematic judgment, existence a~n^ n^onexistence from the
assertoric judgment, and necessity and contingency from
apodeictic judgment. Here, however, has derived too many
categories because he obtains six from three forms of
judgment. Moreover, he has no right to derive impossibility
from the problematic judgment, nonexistence from the asser-
toric judgment, and contingency from the apodeictic judgment.




and then to add the other three
categories as their upposities. In spite of this procedural
flaw, Kant’s derivation of the modal categories is tlie least
questionable operation in tlie Metaphysical Deduction (p. 27).
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However, Swing fails to explain what the problem is. In this section,
I shall develop what is misleading about this dual derivation and how
modal categories relate to the modal functions of judgment.
We have seen that when these functions of judgment go with the
affirmative copula, the resulting unity expresses the logical possi-
bility, actuality, or necessity of judgment. Likewise, it may be
thought that since the modal forms also go with the negative copula,
the negative modalities are to be correlated with problematically,
assertorically, or apodictically judging the negative copula. This
view would provide a clear justification for the dual listing. However,
this view of the relationship betiveen negative modalities and the modal
foims is incoherent.
Ihe following table would define the unity of the modal
judgments with negative copulas:
S Probj (is)~... = S entertains p as impossible
S Assj (is)~. .. = S entertains p as non-actual
S Apj (is)~... = S entertains p as contingent.
The problem is to specify ’p ’ in each case. Consider the following
formulations of this table with respect to negative categorical judg-
ments :
S Probj (is)~(V(A, B)) = S entertains that B is not possibly
affirmed of all A
S AsSj (is)~(V(A, B)) = S entertains that B is not actuality
affirmed of all A
^ ^Pj (is)~(V(A, B)) = S entertains that B is not necessarily
affirmed of all A.
This table follows the suggested interpretation, for entertaining that
B is not possibly affirmed of all A is equivalent to entertaining that
all A is B is impossible, and similarly for the other modal judgments.
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(Entertaining that B is not necessarily affirmed of all A
does not yield the full equivalent of entertaining that all A is R
IS contingent, if we think of contingency as ’-Qp & ~D~p’. However,
for the purposes of stating Kantian logic, it is sufficient for con-
tingency to mean '<^~p ’
,
or equivalently ’~Dp’. In the Vorlesungen /
I^taphysik, Kant defines contingency as that of which the opposite
IS possible (p. 45 ), qj;. that wliich is not necessary.)
’S Probj (is)~(V(A, B))’ is alleged to be the logical rendering
of S's judging that all A is B is impossible. By elementary modal
logic, this judgment is equivalent to S's judging that Some A is not
B is necessary. This second judgment would have to be rendered as
S Apj (is)~(q(A, B)), which, on the suggested table, would be the
judgment that Some A is B is contingent. But it is obvious tliat Some
A is not B is necessary is not equivalent to Some A is B is contingent.
Thus, if 'S Probj (is)~(V(A, B))' is taken as the rendering of All A
is B is impossible, a coherent rendering cannot be given to
'S Apj (is)^-(q(A, B))’.
I take the following table to be the correct version of the
unities yielded by modal forms and the negative copula:
IV. 4.1. MODALITY AND NEGATIVE COPULATION (I)
S Probj (is)~(V(A, B)) = S entertains no A is B as possible
S Assj (is)~fV(A, B)) = S entertains no A is B as actual
S Apj (is)~(V(A, B)) = S entertains no A is B as necessary.
This table reveals that in bringing a modal form into play with a
negative copula, one entertains the negative cognition problematically.
assertorically
,
or apodictically Vv;hen he judges by means of an affir-
mative copula.
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But to hold a negative judgment as possible is to hold its
contradiction, an affirmative judgment, as contingent. Thus, there
is no reason to associate the modal forms with negative copulas with
the listing of the modal categories in the Critique, for IV. 4.1 yields
the following table relating modal forms, negative copulation, and
negative categorial modalities.
IV. 4. 2. MODALITY AND NEGATIVE COPULATION (II)
S Probj (is)~... = S entertains p to be contingent
S Assj (is)~... = S entertains p to be non-actual
S Apj (is)~. .. = S entertains p to be impossible,
where 'p ' is the contradictory, affirmative form of the cognition
represented by ’(is)~...’. Kant himself justifies this reading in the
Vorlesungen/Metaphysik when he maintains that a negative judgment of
necessary apodicticity represents impossibility (p. 22).^”^ We may say
also that a negative judgment held problematically represents contin-
gency.
These tables provide the appropriate logical coherency we
found lacking in the originally suggested view. This coherency is
proven in the following tables in which each of the A, E, I, 0 cate-
goricals is stated with either the problematic or apodictic form and
two translations are given. The first is in terms of the unity yielded
in IV. 4.1; the second, in terms of IV. 4. 2. These two translations are
equivalent to one another by elementary modal logic. In the second
column, the procedure is undertaken with regard to the modal forms and
the affirmative copula. Each translation is to begin with the phrase
’ S enterta ins . . .
’
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IV. 4. 3. MODAL OPPOSITION
S Probj (is)~(\y(A, B))
. . . no A is B as possible
. . . some A is B as contingent
S Probj (is)-(V(A, B))
9ll A is B as possible
some A is not B as contingent
S Probj (is )~(q(A, B))
. . . some A is not B as possible
. .. all A is B as contingent
S Probj (is)-(q(A, B))
some A is B as possible
no A is B is contingent
S Apj_(is)~(V(A, B))
. . . no A is B as necessary
. . . some A is B as impossible
S Apj (is)-(V(A, B))
all A is B as necessary
some A is not B as impossible
S Apj (is)~(q(A, B))
. . . some A is not B as necessary
. .. all A is B as impossible
S Apj (is)-(q(A, B))
some A is B is necessary
all A is B as impossible.
IV, 4. 3 reveals that the logical relations of opposition can be
formulated syntactically for modal judgments, as they were formulated
for the categorical judgments in II. 2. To state the contradiction of
a modal judgment of problematicity or apodicticity one not only must
change the Quality and Quantity of the judgment but also its modality.
The contradiction of S's problematically judging (is)-(\/(A, B)) is
S’s apodictically judging (ishm, B)). Contrariety and subcontra
-
riet^^ for modal judgments can be formulated similarly : for contrary
opposition, one changes Quantity and Quality of the apodictic judg-
ment; for subcontrary opposition, one changes' Quantity and Quality of
a problematic judgment.
The recognition of modal opposition helps explain why Kant lists
the modal categories in the peculiar fashion that he does in the
Critique . As Swing points out, the members of the dual listing are
meant as contradictory opposite categories. However, in the meta-
physical deduction, each modal category is associated witli the whole
unity of tlie judgment tliat is yielded by the modal form, and not with
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the modal form itself as an element in the judgment. Thus, the
category of necessity is associated with the unity thought in cognition
expressed apodictically . The opposite category of necessity is con-
tingency. This category represents the opposite of judging a
cognition apodictically; that is, it represents judging a cognition
contingently. Judging contingently, however, is not apodictically
judging a negative copula, but, as IV.4.2 reveals, it is judging
problematically. Logically, we require the change in modal form to
express judgments of categorial opposition.
Thus, the logical form of judging the opposite of apodictically,
that is, judging that something is contingent, is judging that cogni-
tion problematically. Kant's listing in the Critique represents the
logical relation of opposition betv^een categories; the general logic,
on the other hand, reveals the logical form of judgments expressing
such categories.
2. Contraposition . The only immediate inference that Kant
provides governing the formal inter-relations of modal forms is
contraposition by which one proceeds from an assertoric judgment to
an apodictic one. In the Auszug, Meier presents the following view
of contraposition:
A universal affirmative judgment is contraposed when one
changes its predicate into a negative concept and denies
[of it] the preceeding subject of that universal. All true
universal affirmative judgments can be contraposed, that is,
to what its predicate does not belong, to that its subject
also does not belong (§ 352).^®
This same doctrine is formulated by Kant in the Pblitz notes:
The contraposition of judgments. There takes place a
metathesis, i.e., of relocation of terms, in whicli Quality
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is changed into a negative proposition. The Quantityremains the same, because only universal propositions
can be contraposed (Pol., p. 585 ). 19
^
To this forn.«la1;ioo, Kant acids that once these formal operations are
carried out, the modal form of the judgment is changed from assertori-
City to apodictlcity (N 3170). This part of contraposition is
original with Kant.
The Kantian account of contraposition can be stated as a
me^-dies]^ or relocation of terms in an A categorical negating the
original predicate and changing the quality from affirmative to
negative; and thus affecting a change of modal form. This inference
may be expressed formally:
(Contraposition) S Assj (is)-(v(A, B))—>S Apj (is)~(V(~B, A)).
In N 3170 the contrapositive of 'All bodies are divisible’ is given
as What therefore is not divisible is no body.
(The account of contraposition in the Logik
, § 54, is in error.
Contraposition is defined as a formal operation affecting the change
in modal forms from assertoric to apodictic judgments involving
(1) a metathesis or relocation of terms in which (2) (universal)
quantity is retained but (3) affirmative quality is changed to negative
quality. These steps take one from an (assertoric) A categorical to
an (apodictic) converse of the corresponding E categorical. But this
procedure described by Jasche is clearly invalid, for an A proposition
does not entail its corresponding E proposition to which the converse
is equivalent. Jasche has omitted that the original predicate is
negated in tlie process of relocation. )
Tliere are two separate questions regarding Kant’s tlieory of
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contraposition. First, what is the relationship between this theory
and the traditional one of contraposition? Secondly, why does contra-
position affect a change in modal form?
Ihe formal operations involved in the metathesis of the
Meier-Kant theory of contraposition do not correspond to the inference
of contraposition as traditionally understood. Traditional contra-
position is an inference that is valid for both A and 0 categorical
propositions consisting of an interchange of subject and predicate, in
which both ore negated, while retaining the same quantity and quality.
’All men are mortal’ has the contrapositive ’All non-mortals are non-
men’. However, in the Meier-Kant theory, the contrapositive would be
’No non-mortals are men’. Moreover, neither Meier nor Kant mentions
contraposition with regard to 0 categoricals.
Traditional contraposition is a derived inference involving
successive steps of obversion, conversion, obversion. As we discovered
in III. 2, Kant never states the inference of obversion in his logic.
But obversion partially is taken up in Kant’s theory of contraposition,
for the described metathesis yie].ds the converted obverse (the partial
contrapositive) of an A proposition. Thus, the Meier-Kant theory of
contraposition takes contraposition through only the first two steps
of obversion and conversion. (One can obtain the traditional obverse
of A in the Meier-Kant logic through re-converting the contrapositive.
)
But obversion can be only partially absorbed by contraposition.
Since we can obtain the obverse for only an A categorical, E. I, and
0 propositions are left without formally stated inferences of obversion.
Converted obversion is invalid for E and I categoricals. Moreover,
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the failure of the validity of contraposition for E and 0 categoricals
has tlie formal effec^ of denying that negative judgments can be
obverted (see III. 2), for the immediate inferences which are part of
Kant’s logical grammar do not permit obversion of negative propositions.
It may be thought that contraposition, traditionally valid for 0 cate-
goricals, is invalid in Kant’s logic because the intermediate step in
converting the obverse consists in obverting a negative categorical.
However, in a very early note, Kant formulated the following
succession of inferences (N 3187
Some men are not learned.
.’. Some men are unlearned.
Some unlearned things are men.
The result of these inferences is the converted obverse, that is, the
Meier-Kant contrapositive, of the original 0 proposition. Without ever
formally recognizing obversion for 0 propositions in his theory of
immediate inference (see VI. 1), Kant, at one time, did countenance
the possibility and validity of obverting the negative, particular
categorical. Nevertheless, the interesting question is, Why are these
inferences never recognized as constituting contraposition? The answer
lies in Kant’s contention that the metathesis involved in contraposition
fails for 0 categoricals, we must explain why converted obversion will
not yield the appropriate cliange of modal form, which Kant contends to
be the concern of contraposition.
Kant’s explanation for why contraposition affects a change
of modal form is,
If the predicate as that which contains under itself the
subject is then denied of the entire sphere, so also must
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(LoS,1
that is, the subject
Kant is maintaining that if one begins from the assertion fan
assertoric judgment) that a subject, h, is contained under a predicate,
B, and then proceeds to deny this predicate of the entire realm of
being (as is done when the subject -concept, ~B, is negative) then one
deny the original subject of that negative concept. Hence, the
judgment is apodictic. This point can be seen clearly from the logic
of negative concepts, for the negative concept ’~B’ excludes any
concept S encompassed under B, The universal, affirmative assertoric
judgment places the extension of S under B. Thus, S must be denied
of -v^B.
Kant explains the apodicticity of the contrapositive in
N 3170.“ Although his argument is not clear, I believe it may be
reconstructed in the following manner. We have seen in the preceding
discussion of modal opposition that a judgment which expresses tlie
impossibility of the opposite of a cognition is the same as one
maintaining the cognition apodictically . Kant contends that when an
assertoric judgment is posited, it is impossible to judge the opposite
of the contrapositive. Hence the contrapositive is maintained apodic-
ticall)^ The assertoric judgment that all men are mortal expresses
the impossibility of some non-mortal’s being men. But this judgment
shows the apodicticity of the judgment that no non-mortal is human.
The impossibility of some non-mortal’s being men follows from the
assertoric proposition that all men are mortal by means of the logic
of negative terms.
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Thus, contraposition cannot affect a change of modal forms
unless the original assertoric judgment is universal and affirmative,
for the whole subject must be contained under the predicate. Without
meeting this condition, the assertoric judgment will not express the
impossibility of the opposite of the converted obverse (the contra-
positive). Hence, the converted obverse of an 0 categorical, even
iT is admitted into the logic as a legitimate consequence of an
0 proposition, will not fulfil the conditions of being a true
contrapos itive
.
The remaining question is. Why is the operation of converted
obversion of an A categorical unique among immediate inferences in
affecting a change in modal forms? Kant would argue that no other
operation is such that the opposite of that which is obtained is
represented by the original proposition as impossible.
I
CHAPTER V
THE CERTAINTY OF JUDGMENT: JUDCMENT’S SUBJECTIVE SIDE
In the preceding chapter I argued that the modality of judgment
concerns how a cognition is considered to be true by a judger. The
objectivity of a judgment is accomplished, in part, by the (subjective)
act of bringing the unity of a cognition to the forms of considering
a judgment to be true in relation to thought in general. Such acts
are expressed by problematically, assertorically or apodictically
judging. Moreover, in considering a cognition to be true, there arises
a degree of certa in cy for the judger in the truth (objectivity) of this
cognition. This ceitainty may be called the subjective aspect or
side of a judgment, for it pertains to how the judger is related in
consciousness to the objectivity of his judgment. The question
of certainty is, Hov'^ sure is the judger in his own consciousness of
the objectivity or the universal validity of his cognition for all
judgers?
Since the concern of modal logic is to lay out the logical
forms and unities by which a cognition is considered to be true, the
modal forms express and are concerned with the certainty of judgment
with respect to thought in general. Thus, the reconstruction of Kant’s
modal logic would bo incomplete if tlie subjective aspect of problematic,
assertoric and apodictic judgment v-;ere omitted.
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The certainty of a cognition arises through a self-questioning
on the part of the judger as to the grounds that he possesses for
maintaining the objectivity of his cognition. The sufficiency of
these grounds for allowing or compelling his consideration of truth
gives rise to various possible degrees of certainty, which are thereby
expressed through the modal form of judgment. In virtue of the kind
of certainty the judger has in his cognition, he may be said to opine,
believe or know that which he judges. Thus, Kant’s modal forms play
a central role in explicating the logical form of this traditional
epistemological triumverate of opinion, belief and knowledge.
In this chapter I shall first reconstruct Kant’s general
theory of certainty in human judgment. The second section will deal
with the application of this theory to the analysis of the logical
structure of opinion, belief and knowledge.
§ 1 - Assent and the Theory of Certainty
Kant’s general term for the act of judging, subjectively
considered, is assent (Filivahrhalten, or Vor\N?ahrhalten ). Assent is
the means by which a judger represents his judgment as true (N 2473 ),1
and rests upon the reasons that the judger has for considering his
judgment as objective. Kant maintains.
Assent concerns only the ability to judge in respect to the
subjective criteria for subsuming a judgment under objective
rules (N 2472 ).^
Assent, therefore, is concerned with the subjective validity of a
judgment, i-jith the judger ’s ability to come to know the truth of the
judgment. It is obvious that a judgment (the representation of that
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which is objective) is possible only if it is subjectively valid for
the judger who makes it.
In pertaining to the subjective validity of a judgment, assent
can be either certain or uncertain. Certainty and uncertainty of
assent arises from the different kinds of reasons one may have for
entertaining a cognition. Kant divides the reasons for which one
assents to a cognition into two general kinds (N 2489):^
(A) Subjective reasons: these reasons pertain to the interests
of the judger and to what he must judge in his own particular
situation (N 2489)."^ Subjective reasons include reasons for
action, i.e., reasons for adopting a practical course of
action, and the demands of moral reasoning. In general sub-
jective reasons which ciiaracterize the judging subject himself
in his own (subjective) situation.
(B) Objective reasons: these reasons pertain to rationality
itself in the conceptualization of objects. That is, these
reasons pertain to the object as such and in this they are
constitutive of the nature of the understanding itself.
Kant sometimes refers to objective reasons as logical
reasons, for they pertain to the inherent structure of the
understanding.
These reasons may be found in the process of self-questioning
to be either sufficient or insufficient for accepting the cognition
as true. Reasons are insufficient when it would still be possible,
given these reasons, to accept the opposite of the cognition; that is,
when it would be possible to assent to or to represent as true the
opposite cognition. Reasons are sufficient to represent a cognition
as true when, on the basis of these reasons, one could not accept the
opposite. These reasons may be sufficient either to make representation
of the truth of a cognition necessary for the judger (hence attaining
apodictic certainty), or to outweigh any reasons for representing the
opposite cognition, though such a representation may still bo logically
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possible.
In the case of insufficiency the judger is conscious of the
contingency or uncertain of his judgment; in the case of sufficiency,
he is conscious that his considering the judgment to be true is
certain. Thus, certainty is the sufficient consciousness of truth or
the subjective necessity of considering a judgment to be true (Bus.,
p. 637).^ Certainty, therefore, consists in one’s consciousness that
in general it is impossible for him to entertain the opposite of his
cognition (N2468).^ In this sense, one is certain of that which he
is free from reason to doubt.
In proposing a theory of certainty and of the sufficiency of
reasons to justify the consideration of truth, Kant is obviously
attempting to answer the radical philosophical doubt put forth by
Descartes. In his First Meditation, Descartes says he is going to
subject everything he formally believed (considered) to be true to
doubt. For doubting to take place, there must be some reason to doubt;
hence, Descartes proposes a number of hypotheses—the Dream Hypothesis
and the Evil-Genius Hypothesis—to cast doubt upon the validity of
experience and mathematics as vehicles to describe and provide know-
ledge of reality. Kant answers this scepticism by revealing the kinds
of reasons that provide certainty in experience, science, mathematics,
morals, and religion. In his theory of certainty, then, Kant is
discovering how certainty may come about in human cognition.
Moreover, complete or apodictic certainty in a judgment yields




Objectively there is no difference betvveen Truth and Certainty.
In coming to have complete certainty in the consideration of trutli,
one comes into the objectivity of what he judges. Thus, one’s cer-
tainty is a universally valid certainty for all judgers when complete
certainty is attained.
Certainty can be either empirical or rational (N 2454
Empirical certainty arises a_ posteriori through the experience of an
object. Empirical certainty, therefore, involves objective grounds
(the judger's own experience of an object) in relation to sensible
representations. This certainty in an empirical cognition rests upon
the representation of an object by means of sensibility through the
understanding (Pol., p. 543).® Thus, we may be empirically certain
of that which we ourselves cognize through the understanding in sensi-
ble experience. (If we base our empirical certainty upon the experience
of some other judger, the empirical certainty is ’’derived" certainty.)
But empirical certainty can be only assertorial certainty (Pol.,
p. 544).^ On the basis of experience one may be certain of the truth
of the given cognition but not that the cognition is necessary, or
must be. This view of empirical certainty is' found in the Busolt
notes
:
Empirically I can be certain of a thing, but only that it
exists, not that it is necessary (Bus., p. 639).^^
The subjective necessity of considering the cognition relates only to
my experience of what is. Thus, empirical certainty does not attain
to full certainty, which is the cognition that truth is necessarily and
universally valid for all judgers.
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Kant specifies two features of empirical certainty by calling
It assertorial. First, it is called "assertorial" because the repre-
sentation of the truth of the cognition is well-founded for the judger
in his experience. Thus, the judger possesses grounds for maintaining
what he judges. Secondly, to maintain that which is empirically cer-
tain is to make an assertorical judgment. Empirical certainty fulfils
the criteria of assertorical judgment in that such certainty arises
in accordance with the laws of the understanding, for the sensible
representation of experience is constituted in accordance with these
laws. Furthermore, empirical certainty carries existential import for
the judger, since he is taking cognizance of an object. Thus, on the
basis of the well-founded-ness of his cognition and its accordance with
the understanding, the judger can be said to assert that of which he
is empirically certain. Hence, the logical form of the act of being
empirically certain in one’s assent or consideration of the truth of
a cognition is expressed by the function ’Ass.’.
Rational certainty, on the other hand, arises a priori through
reason and is, therefore, apodictic certainty. Such certainty is bound
up with the consciousness of the necessity (Pol., p. 544)^^ of judging
or assenting to a cognition on the basis of reason. When we are
rationally certain of the truth of a cognition we discern this truth
a_ prior i through rational principles, rather than on the basis of mere
experience. Because this representation of truth originates a priori
from Vv^ithin the mind itself, rational certainty rests upon the ^ priori
structure of the undt.'rstanding and reason. Thus, in accordance with
Kant’s Copornican l^evolution in philosopliy, the object must conform to
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the cognition and the cognition itself is necessarily valid for
everyone.
One of Kant's most important contributions to the theory of
certainty is the recognition of how subjective reasons can justify
certainty in a cognition. In his critique of traditional metaphysics,
Kant shows that the a priori principles of morality are themselves
part of the structure of (practical) reason. Thus, the principles
upon which the subjective determination of a practical cognition rests
can produce rational, that is, a priori certainty (D-4\?, p. 734).
Hence, Kant presents the following classification of the types of












* Synthetic knowledge through reason resting upon the
construction of concepts in intuition (time and space)
** Synthetic knowledge through reason resting upon mere
concepts
1. ) Practical or moral certainty rests on the moral use of
reason ^ priori . We are practically certain of that whicli is necessary
for the moral law and of which we can posit a priori through moral
reason. In the "Canon of Pure Reason", § 3, of the Critique, Kant
argues tliat the three instances of such moral certainty is the existence
of God, free will and the immortality of the soul. These three beliefs
ore the necessary conditions for tlie moral use of reason in determining
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a practical cognition (B856-857); hence, we are rationally certain of
them. However, there is no objective evidence for these beliefs; the
moral law, as Kant argues, lies within the moral subject himself.
Moral certainty pertains to or rests upon subjective reasons. Thus,
moral certainty is subjective; it allows the judger to assert only
that "I am certain. . ." (N 2484).^'^
2. ) Logical certainty, on the other hand, rests on principles
of the understanding in the conceptualization of any object of exper-
ience whatsoever. Such certainty pertains to theoretical cognitions
of objects which we can determine a priori . The two types of such
certainty are mathematical or philosophical. In the first instance
mathematical cognitions of objects are determined on the basis of the
construction of mathematical concepts in the pure intuitions of time
and space, in which all objects of knowledge must be given to the human
mind. Philosophical certainty pertains to synthetical principles which
make empirical knowledge possible.
Since logical certainty pertains to or rests upon objective
reasons, the judger may say, ”It is certain that . . meaning
thereby that his certainty rests upon that which is objective ratlier
than merely subjective. Though moral certainty is rationally certain,
the consideration of truth pertains only to the judger. Although
nothing can move the morally reasoning judger from that in which he is
morally certain (God, freedom and immortality), the judger is conscious
that the certainty cannot be valid at the same time for all other
judgers. Thus, complete or objective certainty does not apply to moral
certainty. But in logical certainty, because it rests upon objective
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grounds, the judger is conscious that his cognition is also valid at
the same time for all other judgers. Thus, such certainty is apodictic
in the sense that it is impossible for any judger to judge the opposite
of what one considers to be true. Hence, the act of judging anything
as logically certain is apodictic in form, for it would be accompanied
by the consciousness of the necessity of judging.
Apodictic certainty, then, provides an answer to Descartes’
philosophical scepticism, for it is impossible to doubt that which is
logically certain. Mathematics is undubitable, since it rests upon
the structure of pure, human intuition; synthetic principles of
experience are indubitable, for they make experience possible. Indeed,
since judgments of experience are determined by the a prior i synthetic
principles of the understanding, deception is impossible with regard
to them. Kant i-^rites in his logic notes.
It is impossible that my judgments of experience can be
deceptive, for the assent is apodictic, although the pro-
position is objectively contingent (N 2474
And,
Assent can be apodictic, without the necessity of the
cognition being objectively apodictic. The former is only
the consciousness, that one cannot be mistaken in the
application of indubitably -certain rules, for example, in
experience (N 2479).^^
Finally, both empirical and rational (logical) certainty may
occur with regard to the same judgment of experience.
We are rationally certain of that which even without
experience we should have discerned a priori . Hence, it
is possible that our cognitions may concern objects of
experience and yet their certainty may be both empirical
and rational, namely, when we discern from a priori prin-
ciples the truth of a proposition which is empirically
certain ( fvogik, "Einleitung, " IX
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The following example of this possibility occurs in the Wiener Logik,
Our cognitions can conceive of objects of experience and ourcertainty can be either empirical or rational. For example
the proposition of the power by means of a lever has erapiril
cal certainty, but also rational certainty; for if experience
does not teach us anything about it, still I would know itthrough reason (WL, p. 857 ). 18
§ 2 - Opinion, Belief and Knowledge
Since assent consists in the possession of either subjective
or objective reasons which may be either sufficient or insufficient
for ceitainty, assent can take place in three different ways: the
judger’s reasons may be both subjectively and objectively insufficient
for his considering the cognition to be true, or objectively insuffi-
cient but subjectively sufficient, or both objectively and subjectively
sufficient. These three possibilities respectively define the three
modes of assent, namely, opinion, belief and knowledge. The following
table systematically defines these modes of assent by relating them to











Opinion Insufficient Insufficient No certainty
whatsoever
Belief Sufficient Insufficient Subjectively
certain only




Since tlie modal functions of judgment express how the judger
considers his cognition to be true, we can expect that tliese functions
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express the logical form of opining, believing, and knowing. In N 2474,
Kant correlates each mode of assent with a modal form of judgment.
What I opine, that I judge with a consciousness only as
problematic.
What I believe, assertoric, however, not as necessary (valid
for me).
What I know, as apodictic according to the laws of the under-
standing, even if the truth is merely empirical. ^9
This theme is reiterated throughout the student lecture notes; for
instance, from the Wiener I/)gik,
In opinion, our judgment is problematic. ... In belief, we
judge assertorically, i.e., we explain ourselves for tlie truth
(WL, p. 850 and 851).
And from the Busolt notes.
In opinion, we judge problematically, in belief, assertorically,
in knowledge, apodictically (Bus., p. 638 ).
This correlation can be summarized as follows:
What I opine, I judge problematically
What I believe, I judge assertorically
What I know, I judge apodictically.
A discussion of the three modes of assent will illuminate the acts of
judging whose logical form is expressed by the unities of the modal
forms (IV. 3).
(I) Opinion. In opining, the judger is conscious of the
insufficiency both subjectively and objectively, of his grounds for
maintaining the cognition. Such assent is obviously uncertain, for
the judger is conscious that another judgment could just as well have
been entertained. The logical form of opining is problematic, for
that which is opined is thought according to its own formal possibility




Kant suggests that ”the greatest part” of our cognitions begin
by holding them as mere opinions (Pol., p. 541), ^2 v^pi^h are to be
critically tested to determine their truth. However, Kant’s account
of the origjjis of opinion in scientific knowledge is incomplete. An
opinion is like a guess to begin an enquiry. In the "Introduction"
to the l£>gik (IX), the ether of "modern physics" is given as an example
of a "mere matter of opinion." But there is nothing in the definition
of opinion that prohibits quite uneducated or insignificant guesses
from being the initial points of enquiry. However, scientific enquiry
properly begins with significant guesses that relate to something
previously known. In this way a scientist does not waste his time
testing hypotheses which do not relate to already existing theories.
Opinions, then, in science are based upon knowledge; they are
not just completely arbitrary guesses. What distinguishes opinions
from assertions in science is that this knowledge is not sufficient to
determine vs^hich of a number of alternative hypotheses is true. Hence,
opinion is free only with respect to a range of alternatives determined
by already known facts.
Kant himself was not unaware of the structure of scientific
enquiry. In "The Canon of Pure Reason," Kant asserts,
I must never presume to opine, without knowing at least
something by means of which the judgment, in itself merely
problematic, secures connection with truth, a connection
which, although not complete, is yet more than arbitrary
fiction. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be
certain. For if, in respect of this lav-; also, I have nothing
but opinion, it is all merely a play of the imagination, with-
out the least relation to truth (B850).
But this passage, while focusing on the relationsliip bet\%'een prior
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knowledge and a subsequent opinion, leaves this relationship obscure.
According to Kant, the relationship arises through a law which is
certain but justifies a connection which lies somewhere between a sure
connection with the truth and an arbitrary fiction. Kant is aiming
at a theory of a probable relation beti^een given knowledge and sub-
sequent opinion. A theory of probability is required to bridge the
gap between a sure connection with the truth (probability of 1) and
an arbitrary fiction (probability of 0). Thus, by assessing the pro-
bability of an opinion with respect to prior knowledge, a scientist can
adjudicate between guesses as to which is the most significant.
However, the importance of providing a theory of probability
for scientific knowledge seems to have escaped Kant. Moreover, Kant
cannot express the notion of probability as part of the logical form
of opinion. Kant’s theory of the modal forms is merely qualitative
in the sense that it specifies the ways in which a cognition is judged.
A quantitative pragmatics, on the other hand, has been developed for
the notion of acceptance—acceptance to a degree—^by R. M. Martin (see
IV. 2). I am suggesting that Kant, in order to provide an adequate
theory of the logical form of opining, should- have considered as the
unit of analysis ’S problematically judges p to degree a’, for the
degree of probability of an opinion is important in assessing its worth
for future assertion.
According to Kant, one proceeds from problematical judging
(opining) to assertorical judging (asserting) to apodictic judging




-* • is thus incorporated in the understanding
step by step—inasmuch as we first judge something prohle-
maticallyj then maintains its truth assertorically
,
and
finally affirm it as inseparably united with the under-
standing, that is, as necessary and apodictic (BlOl).
In this progression, one proceeds by fulfilling the logical criteria
of problematic, assertoric, and apodictic judgments (see IV. 3). We
might have wished that Kant had outlined this procedure by which these
criteria are fulfilled in a more concrete manner. For instance, he
might have maintained that causal connections can be asserted on the
basis of procedures similar to J. S. Mill^s methods. However, Kant’s
failure in this regard is not a foiirial incompleteness of his system,
for these considerations operate on the material level of cognition.
This incompleteness, therefore, is not relevant to the disclosure of
the logical form of judgments. But, as I suggested in the preceeding
paragraph, Kant should have incorporated into his theory of the logical
fonm of opining a notion of entertaining to a degree relevant to
already accepted knowledge, even though the logic of probability may
be a material logic.
(II) Belief. Kant’s account of belief is more complex but,
I believe, philosophically more incisive than his account of opinion
in scientific enquiry. Belief is assent from grounds which are sub-
jectively sufficient but objectively insufficient to justify certainty
in the representation of truth. Thus, my belief in something is
necessary only for me; belief gives rise only to subjective certainty
(valid for me ).
’Belief’ is a broad and ambiguous term. But perhaps no
tendency is more pernicious and obstructive of an incisive philosophical
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theoiy of belief than viewing belief as a concept characteristic of
all forms of entertaining a proposition. This tendency appears most
clearly in Bertrand Russell’s Analysis of and has been adopted
by many contemporary logicians. Russell states.
The whole intellectual life consists of beliefs, and of the
passage from belief to another by what is called ’reasoning’.
Beliefs give knowledge and error; they are the vehicles of
truth and falsehood. Psychology, theory of knowledge, and
metaphysics revolve about belief, and on the view we take of
our philosophical outlook largely depends. ^3
But belief is a special notion with its own meaning and use; it sejrves
to characterize a special way of entertaining a cognition. It is to
Kant s credit that in his theory of belief he attempts to focus on the
central and distinguishing features of this concept. Thus, belief
receives a special definition in terms of the sufficiency of subjective
grounds
.
Moreover, Kant classifies beliefs according to where they occur
in human cognition and of their respective validity and status.
According to Kant, beliefs are of two kinds; theoretical and practical.
(N 2487). ^ Theoretical beliefs occur with regard to objective cogni-
tion for which the judger does not possess sufficient objective grounds,
but for which the judger has grounds which are subjectively sufficient
for him to assent to the cognition. With regard to theoretical belief,
the judger accepts grounds concerning an object as subjectively valid
for his assent. These beliefs occur v;ith regard to the present,
sensible experience of the judger, historical propositions, and theore-
tical cognitions of speculation that Kant calls "doctrinal beliefs" in
tlie "Canon".
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As we have seen, V.l, we have empirical certainty with
regard to the content of our experiences. But such certainty arises
only through belief, for our experience, Vv?hile pertaining to objects,
is only subjectively valid for us. This point is made in the Wiener
Logik :
Belief is a subjectively sufficient, but objectively
insufficient assent. Sense is at all times subjective
p. 852). 25
On the basis of present experience, the judger can maintain only that
the object exists in his experience, not that it must exist in the
experience of all judgers; hence, the existence of the object is
valid only for the judger. Thus, empirical certainty is only belief.
Kant is refurbishing the distinction betv'^een belief and
knowledge made by Plato. For both, belief concerns merely what occurs
in sensible experience; whereas knowledge possesses a priori elements.
Kant defines the difference be'tween empirical belief and knowledge
more acceptably than Plato in terms of the taking up of an empirical
cognition and maintaining it on the basis of objectively sufficient
grounds, or a priori grounds which are valid for all judgers.
Secondly, the beliefs in the existence of God and the
immortality of the soul may be considered theoretical (or doctrinal)
beliefs, for the objective grounds for these theoretical cognitions are
insufficient to compel certainty wliile the judger may possess subjec-
tively sufficient grounds. Theoretical beliefs occur with regard to
that which is objective when nothing objective can be cited that
completely justifies assent to the cognition; yet we regard ourselves
as possessing grounds wliich are subjectively sufficient to convince
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us of its truth. Theoretical belief in the existence of God, for
instance, arises because of examples of purpose which can be found in
nature. But such examples provide no objective grounds for asserting
the existence of an intelligent Creator; certainly Hume showed this
in liis Dialogues Concern ing Natural Religion . However, Kant argues
in the "Canon".
I know no other condition under which this purposive unity
can supply me with guidance in the investigation of nature,
save only the postulate that a supreme intelligence has
ordered all things in accordance with the wisest ends
(B854).
But this assent to the existence of God, even though based on something
found in objects, is merely subjectively valid for the judgor who
makes it. It is only h^ who "knows no other condition" to explain the
phenomenon of apparent purpose in nature.
Belief, for Kant, is primarily a practical notion; its
primary meaning derives from its relation to action. In reasoning out
a course of action, one has a certain end in mind. However, the
sufficiency of reasons for this end cannot be objectively certain or
valid for all judgers; the end which the judger sets for himself in
practical cognition can only be subjectively -sufficient for him.
Everything which we accept for a purpose is for us only
subjectively sufficient—i.e., I must accept that it is so,
otherwise I cannot proceed in my reasoning. Of course, I
cannot accept this as objectively valid, still it is for me
sufficient (D-W, p. 733).^^
Thus, the consideration of the truth of a practical cognition can be
no more than a belief for the judger.
In the "Canon", Kant distinguishes beti'jeen practical cognitions
wliich are pragmatic and those which are moral.
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[The] practical point of view is either in reference toskm or in reference to morality
, the former being concerned
with optional and contingent ends, the latter with ends that
are absolutely necessary.
Once an end is accepted, the conditions of its attainment
are hypothetical.ly necessary. This necessity is subjectively
but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I know of no
’
othei conditions under whicli the end can be attained. On
the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for every-
one, if I know with certainty that no one can have knowledge
of any other conditions which lead to the proposed end. In
the former case my assumption and the holding of certain
conditions to be true is a merely contingent belief; in the
latter case it is a necessary belief (B851 -852 ).
Pragmatic cognitions are those for which a judger can think of no
better means to attain a posited or self—chosen end. The consideration
of the means to this end, while being subjectively necessary for the
judger himself, are only contingently necessary for him, because some-
one else may realize a better means for attaining the end, or even a
better end for the judger to choose in his circumstances. Thus, the
subjective sufficiency (belief) in a pragmatic cognition arises from
the positing of a subjectively considered course of action leading to
a contingently posited end.
On the other hand, in morality, the end—that one’s actions be
in conformity to the moral law—is irrefragably established, and, hence,
is not contingent in the sense of being relative to the judger ’s sub-
jective circumstances and what he posits for himself. Kant argues in
his moral philosophy that the only condition under v>;hich this end can
make moral action possible is that the judger posits the existence of
God, freedom, and the immortal soul. These three presuppositions make
moraJ.ity and moral reasoning possible. Thus, just as Kant's transcen-
dental pliilosophy provides the grounds of certainty in science, the
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critique of practical reason provides the grounds upon which certainty
in morals can he grounded. Kant calls these moral beliefs Vernunft -
^lauhe, beliefs of reason, for they derive from the structure of pure
practical reason itself.
Nevertheless, because moral principles are not found in
objects, but arise only through the moral use of reason by the judger
himself, the positing of beliefs of reason can be only subjectively
valid. But the certainty that the judger can have in these beliefs
renders them absolutely unchangeable for him.
T am certain that nothing can shake this belief, since ray
moral principles would thereby be themselves overthrown,
and 1 cannot disclaim them without becoming abhorrent in my
own eyes (B856 ).
In the Politz notes, there is an almost moving passage describing tlie
strength of these beliefs
:
The practical belief is often stronger than all knowledge.
In the latter, one still attends to counter arguments, but
this is not so in practical belief. E.g., the belief in
God and another world is stronger than all knowledge,
because we have such a great interest in these. The prac-
tical conviction is the greatest possible. . . . The
practical belief is, therefore, firm, unchangeable conviction.
(Pol., 543). 27
We may summarize Kant’s classification of belief as follows:
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BeMef: subjectively sufficient assent






















Kant maintains that beliefs, according to their logical form,
are assertoric. We have already seen that empirical certainty is
assertoric In form. Belief in general brings into play the formal
features of assertorical judgment. Assertoricity yields the thouglit
of the actuality or truth of a cognition, or of what is involved in
the judger’s asserting something. Asserting, for Kant, involves the
positing the existence of something in accordance with the understanding
or reason (see IV. 3). In belief, the judger is making an assertion
about what he takes to be the case. Moreover, in all cases of belief
the existence of something is being posited—God, a free self, and an
immortal soul. Furthermore, the positing is in accordance with the
laws of the understanding and reason.
Kant’s theory of belief illuminates the nature of asserting.
for asserting can now be seen to rest upon what is subjectively valid
for the judger. Herein lies the feature that distinguishes asser-
torical from apodictic judgment. An apodictic judgment rests upon
153
objective grounds, whereas assertion is objectively insufficient.
Knowledge is possible only with regard to what can be apodictically
maintained as resting upon objective grounds valid for all judgers.
Thus, even though the certainty with regard to beliefs of reason is
unchangeable, one cannot have knowledge of these matters.
(Ill) Knowledge. The concern of the apodictic form of judgment
is the expression of knowledge of a cognition. Knowledge is defined as
assent from reasons which are both subjectively and objectively suffi-
cient. Kant would look with displeasure on attempts to define knowledge
by means of true belief. For Kant, the notion of true belief reaches
into far wider areas of human cognition than knowledge could hope to
enter. The relationship between belief and knowledge must be viewed
in terms of the relationship between assertoric and apodictic judgments
(see IV.3): In acquiring knowledge, we take up what is asserted and
maintain it on the basis of the a_ priori laws of the understanding.
But this procedure would be possible only for cognitions of which
the judger is empirically certain.
For Kant, the crucial notion involved in knowledge is objective
sufficiency which can be determined only with regard to the £ priori
laws which are valid for the understanding of all judgers. Such
reasons are constitutive of the nature of objects and determine what
the mind brings a priori to experience. Thus, the cognition is
posited a prior i through the principles of the understanding, and the
forni of the judgment is apodictic.
Kant, as we have seen, maintains that apodictic assent can
take place with regard to an empirical cognition that is only
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contingent (N 2472, see nn. 16 and 19), if this cognition can also
be constituted on the basis of a prior i principles. In such cases
one attains empirical knowledge of objects. Furtliermore, the a priori
knowledge of mathematics and philosophy also involves assent resting
upon objective grounds. Mathematics rests upon the a priori grounds
of the constructing concepts in pure intuitions, v^hich is valid for
all judgers. Synthetic, a priori knowledge in philosophy rests upon
the conditions of possible experience, which are, again, valid for all
judgers. Thus, the principles laid out in the ’’Transcendental Analytic”
of the Critique constitute apodictically certain, philosophical
knowledge of objects.
CHAPTER VI
KANT'S THEORY OF THE FORMS OF JUDGMENT:
SOME FINAL COMMENTS
§ 1 - The Problem of Completeness
This section will formulate precisely and explore the question
whether Kant’s theory of logical grammar provides a complete charac-
terization of the formal mechanisms of judgment. By the completeness
of the system I mean that all the forms and grammatical operations
necessary to characterize judgment can be stated or are derivable in
the system. This definition is meant to parallel the notion of
completeness for modern systems of logic in the sense that a logical
system must permit the derivation of all truths of that system. The
problem of proving completeness is not foreign to Kantian thinking,
for Kant himself formulates it with regard to his system of categories.
The completeness of the system . . . requires that none of
the derivative concepts be lacking (Axxi).
The problem regarding Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment
is tv>;o-fold. First, do the given logical constants permit the logical
classification of every judgment? Secondly, do the specified gramma-
tical operations allow the statement of all possible logical operations
for the given set of constants? Notice that the second question
assumes only the presence of a set of logical constants; the set itself
could be incomplete in the sense of the first question.
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Philosophers sceptical of Kant’s claim that the table of
judgments provides the ’’clue" for proving the completeness of the
categorial system raise only the first question. This question has
been argued by Klaus Reich in his famous dissertation, Die Vollstandig -
bantischen Urteilstafel, where he attempts to reconstruct a
Kantian proof for the completeness of the table of judgments through
a derivation of the table from the "I think" which accompanies all
judgments. 1 However, in III. 4, I argued that the omission of con-
junction obstructs the treatment of judgments and inferences that
occur in the system, yet conjunction is not derivable from the "I
think", for it fails to yield a specificable wa^^ of thinking the
relationship between judgments. Thus, there are grounds maintaining
that as regards Relation Kant’s classification is incomplete.
But whether Kant provides a formally adequate classification
of all judgments ultimately brings on the more speculative and meta-
physical issue of whether just one formal characterization of judgment
is adequate for science. Just as alternative categorial systems and
systems of science are now known to be possible, ^ it seems possible to
have alternative logical systems of judgment. ' Differing systems of
science might very well employ judgments constituting objectivity of
differing logical forms. Thus, completeness in the first sense is a
metaphysical problem, which lies beyond the scope of the present
discussion.
It is, therefore, wiser and of more logical interest to
accept Kant’s set of logical constants as partly characterizing a_
conception of judgment, perhaps tliat conception most appropriate to
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Newtonian physics, and to raise the second question of completeness.
Here it is logically feasible to ask for a proof, for it makes sense
to question whether all valid immediate inferences possible for the
given constants are or can he expressed by means of the provided
system.
We have seen a threat to this completeness in the assimilation
of obversion to contraposition (IV. 4). This move leaves E, I, and 0
propositions without obversions. Moreover, the contraposition of 0 is
unincorporated in the system because it fails to affect a change of
modal form. But the proof of completeness or incompleteness of Kant's
logical grammar cannot be a haphazard attempt to determine whetlier an
inference does or does not hold within the system, for it is always
possible to define a feature of Kant's conception of judgment which
would explain why a particular inference fails to he valid for this
conception of judgment. Thus, the discovery that an inference tradi-
tionally thought to be valid is not derivable in the system could say
more about the special Kantian conception of judgment rather than the
incompleteness per se of the system of logical grammar.
A systematic proof of completeness is required. Again, Kant
was not unaware of the need to prove completeness systematically, for
in the Critique lie maps out what he considers to be the basic strategy
for a proof of completeness,
[Completeness] is possible only by means of an idea ^ the
totality of the a_ priori knowledge yielded by the under-
standing . . . exhibiting their interconnections in a system
(B89).
To prove completeness a general, uni lying idea systematically relating
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the elements of the system is required. According to Kant, this
systematic idea proves completeness in the sense that it shows how
— elements of the system are interconnected.
Kant never explicitly develops and identifies such a
systematic idea for proving the completeness of the doctrine of imme-
diate inference. Nevertheless, in his lecture notes we can find a
systematic treatment of this doctrine that correlates each kind of
immediate inference with a corresponding heading on the table of
judgments. This correlation is as follows (N 3170):
VI. 1.1. TABLE OF IMMEDIATE INFERENCES









This treatment of the doctrine of immediate inference does not appear
in Meier, and is, therefore, original with Kant. The procedure paral-
lels his attempt to prove the completeness of the categorial system by
relating each category with a function of judgment; and thus, it may
be understood as an attempt to provide the required systematization
for proving the completeness of the doctrine of immediate inference.
Moreover, this correlation is natural, for the immediate inferences
O
concern operations with the forms of judgment ( Logik, § 45).'
But if this correlation is Kant's attempt to demonstrate the
completeness of his doctrine, then the attempt must be judged a failure.
The systematization is arbitrary, and hence no systematization at all.
For a proper systematization there must be a single principle in terms
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of which the inferences are to be correlated with a particular heading.
Without such a principle of association, the display would be just
a haphazard arrangement of the immediate inferences based upon an
accidental correspondence between the headings of the forms of judg-
ment and the kinds of immediate inference.
The obvious and natural principle is that each heading concerns
the logical constant that is being operated upon in the immediate
inference. We find this principle explicitly formulated in § 44 of
the Logik :
The essential character of all immediate inferences and
the principle of their possibility consists in a change
of the mere form of the judgment.
4
This principle is clearly at work with regard to Quantity and Modality,
for subalternation and contraposition are formal inferences involving,
respectively, a change of quantifier and of modal operator. Moreover,
although there is no change of logical constants in conversion, the
interchange of subject and predicate is a change in the form of the
judgment expressed by the copula. Kant's conception of logical form
accommodates the relation of one concept as subject to another as
predicate in virtue of their copulation in a quantitative/qualitative
relation. When this relationship occurs as it does in E and I propo-
sitions, the formal positions of subject and predicate can be
interchanged, hence, Kant can speak of conversion as involving a
change in the form of the judgment under Relation.
But til is principle fails with regard to opposition under
Quality. We must recognize an important logical distinction bet^";een
the kinds of inferences listed under the other licadings and the
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inferences involved in the relations of opposition. Where the other
inferences concern only formal operations with respect to the constants
of the logic, the immediate inferences falling under opposition (see
II. 2) are meta-linguistic inferences; that is, they are inferences
bet^7een sentences in the logic's meta-language. When we say that
from the truth of an A proposition we can infer the falsity of an E
proposition, we are naming judgments within the logic and using
sentences involving the truth-predicate. These factors classify the
inference as meta-linguistic.
Kant is guilty of a mistake in associating opposition with an
immediate inference to be placed under Quality. While it is true that
in proceeding from the truth of A to the falsity of E one effects a
change in the form of the judgment, this change is of a fundamentally
different character than those involved with respect to Quantity and
Modality. In the latter cases the change of form is a valid inference
within the logic for which truth is preserved for the judgments. But
with respect to opposition one does not merely change the form of
judgment, but also its truth-value. Thus, the inferences involved in
the relations of opposition fail to possess the "essential character"
of consisting in a change of the "mere" form of the judgment.
Placing opposition under Quality prohibits Kant from
systematically stating other forms of opposition that are present in
his logic. In IV. 4, I revealed the logic of judgments expressing
negative modalities and shov^ed how the relations of opposition can bo
defined for problematic and apodictic judgments. Confining the theory
of opposition to just the assertoric judgments of affirmative or
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negative quality overlooks that the same relations can be defined for
modal opposition. Opposition, thus, is a type of inference which
overlaps the various headings of judgment, and, therefore, incorrectly
incorporated by Kant into his system of immediate inference.
Kant’s failure here is symptomatic of the underlying difficulty
in his treatment of immediate inference that we have already recognized.
The irony is that the immediate inference which should be associated
with Quality is obversion. Obversion concerns formal, truth-preserving
operations within the logic itself between the qualitative forms of
judgment (see III. 2). Thus, obversion parallels the structure of the
other immediate inferences concerning merely a change of logical form
in a judgment.
It is certainly desirable that Kant state a theory of obversion,
for, as we have seen (III. 2. 5), at least inferences from infinite to
negative judgments are valid. Yet these inferences receive no official
recognition in Kant's treatment of immediate inference. Moreover, by
placing a tlieory of obversion under Quality, we would have a means of
incorporating the mysterious converted obverse of the 0 categorical we
discovered in N 3187 (IV. 4), while still maintaining that "contra-
position” is an inference that changes the modal form of universal,
affirmative categoricals.
Thus, Kant failed to complete the doctrine of immediate
inference; his systematization of this doctrine reveals the inadequacy
and incompleteness of his own treatment. Moreover, the completability
of Kant's system is unclear witliout a definitive pronouncement on Kant’s
behalf on tlie nature of obversion for his conception of judgment.
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Kant was lax in pursuing and developing a logically complete doctrine
of immediate inference even for his own conception of judgment.
§ 2 - A Point About Logical Theory
I shall conclude my study of Kant’s logic of judgmients with
some theoretical observations concerning the nature of Kantian logic.
In this section, I will investigate the relationship between a logic
of judgments and the requirements of a general or formal logic. This
investigation will reveal an important point about the nature of
Kant’s logical system and systems that, like it, formalize the internal
structure of proposition.
Kant’s general logic, as we have noted, is a logic of judgments.
The fundamentals of the Kantian conception of judgment were presented
infonnally in IV. 1. Judgment is defined by Kant as a means of repre-
senting that which is objectively or universally valid for all judgers.
The objectivity of judgment implies that judgment is the conceptual
representation of an object of which every judger can take cognizance.
This is Kant’s concl.usion after a brief discussion of the nature of
judgment in the Critique .
Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object,
that is, the representation of a representation of it (B93).
The foriTiS of this objectivity in the mediate representation of an
object m.ay appropriately be called the forms of judgmient , for they are
forms which make judgment possible.
On the other hand, we saw in I.l that Kant also views general
logic as a theory of the structure of valid, deductive inference. Such
inferences are possible in virtue oi tlie logical form of tlie piopositions
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involved in the argument. Hencej we found Kant saying.
General logic . . . considers only the logical form [of
knowledge] in relation to any knowledge to other knowledge
(B79).
Thus, general logic attempts a theory of forms upon which valid,
deductive inference rests. These forms may be called logical forms,
for they make deductive inference possible.
The adequacy of a theory of logical forms consists in its
ability to show the validity of arguments in any area of discourse.
Thus, these forms must permit the proof of all valid arguments. Kant
himself formulates this requirement of adequacy for general logic; he
states,
PThe sole concern of general logic] is to give an exhaustive
exposition and a strict proof of the formal rules of all
thought (Bix).
The distinction between the forms of judgment and logical forms
is purely conceptual; it is defined only in terms of whether a theory
purports to present the forms of judgments or of inferences. The
interesting, philosophical question is. What relationship actually
exists between these two conceptions of or ways of defining forms? Do
they provide identical sets of forms, does one set partially include
the other, or is one set a proper subset of the other, or do they
provide distinct sets?
According to Kant, the Analytic of general logic is a unity
consisting of three levels of analysis: the theories of concepts, of
judgments, and of Inferences. Through these levels of analysis, Kant
relates the theory of inference to that of judgments. The latter
provides the logical forms of the theory of inference, just as the
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theor}^ of concepts provides material for judgment. More exactly
^
Kant understands the forms of judgment be an adequate set of logical
forms for a theory of inference, which needs only to investigate the
valid inferences between judgments constituted by those forms.
However, Kant’s theory of judgment pertains to the forms of
the conceptualization of an object. Given this conception of judgment,
Kant cannot correctly persist in his conviction of the unity of general
logic, for valid inferences can take place for a far broader range of
judgments than those countenanced by Kantian general logic. Modern
logic has shown how to prove the validity of arguments which are
irreducible to syllogistic or immediate inference. Such arguments
rest upon truth-functional sentential connectives or involve more than
two predicate constants or relations and multiple quantification. The
famous "heads-of-horses” argument.
All horses are animals.
Therefore, all heads of horses are heads of animals,
which could not be treated in traditional logic, has become an
elementary exercise for the beginning student of modern logic.
The problem of discovering a generally adequate formal theory
of inference ultimately raises the question whether there are founda-
tions upon which a theory of logical forms can be justified. When a
logician develops a formalized theory of inference, he represents the
logical constants upon which valid inference depends by means of
symbolic functions. The definition of these symbols determines what
inferences are valid or invalid. Kant represents quantification so that
subalternation is valid; whereas modern logic prohibits this inference
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bet\-^een categoricals . Which system can he considered justified?
To answer this question in a Kantian manner, we must know
whether there is a method ^ hy which a logician can define the nature
of the logical constants upon which the validity of arguments rest.
We must ask whether there is a criterion which determines what is
part of the logical form of an inference. Kant’s own ansv^?er is that
logical forms rest upon the forms of judgment; hut Kant’s theory of
objectivity proves too narrow for a philosophical foundation of a
theory of inference.
There is one area of formal logic, namely the propositional
calculus, for which a method and criterion are readily available. This
calculus derives from the notion of the truth-functional sentential
connective.^ Truth-tables foriTially represent these connectives and
provide an effective procedure for determining the validity of argu-
ments whose structure can be translated by means of truth-functions.
The formal theory of truth-functions is complete with respect to
proving all logical truths whose validity rests upon truth-functional
structure. Thus, in a clear sense a truth -functional sentential
connective is a logical constant in a formal theory of inference.
Moreover, the theory of truth-functions can be viewed as
analytic a priori . The method of setting up a propositional calculus
consists in merely analyzing the notion of a truth-function. A truth-
table defining a unique truth value of a connective 0, given the
exhaustive possibilities of truth values for its component sentences,
can he given a priori , and the adequacy of a set of such definitions
in the sense of expressing all possible truth-functions can be proved.
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GgaiiTj pr ioi i . ThuSj truth—functionality serves as an analytic
a priori foundation for an important part of the theory of valid
inference: the propositional calculus. Unfortunately, as we have
seen, the propositional calculus is absent from Kant’s general logic.
Kantian general logic, on the other hand, deals with the internal
structure of a proposition.
However, the criterion of truth-functionality fails to define
a logical constant with respect to a tlieory of the internal structure
of a proposition. There are at least three possible views of quanti-
fication, none of which represents a truth-functional concept.
(1) The Medieval view (see II. 1 &- .3): quantifiers indicate
the mode of supposition of the subject in a proposition.
(2) The Kantian view: quantifiers represent a special kind of
connection between t\N?o extensions in a subject-predicate
judgment.
(3) The modern view: quantifiers bind individual variables
which range over a domain of objects.
If a philosophical foundation could be found for determining the nature
of quantification and quality in the internal structure of a proposition
as truth-functionality is the foundation for the proposition calculus,
then the logician would know how to proceed in formulating the correct
formal theory of inference and how to decide which of the above views
are justified. However, no satisfactory foundation in this sense has
yet been found in logic.
Moreover, the recognition of the three views of quantification
reveals that the theory of the internal structure of a proposition
is, in a Kantian sense, synthetic. A set of definitions of the logical
constants for quantification, Quality, Relation and Modality, and of
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the corresponding rules of inference is logicall}; compatible with
alternative systems of the same concepts. Thus, the logic of the
internal structure of a proposition is essentially theoretical in
the sense in which the theory of truth-functions is not because of the
analytic a priori foundation of this theory. The point I wish to make
concerning the nature of the Kantian system of logical functions is
that this system must he taken as synthetic of the concepts of Quantity,
Quality, Relation and Modality.
The synthetic character of logical theory was never explicitly
recognized by Kant, and his feelings toward the status of logical
theory is ambiguous. Although the preponderance of evidence seems to
indicate that Kant felt that general logic is analytic a priori, Kant
never states that he considers general logic to be analytic a priori .
The ambiguity in Kant’s view has been clearly perceived by Gottfried
Martin, who recognizes that Kantian logic must be considered synthetic.
According to Martin,
Kant retains the analytic character of formal logic in the
sense that [all true propositions in formal logic can be
proved from the principle of contradiction alone]. . . .
’'Hov^;ever]
,
the development of modern logic has shown that
Kant’s fundamental distinction between mathematics and logic
cannot stand. . . . The development has in our opinion
shown that Kant did not go far enough. Kant recognized the
synthetic character of mathematics but retained the analytic
character of logic; I should like to say now that logic is
also a synthetic science (p. 88).
If Kant’s theory of logical form had an analytic a priori foundation,
then views (1) and (3) above would be self—contradictory . In this sense
Kant evidently believed that his was the only logically possible system
of logical forms. But this view is in error; thus, the theory of
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inference for the internal structure of propositions must be synthetic.
Martin is correct in his insight; however he does not full); pursue its
consequences with regard to Kantian thinking. The consequences of
this recognition are, I believe, something special, and I wish to deal
with them now.
If logical theory is "in a Kantian sense" a synthetic science,
then we may raise the central question of Kantian philosophy with
regard to general logic
:
How are synthetic a priori judgments (principles) possible in
general logic?
This general problem that Kant discovered underlying mathematics,
physics and metaphysics occurs in general logic as wel]..
To take this problem in a Kantian sense is to ask for the
grounds by which to distinguish the true principles of logic from those
n
which are false. The problem is to determine the logical system that
exists for human thinking as opposed to those that are merely empty
systems. According to Kant, construction in intuition and the grounds
of the possibility of experience are the limitative factors for deter-
mining which mathematical and physical systems exists for human thought.
From among the logically possible systems, that is, those that are free
of contradiction, only Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics comply
with these limitations. If we can parallel the synthetic a priori
problem as it exists in mathematics and physics for general logic, then
it must be possible to find the limiting factor of general logic that
distinguishes a Kantian system from the modern system of the predicate
calculus as that which does pertain to human cognition.
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It is insufficient for Kant to reply to this problem by saying
that only those logical forms exist which are constitutive of objec-
tivity, for, as we have already noted (VI. 1), the possible systems of
science are themselves fluid. As Gottfried Martin has beautifully
argued, though not expressing tlie point in quite this manner, no
science ^ synthetic a priori precisely in Kant’s sense of being
synthetic a_ priori
;
that is, as involving the determination of a
unique set of true synthetic ^ priori principles.
Moreover, Martin fails to observe that while being synthetic,
logic cannot be synthetic a priori precisely in Kant’s sense, for the
dimensions of the synthetic ^ priori problem in general logic out-
strips the possibility of answering it in a strictly Kantian manner of
identifying the one actual system of logic for human thought out of a
number of logically possible alternatives. According to Kantian
thinking, while other systems of mathematics and physics are logically
possible, only those systems which are constructible or pertain to the
grounds of possible experience are, respectively, mathematically or
physically possible (p. 23). But to carry this same manner of reasoning
through with regard to general logic one arrives at a nonsensical for-
mulation. It makes no sense to ask which one of a number of logically
possible systems (of logic) are logically possible. All are logically
possible in virtue of their freedom from contradiction. In other
words, any consistent system of logical forms exists as a logical
system of human thought.
These concluding remarks have been theoretical and philosophical
in nature, and were meant only as an elaboration upon the insight that
I
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we discovered, and shai'ed with Gottfried Martin, concerning the nature
of Kant’s system of general logic. They raise the underlying problem
in Kant’s theory of the forms of judgment, rather than try to solve
it. And it is doubtful whether a solution can be provided V'^ithin a
strict interpretation of Kantian presuppositions.
§ 3 - A Concluding Assessment
Kant brings to the logical theory of his own day a
systematization which capsulized the Wolffian logic into its essential
elements and organized it along philosophical lines.® Thus, Kant
eliminates such unnecessary division of judgment as the simple/com.plex
distinction, and his classification of judgments clearly identifies
the nature of logical functions and, most importantly, their gramma-
tical position in a judgment relative to other functions. Kant reveals
a sensitivity to logical problems in his attempt to distinguish singu-
lar judgments from generally quantified judgments according to their
logical form, and in his theory of modality. This latter theory
represents Kant’s logical acumen into the requirements of a theory of
how the objectivit}^ of judgment is constituted. He is correct in
noting, N 3111 (see 1.2), that without modality judgment is impossible,
and, hence, that assertoricity is itself a modal form. In his modal
logic, Kant proves himself \s?orthy of the standards of a modern logician
by eliminating everything psychological from his formal treatment of
how a cognition is maintained by a judger.
Nevertheless, Kant is apparently unable to break out of the
presuppositions of his day regarding sucli topics as the treatment of
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obversion. He evidently sees no problem in the contemporary treatment,
but as we have seen, Kant himself needs a theory of obversion; its
omission causes him difficulty in his attempt to systematize the
doctrine of immediate inference.
But the interest in the preceding investigation reaches beyond
the merely historical or the scholarly. The discussion has proved to
be a vehicle for revealing important problems concerning the nature
of logical theory. Kant shows an awareness of some of the underlying
problems of a philosophy of logic in his attempt to structure general
logic as a unity; and the problems he incurs in this attempt are
problems we have with us today.
Moreover, the unity of logic at which Kantian thinking aims
but which Kant was unable to attain sufficiently for the philosophical
grounding of the theory of inference, is not totally alien to concerns
in recent philosophy of logic. Kant attempts to base the theory of
inference upon a theory of judgmental forms that make objectivity
possible. In this attempt he is not far removed from those modern
logicians who develop the theory of logical forms on the basis of a
theory of the formal mechanisms of reference to objects in a domain.
W. V. 0. Quine is especially noteworthy in this regard. Quine^
develops tlie formal theory of inference on the basis of a theory of
the mechanisms of objective reference. The possibility of this
philosophy of logical forms rests on Quine’s conviction that these
mechanisms are the mechanisms of quantification upon which valid
inference depends. This unity between the mechanisms of reference and
the formal theory of inference is logically parallel to, though, of
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course, not parallel to in content, the Kantian unity betv’een the
forms of judgment and the theory of inference.
Furthermore, Kant makes logical distinctions which present a
challenge to the modern theory of reference. Central to the Kantian
conception of judgment is a distinction between quantification and the
mechanisms of reference. As we have seen in 11,3, quantification for
Kant fails to carry ontological commitment in the Quinean sense of
commitment to the existence of objects in a domain. The mechanisms
of reference are revealed by Kant in the theory of modality (see IV. 3).
According to Kant, reference is a function of how a cognition is
maintained or posited. The assertoric and apodictic judgments serve
to posit a cognition objectively for all judgers, while the problematic
judgment does not. The notion of a quantifier that expresses existence
or the positing of an object "outside” of a judger would be, for Kant,
a confusion with regard to the role of logical functions in a judgment.
Positing is an activity on the part of a judger with respect to what
he entertains in his consciousness.
Those v7ho reject Quine’s existential interpretation of
quantification in terms of reference and a domain of objects^*^ will
find in Kant an original means of expressing existence. Kant shows us
how a theory of reference might be developed as part of tlie pragmatics
of a logic.
Indeed, the most logically fruitful part of Kant’s theory of
the forms of judgment lies in his theory of modality. This theory can
serve as a model on which to formalize theories of opinion, belief, and
knowledge, for the Kantian theory makes the needed distinctions among
these concepts for a viable basis on which to present and expand




1. This discussion is a summary of the definition of judgment given
by Kant in N 3044-3066, esp. N 3047, 3049-3052 (see below § 3 and
n. 13). I shall return to the Kantian conceptions of judgment
and of objectivity in Chapter IV, § 1.
2. The Norman Kemp-Smith translation (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.,
1963) will be used throughout. However, if I deem that corrections
of his translation be required, these will be indicated in a foot-
note. Otherwise, page references to the Critique of Pure Reason
will appear in the text; the second edition, indicated by B, will
be used, unless the passage appears only in the first edition,
which will be indicated by A. The corrections of the Kerap-Sraith
translation will be based upon Kritik der reinen Vernunft
(Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1956 ).~
3. See Klaus Reich, Die Vollstandigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel,
2. Auf . (Berlin: Verlagsbuchhandlung von Richard SclToetz, 1948),
p. 30; "Die Funktion kann also, wenn man will, als das "Gesetz"
der Handlung oder Operation bezeichnet werden. Bei dieser
Ausdrucksweise bemerkt man die Uebereinstimmung diese Begriffes
mit dem mathematischen Funktionsbegriff leicht." However, it does
not occur to Reich to formulate the structure of a logical function
on the model of a mathematical function as I shall in § 3.
4. The respects in which Kant's table do differ, by his own admission,
from a classificatory table in general logic are: that singular
quantification and infinite quality are made "co-ordinate" forms
of judgment. However, as we shall see, this move does not intro-
duce any new logical constant not already available in general
logic. Furthermore, Kant drops a distinction a judgments under
Relation into Simple and Complex. This distinction is only
grammatical; there are no logical constants corresponding to such
a division of judgments (see III. 3). Finally, Kant introduces
the assertoric form as a distinct modal constant of a judgment.
This was not done in the textbook which Kant himself used for his
lectures on general logic. But this move, as we shall see, is




5. The idea that these forms of judgment are logical constants is
also maintained by Hans Lenk, Kritik der Logischen Konstanten
Kapitel I (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., IHHSX
^
6. Quoted from Norman Kemp-Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s 'Critique
of Pure Reason ’ (New York; Humanities Press, 1%2 ), p. 173.
§ 2
7. 0p_. cit . , § 3. Reprinted in Translations from the Philosophical
Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. by Peter Geach and Max Black
(Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1966), see p. 3.
8. Arthur 0. Lovejoy, "Kant’s Classification of the Forms of
Judgment," in Kant : Disputed Questions, ed. by Moltke S. Gram
(Chicago: Quadrangel Books, 1967), p. 281.
9. Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1966), p. 78. Further references to°this work
will be acknowledged in the text.
10. "Ohne modalitaet ist gar kein Urtheil moglich
;
also ist das
modale Urtheil nicht unrein." For the division of judgments
into impure and pure, see Meier, Auszug
, § 309.
11. Qp_. cit . (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 356.
12. See also, Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
,
ed. by
Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.,
1950), § 20, n. 4 where Kant says that his procedure in trans-
cendental logic is that of basing categorial analysis upon
logical distinctions.
§ 3
13. Kant’s Handschriftlicher Nachlass: Logik
,
the Prussian Academy
of Science edition, Ka nt ’ s Gesammelte Schriften
,
vol. 16 (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter and Co., 19*247^ Translations of these notes
are my own; the original German will be given in a footnote with
Kant’s spelling preserved.
14. Kant ’s Introduction to Logic, trans. by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1963). Quoted passages from
the Logik, "Einleitung" will be taken from this translation;





the Prussian Academy of Science
edition, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 9 [Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter and Co7, 1923]) are my own and the original German will
be given in a footnote.
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Busolt=Bus., Dohna-Wundlacken=D-W, and the Wiener Logik=WL
followed by the page reference in Kant^s VorlesungiFT~V^iesungen
Logik
,
the Prussian Academy of Science edition Kant’s
Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co T966)
Again, the original German will be given in a footnote.'^
16, Similar comments about formalization may be found in R. M Martin
Trut± Denotation, Chapter I (London: Routledge and Kegan
’
Paul, 1958) and Hao Wang, A Survey of Mathematical Logic
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1951 )7~pp. '^57-67 .
17. There are cases where formalized distortion is desirable as
when True is assigned to p3q when the antecedent is false. In
such cases distortion is innocuous, for one's material in this
case, say ordinary language, is silent with regard to tlie truth-
value of p=5q in this case. Furthermore, are different types of
inexactness: vagueness and ambiguity to mention only two.
Problems presented by each of these would have to be handled
differently. Finally, perhaps the most philosophical interesting
case of what may be called inexactness is inexactness within the
formal language-system itself. Such a case arises when a concept
cannot be fully formalized in the sense that the formalization
characterizes this concept and nothing else, as in the case of
the formalization of the concept of integers.
CHAPTER II
1. See Peter Stravs'son, Introduction to Logical Theory
,
Chapter 6
(London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1952); I. M. Bochenski, Ancient
Formal Logic (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1963);
Jan -Lukasiewicz, Aristotle 's Syllogistic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1957 ). Lukasiewicz takes the functions of the
A and I categoricals as primitive and introduces those for E and
0 through definition with propositional negation. This seems to
be a bold innovation based upon the techniques of modern logic in
rendering tlie Aristotelian syllogistic.
§ 1
2. ”Im allgemeinen Urtheile wird die Sphaera eines Begrifs ganz
innerhalb der Sphaera eines andern beschlossen; im particularen
ein theil der ersteren unter die Sphare des andern; im einzelnen
ein Begrif, der gar keine Sphaeram hat, mithin bios als Theil,
unter die sphaeram eines andern beschlossen.” This passage is
used by Jasche, Logik
,
§ 21.
3. ”Die actus des Verstandes sind offenbar verschieden ob man
gleich sieiit, dass der eine Gebrauch des Verstandes eben so viel
gilt, als der andere."
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4. Quoted from Philotheus Boehner, ^d^eval Logic (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1952), p. 23.
5. ’’Die quantitaet betrift nicht die Begriffe, sondern ihr
Verhaltnis.”
6. 0. Sickenberger, "Kants Lehre von Der Quantitat des Urtheils "
Kantstudien
,
II (1898). The following series of page references
in the text are to this article,
7. "Unter dem allgemeinen sind die besondern und einzelnen alle
enthalten, aber nicht unter dem besondern alle einzelne."
8. This point is explicitly observed by Meier, § 301: "Das
''besonderes Urtheil] ist entweder zugleich allgemein wahr, ein




"Im bejahenden Urtheile wird das Subject unter der Sphare eines
Pradicats gedacht, im verneinenden wird es ausser der Sphare
des letztern gesetzt.” See also N 3068.
10. "In den kategorischen Urtheilen machen Subject und Pradicat
die Materie derselben aus, die Form, durch welche das Verhaltniss
(des Einstimniung oder des Widerstreits
) zwischen Subject und
Pradicat bestimmt und ausgedruckt wird, heisst die
11. P. T. Geach, Reference and Generality (Ithaca: Gornell University
Press, 1962), p. 37.
12. G. Frege, "Function and Goncept," in Black and Geach, p. 30.
13. J. S. Mill, A System of Logic (London: Longmans, Green and Co.
Ltd., 1965 ), I, 4, § 1.
14. For a discussion of this topic, see A. N. Prior, Formal Logic
,
2nd ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 163-164.
15. These principles are presented in Logik, "Einleitung, " Kapitel VII.
See also N 2172, 2174, 2176, 2178, 2181, 2185; for example,
N 2172: "Das (logischo) Criterium der Warheit in der Logik ist
erstlich das der Moglichkeit nach dem Satz des Wiederspruchs,
zweitens der logischen Wirklichkeit nach dem Zureichenden Grundes.
Moglich und Gegrundet." And, N 2178: "(Also sind es drei
logischo (formale) Arten die Warheit zu finden: 1) principium
condictionis et identitatis; 2. principium rationis; 3. princi-
pium exclusi medii inter 2 contradictoria .
)"
16. N 2178: "(Das dritte princip ist das exclusi medii: da durch die
Falschheit das Gegonstheils Warheit bewiesen wird. )"
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17. g 22, Anmerk . 3, "In verneindenden Urtheilen afficirt die
Negation immer die Copula."
18. Aristotle, Interpretatione
. in The Basic Works of Aristotle
ed. by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941)'^
’
§ 3
19. The following discussion is based upon Geach, Reference and
Chapter 3, esp. pp. 51-52, 62-63, 71-72; and'^on
Ernest Moody, 1 ru th and Consec|uence 3_n Mediaeval Logic (Amsterdam:
North-Holland Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 20-21.
20. "Ein jeder Begriff, als Theilbegriff
,
ist in der Vorstellung
der Binge enthalten, als Erkenntnissgrund, d.i. als Merkmal sind
diese Binge unter ihm enthalten. In der erstern Rucksicht hat
jeder Begriff einen Inhalt, in der andem einen Umfang.
"Inhalt und Umfang eines Begriffes stehen gegen einander in
umgekehrten Verhaltnisse. Je mehr namlich ein Begriff unter
sich enthalt, desto weniger enthalt er in sich und umgekehrt.
"Anmerkung. Bie Allgemeinheit oder Allgemeingultigkeit des
Begriffes beruht nicht darauf, dass der Begriff ein Theilbegriff,
sondern dass er ein Erkenntnissgrund ist."
This passage is paralleled by N 2902 and 2881.
21. "Bie Erkenntniss ist Zweyfach, intuitus, Anschauung, conceptus
,
Begriff. Intuitus ist eine einzelne Vorstellung, repraesentatio
singularis . . . . Conceptus ist repraesentatio communis, die
vielen Sachen gemein ist."
22. "Ein jeder Begriff enthalt mehr mogliche Begriffe unter sich."
23. "Bei alien Begriffen merken wir den Umfang (sphaera)."
24. "Sphaera ist der Umfang eines Begriffes, und geht auf die Menge
der Binge, die unter dem Begriff enthalten sind." A simi].ar
passage occurs in Bohna-Wundlacken, p. 755.
25. "Bas Urtheil ist entweder: a.) allgemein, wo das Pradicat mit
alien Begriffen die zur Sphaera des Subjects gehoren verglichen
wird
;
b. ) wo es nur mit einigen verglichen wird, das ist ein
besondres Urtheil."
26. See, for instance, W. V. 0. Quine, Methods of Logic, Rev. ed.




Begriff Caesar ein einzelner Begriff ist der nicht
eine Menge unter sich fasst, sondern nur ein einzelnes Ding ist."
2. "Aber der Gebrauch eines conceptus kann singularis seyn. Denn
was von vielen Dingen gilt, kann auchauf einen einzelnen Fall
angewendet Vv^erden. Icb denke mir einen Menscben in individuo
e.i. ich gebrauche den Begriff des Menscben, um ein ens singulare
zu haben. ... Ich kann in meinem Urtbeil das Ding mit alien
einigen, und einem einzelnen Ding vergleichen. "
’
3. See, for instance, D. P. Dryer, Kant’s Solution for Verification
jni Metaphysics (London: George Allen and Unwin, LtdT^' 1966),
p. 109; and Thomas Kaebao Swing, Kant's Transcendental Logic
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1%97, pp. 7-8. Further'
references to Swing will be acknowledge in the text.
4. For examples, see N 3080, ^gik, § 21, Anmerk. 1, and Wiener
Logik, p. 931.
5. "Es ist ein Fehler in der Logik dass man algeraeine, besondere und
einzelne Begrife annimmt, denn es giebt solche nicht, aber der
Gebrauch derselben kann so eingeteilt werden. Demnach werden wir
nicht die conceptus, sondern, die judicia so einteilen, weil sie
die Verhaltnisse der Begriffe sind, denn ich kann einen Begrif
mit dem andern ganz vergleichen, oder nur einige Teile, oder
nur einen einzigen Teil. Dieser Fehler ist aber so eingerissen,
dass man ihn nicht vermeiden kann."
6. Methods of Logic, p. 216.
7. "Also sind die indicia singularia den vniversalibus gleich zu
schatzen, und Umgekehrt ist ein indicium vniversale als ein
einzelnes Urteil in Ansehung der sphaera zu betrachten. Vieles,
so fern es an sich nur eines ist." The first part of this note
is well-known, but the phrase beginning "und Umgekehrt" appears
only in this note; it is not incorporated by Jasche in his use
of the note in § 20 of the Logik.
8. See Prior, Formal Logic
, p. 160.
§ 2
9. See Logik , § 22, Anmerk . 3: "In verneinenden Urtheilen afficirt
die Negation iinmer die Copula, in unendlichen wird nicht die
Copula, sondern das Pradicat durch die Negation afficirt."
10. See Prior, T’ormal Logic
, p. 127.
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1. Das \erhaltniss ist zwar desselbe, wie bey einem bejahenden
Urteil, aber die negation ist doch immer da, und folglicb sindsievom bejahenden unterscbieden. Diese Sache scheint in der
Logic eine subtilitaet zu seyn. Aber in der Metaphysic wird es
vom W’icbtigkeit .
"
12. (Kant is here speaking of the infinite judgment Men are
non-educated
) "Also ist die Bestimung des Begrifs der Menschen
durcli die Schranken des Begrifs der Gelehrten."
13. "Sage ich aber: anima est non mortal.is; so ich nicht bloss
dass die Seels nichts sterblicbes enthalte, sondern dass sie
auch in der sphaera alles dessen, was nicht sterbliches ist,
enthalten sey. Es ist also hierbey etwas besonders gesagt, dass
ich einen Begriff nahmlich nicht bloss von der sphaera eines
andern Begiiffes ausschliesse, sondern auch den Begriff unter
der ganzen ubrigen sphaera denke, die nicht unter dera Begriffe,
der ausgeschlossen ist, gehort." This passage is paralleled by
N 3065.
r to r .y
14. N 3069: "Der Uberrest ist Unendlich, , wenn man vom Unendlichen
einen bestimmten Theil wegnimmt."
15. "Sie heissen judicia infinita, weil sie unbegranzt sind. Sie
sagen nur immer, was nicht ist, und solcher praedicate kann ich
unzahlige rnachen, denn die sphaera der praedicate, die mit non
afficirt vom subjecte konnen gesagt werden, ist unendlich."
16. N 3065: "Das Llnendliche Urtheil zeigt . . . an . . . dass [ein
Subiect] ausser der Sphare desselben in dem unendlichen irgendwo
sei; folglicli stellt es die sphare des Pradicats als beschrankt
vor." See also N 3063.
17. Immanuel Kant ^s Vorlesungen ilber die Metaphysik
,
ed. by Karl H. L.
Pdlitz (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964),
pp. 49-50. See also Critique , BllO. Further references to the
Vorlesungen iiber die Metaphysik will be acknowledged in the text;
the work itself will be referred to as Vorlesungen/Metaphy s ik .
18. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I, Chapter 6, in McKeon. See also
Prior, Formal Logic, p. 125; and M. Thompson, "On Aristotle's
Square of Opposition," in Aristotle : A Collection of Critical
Essays
,
ed. by J. M. E. Moravcsik (Garden City: Doubleday and
Co., Inc., 1967 ), pp. 58-59.
19. Meier, § 294: "Man kann also alle verneinende Urtheile in
bejahende verx^andeln, wenn man die Verneinung von dem Verbin-
dungsbegriffe weg zum Pradicate setzt."




21. See, for instance, Kemp-Sraith, Commentary, p. 193.
22. . . und die Vorstellung dieser Art von Verknlipkung beider
Urtheile unter einander zur Einheit des Bewusstseins wird die
Consequenz genannt, welche die Form der bypotbetischen Urtheile
ausmacht. ”
23. ”,Uie Form der VerknUpkung in den bypotbetischen Urtbeilen ist
zwiefacb: die setzende
(modus ponens) oder die aufhebende (modus
tollens "
24. ”Es Sind da 2 Erkenntnisse die als Grund and Folgen miteinander
verbunden sind.” Also Wiener Logik
, p. 933; ”Im bypotbetischen
Urtheile betrachte icb die Verbindung zweyer Urtheile. als Grund
und Folge."
’
25. "Der Grund ist das, worauf etwas ganz notbwendiger Weise folgt;
oder, der Grund ist das, worauf etwas nacb allgemeinen Regeln
folgt.
"
26. This discussion of causal conditionality follows that of
Robert C. Stalnaker, "A Theory of Conditionals," APQ Monograph
Series, Monograph 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Pr^s, 1968)
pp. 106-107.
27. "Aller Grund ist zweifach: entweder ein Logischer oder ein
RealGrund. Der logische Grund ist das, wodurch etwas gesetzt
Oder aufgehoben wird nacb dem Satz der Identitat. Der Real-
Grund aber ist das wodurch etwas gesetzt oder aufgehoben wird,
nacb dem Satz des Widerspruchs. Der erste ist analytisch, und
der andere synthetisch. . . . Der nexus logicus kann zwar auch
nacb dem Princ ipio contra dictionis
,
oder nach dem Satz des Wider-
spruchs, weit deutlicher und leichter aber nach dem Principio
identitatis eingesehen werdem. . . . Icb leite den 'Begriff aus
dem andern her, nach der Ableitung, die durch die Analysis
geschieht. Die folge liegt also im Grunde, und ist implicite
an und fiir sich selbst einerlei rait ihm, aber nicht explicite .
Daher ist die Verschiedenheit nicht real, sondern nur der Form
nach. Ein Realgrund ist, dessen Folge eine reale Folge ist."
28. "Die Materie der disjunctiven Urtheile sind also verschiedene
Urtfieile, die aber in opposition betrachtet werden, so dass alle
Urtheile zusaramen genornmen, das ganze Urtheil ausmachen. Man
sieht wohl, dass sie bloss eine logische Eintheilung ausmachen."
See also N 3095, 3098, 3101, 3107.
I
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29. "Die Disiunctiven Urtheile bestehen aus zwey, oder mohreren
Urtbeilen, die ein Verhaltniss der opposition baben, welche oppo-
sition abei contradictorisch seyn muss, es mussen also die membra
contradictoriscb seyn, aber zusamrnen dem Conceptui diuerso gleicb
seyn." ^
30. "Alle Glieder der Disjunction, ausser Einem, zusaramengenommen,
macben das contradictoriscbe Gegentbeil diese Einen aus. Es
findet also bier eine Dicbotomie statt, nacb welcher, wenn eines
von beiden wahr ist, das andre falscb sein muss und umgekehrt."
31. "Es wird bier ent^veder 1) von der Wahrheit Eines Gliedes der
Disjunction auf die Falscbbeit der iibrigen geschlossen, oder
2) von der Falscbbeit aller Glieder, ausser Einem, auf der
Wabrbeit dieses Einen."
§ 4
32. "Ein Urtbeil, welcbes aus einem bejabenden und vemeinenden auf
eine sebr versteckte Art zusammengesetzt ist, beisst ein
exponibeles Urtbeil ." See also, Logik, § 31 and N SllTr
33. In N 3112 Kant gives tbe example "Only men are saved tbrougb
Gbristianity . " I find it dubious that ’only’ represents an
exponible quantitative comparison, for it is equivalent to just
one universal, affirmative judgment, ’All things saved tbrougb
Gbristianity are men’.
34. "Da die Natur der exponiblen Satze lediglicb von Bedingungen
der Spracbe abbangt, nacb welcben man zwei Urtbeile auf einmal
in der Kurze ausdr'dcken l<ann : so gebort die Bemerkung, dass es
in unserer Spracbe Urtbeile geben kbnne, die exponirt werden
mussen, nicbt in die Logik, sondern in die Grammatik." See
also Politz, p. 580.
GHAPTER IV
§ 1
1. "Der Modalitat nacb, durcb welcbes Moment sind das Verbaltniss
des gangen Urtbeils zum Erkenntnissvermogen bestimmt ist, die
Urtbeile entweder problematiscbe oder assertoriscbe oder
apodictiscbe, " ; and "Dieses Moment der Modalitat zeigt also nur
die Art und Weise an, wie im Urtbeils etwas bebauptet oder
verneint wird."
2. ’’. . . z.E. alle Menscben sind Notbwendig unsterblicb, bier
ist notbwendig die limitation, die die Art und Weise zeigt wie




Urtl:ieil 1st die Vorstellung der Einheit desVerhallnisses des Erkentnisgrundes zum moglichen Erkentnisseeines obiects."
K 3052: "ludicium est repraesentatio unitatis obiectlvao (in
del- Irkentnis eines obiects
) in conscientla variorum conceptuum
notbweidlg"®
Bewustseyns) 1st allgemeinguitig und
N 30S5: "Urtheil; Die Vorstellung der Art, wie verschidenen
Begiifre objective (fur jedermann) zu einem Bewustseyn gehoren.
*(d, i. um ein Erkentnis des objects auszumacben. )"
§ 2
4. Kemp-Smith translates ’wirklicb’ as ’real’; the more suitable
translation, which Kemp-Smith himself employs at all other times
is ’actual’. ’
5. "Die problematiachen sind mit dem Bewusstsein der blossen
Moglichkeit, die assertorischen mit dem Bewusstsein der Wirk-
lichkeit, die apodiktischen endlich mit dem Bewusstsein der
Nothwendigkeit des Urtheilens begleitet."
6. Arthur Lovejoy, "Kant’s Classification of the Forms of Judgment"
p. 279.
7. Quoted from P. Hauch, "Die Entstehung der Kantischen Urteilstafel,"
Kantsstudien, XI (1906), p. 204; "Man hat . . . noch eine andere
Eintheilung der Satze, die von gewissen sehr allgemeinen Bestira-
mungen herruhrt, welche man dem Bindewortchen beylegt. Diese
Bestimmungen beruhen uberhaupt auf dem Unterschiede des Moglichen,
Wirklichen und Notwendigen.”
8. For example, R. M. Martin, Toward ^ Systematic Pragmatics
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1959); and his
Intens ion and Decision (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1963~)7 Chapter II.
9. Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief : An Introduction to the
Logic of the tv^o Notions (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1962).
10.
Nicholas Rescher, Topics in Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht-Holland
:
D. Reidel Publishing" Co. ,n)968), ChapteF~XIV. Further references
to Rescher are from this work and will be acknowledged in tlie
text.
G. H. von Wright, An Essay on Modal Logic (Amsterdam: North-




12. Problema tische Urtheile sind solchcj deren niaterie gegeben 1st
rait dem moglichen Verhaltnis zwischen praedicat und subiect."
13. ”Der assertoriscbe sagt von logiscber Wirklicbkeit oder Wabrhcit,
wie etvva in einem hypothetischen Vernunftschluss das Anlecedens
im Obersatze problematiscb, im Untersatze assertorisch vorkoramt,
und zeigt an, dass der Satz mil dem Verstande mach dessen Geset-
zen scbon verbunden sei." Kamp-Smith translates this passage:
”lhe assertoric deals with logical reality or truth. Thus, for
instance, in a hypothetical syllogism the antecedent is in the
major premiss problematic, in the minor assertoric, and what the
syllogism
;
sicj ] shows is that the consequence fs^J] follows
in accordance with the laws of the understanding."
14. Logik
,
§ 30, Anmerk . 3; Wiener Logik, p. 934.
15 ‘ ”... in [dem assertoricsh] lege ich dem Object ausser mir,
und nicht in Gedanken, ein Pradicat bei."
§ 4
16. "Contingens ist das, wovon das Gegentheil raoglich ist."
17. "Ein nothwendiges apodictisches verneinendes Urtheil ist die
Unmoglichkeit.
"
18. "Ein allgemein bejahendes Urtheil wird contraponirt, wenn man
sein Pradicat in einen verneinenden Begriff verwandelt, und das
vorige Subject von demselben allgemein verneinet. Alle wahren
allgemein bejahenden Urtheile konnen contraponirt werden, das ist,
wera ihr Pradicat nicht zukommt, denen kommt auch ihr Subject
nicht zu."
19. "Per judicia contraposita . Da findt eine solche metathesis,
d. h. Versezung der terminorum statt, wo die Qualitaet mit
verandert wird, es wird nehmlich ein negativer Saz. Die
Quantitaet aber bleibt, weil nur ein algemeiner Saz contraponirt
werden kann."
20. "Die per contrapositionem iudicii gehoren zur modalitaet; aus
einem assertorischen ein apodictisch Urtheil zu machen."
Pdlitz : "Bei der contraposition betrift die Veranderung bios
die Modalitaet."
21. Kant is illustrating a passage in Meier, § 351: "Wenn man in
den besonders verneinenden Urtheilen, die Verneinung zum Predicate
setzt, so werden sie besonders bejahende Urtheile, und konnen also
alsdenn schlechtweg umgehehrt werden."
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t*Gnn wGnn das Pradicat als dasjsnigej was das Subject unter
sich enthalt, mithin die ganza Sphere verneint wird; so muss
auch ein Theil derselben verneint werden, d.i, das Subject.”
See alsOj N 3170, 3189 and Pdlitz p. 585 and Wiener Lopik
p. 939.
23. ”A11 Korper sind theilbar (assertorisch ). Was also nicht
theilbar ist, ist kein Korper (apodictisch Urtheil, well es
sich wiederspricht, ein Korper und nicht theilbar zu sein, und
ein Satz, dessen Gegensteil sich wiederspricht, apodictisch
ist. )
(Man kann auch einen empirischen Satz zum Beispiel brauchen.
e.g. Alle Menschen sind sterblich. Denn, diesen Vorausgesetzt,
ist der Satz: was nicht sterblich ist, ist nicht Mensch,
apodictisch ausgedrukt. )"
CHAPTER V
1. "Das Urtheil, wodurch etwas als wahr vorgestellt wird . . . ist
subiective: das Vor\%/arhalten. ” See, also, Dohna-Wundlacken,
p. 731: "rpurwahrhalten] ist das Urteil ira Verhaltnis under der
Beziehung auf das Subjekt."
2. "rFiirwahrhalten] betrift nur die Urtheilskraft in Ansehung der
subiectiven Criterien der Subsumtion eines Urtheils unter
obiective Regeln."
3. For a discussion of these reasons see N 2495 and Logik,
"Einleitung, ” Kapitel IX.
4. "Practisch hinreichend vorwarhalten—in Absicht auf das Interesse,
und zwar von jederraann." See also Wiener Logik, p. 851: "Ich
kann einen subjectiven Grund haben, etwas fur wahr zu halten, doch
so, dass dieser bestandig ist, aber fur mich nicht auf jede Zeit
hinreichend, sondern nur auf die Lage, worin ich mich befinde.”
5. "Gewissheit ist ein hinreichendes bev-;ustseyn Wahrheit.” Certainty
is the cognition of truth; for example, Meier, § 155: "Die
Gewissheit (certitudo subiective spectata ) ist das Bewusstsein
der Wahrheit, oder die klare Erkenntniss der Wahrheit."
6. "Bei der Gewissheit ist es iiberhaupt nicht moglich, das gegentheil
anzunehmen.
"
7. See N 2455 and Dohna-Wundlacken, pp. 734-735.
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. Ein etnpirisch Erkenntniss ist ein Erkenntniss durch den
Verstand uber Objecte die durch Sinnlichkeit vorgestelt werden.
Alle empirisclie Gewisheit geht also auf das Verhaltniss der
sinnlichen Vorstellungen und biebei mussen wir es bewenden
lassen." See also, Wiener Logik, p. 856, and N 2485.
9. See Politz, p. 544: "Die Empiriscbe Gewisheit ist assertorisch "
Also, Logik
, "Einleitung," Kapitel IX.
10. "Empirisch kann ich von einer Sache gewiss seyn dass sie dasey
nicht dass sie Nothwendig sey."
’
ll* • • . die rationale [Gewissheit ist] apodiktisch, d.h. die
Gewisheit einer Erkenntniss die mit dem Bewustsein der Noth-
wendigkeit verbunden ist."
12. Die Gewissheit, die zur Kenntnis des Gebots oder Verbots einer
Handlung gehdrt, ist die moralische."
13. See also Dohna-Wundlacken, pp. 734-735.
14. See, for instance, N 2484: "Ich bin moralisch gewiss, nicht:
es ist moralisch gewiss." Also, Dohna-Wundlacken, p. 734: "Da
kann isch nur sagen: ich b in gewiss. Aber bei der Gewiss-
heit: es ist gewiss, dies ist allgemeingultig.
"
15. "(es ist unmoglich, dass ich bei meinera Erfahrungsurtlieil kbnne
betrogen sein; da ist das Vor\'^ahrhalten apodictisch, obgleich
der Satz obiective zufallig ist. )
16. "Das Furiv'ahrhalten kan apodictisch sein, ohne dass das Erkentnis
obiective apodictisch ist. Jenes ist nur das Bewustsein, dass
man sich unmoglich in der Anwendung ungezweifelt-gewisser Regeln
habe irren konnen, z.B. in der Erfahrung. Es ist gewiss, dass
es Erfahrung sei."
17. Quoted from Abbott, p. 61. See also Politz, p. 544.
18. "Unsere Erkenntniss kann Gegenstande der Erfahrung begreifen,
und urisere Gewissheit kann doch entweder empirisch, oder rational
seyn, Z.B. der Satz von der Potenz vermittelst des Rebels hat
empirische Gewissheit, aber auch rationale. Denn wenn die
Erfahrung uns auch von ihr nichts lehrte : so \'7urde ich es schon
durch die Vernunft erkennen konnen."
187
19. ”Was ich meine, da urtheile ich (mein Von^ahrhalten
) mit
Bewustsein (nnr fur) problematisch. ... Was ich glauhe, asser-
torisch, aher nicht als nothwendig (gilt fur mich). . . . Was
ich weiss: als apodictische nach Gesetzen des Verstandes; wenn
gleich die Warheit hlos empirisch ist, so ist doch das von^ar-
halten . . . apodictisch^ d.i. allgemein nothwendig (gilt fur
alle. )"
20. ”Beym Meinen ist unser Urtheil prohlematisch"
;
and ’Beym Glauhen
urtheilen wir assertorisch, d.h. wir erklaren uns fiir die
Wahrheit .
”
21. ”Beim meinen, urtheile ich Prohlematisch, heim Glauhen
Assertorisch, heim Wissen apodiktisch.”
22. "Von Meinungen fangen wir grostenteils hei unsern Erkenntnissen
an.
"
23. C^. cit . , (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 231.
See Reseller, p. 40.
24. "Aller Glauhe 1st entweder theoretisch . . . oder practisch."
The following discussion of belief is gleaned from N 2487 and
the student lecture notes.
25. "Glauhen ist ein subjectiv zureichendes, aher objective
unzureichendes Furv^?ahrhalten. Subjectiv ist allemahl der Sinn."
26. "Alles, was wir aus Zweeken annehmen, ist fur uns nur suhjektiv
hinreichend - - (d.h. ich muss annehmen, dass dies so sei, sonst
komme ich mit meiner Vernunft hier nicht fort—dies kann ich nun
freilich nicht also objektiv geltend annehmen, doch ist es fur
mich hinreichend. )
27. "Der praktische Glauhe ist oft fester als alles Wissen. Bei
].ezterm hort man noch nach Gegengrunden aher heim praktischen
Glauhen nicht. Z.E. Der Glauhe an Gott und eine andere Welt ist
fester als alles Wissen, well wir dabei soviel Interesse haben.
Die praktische Ueberzeugung ist die grostmoglichste. . . . Der




1. Reich’s reconstruction has recently come under attack. See Hans
Lenk, Kritik der logischen Konstanten
, Kapitel 1; and Gottfried
Martin
j
Kant ’ s Metaph}^sics and Theory of Science (see following
note), pp. 86-88. Martin is concerned“with thF’possihility of
proving completeness of the table; his conclusion is that Reich
is unable to avoid crucial criticisms of the very possibility of
such a proof.
2. See, for instance, Gottfried Martin, Kant’s Metaphysics and
Theory of Science
,
P. G. Lucas, trans. (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1955), pp. 82 and 97. Further reference to
this work vs'ill be acknowledged in the text.
3. ’’Die Verstandesschliisse gehen durch alle Klassen der logischen
Functionen des Urtheilens und sind folglich in ihren Hauptarten
bestimmt durch die Momente der Quantitat, der Qualitat, der
Relation und der Modalitat.”
4. ”Der wesentlich Character aller unmittelbaren Schlusse and das
Princip ihrer Mdglichkeit besteht lediglich in einer Veranderung
der blossen Form der Urtheile, wahrend die Materie der Urtheile,
das Subject and Pradicat, unverandert dieselbe bleibt."
§ 2
5. I use ’’method" in a Kantian sense, see Critique , Bx-xiv.
According to Kant, for a discipline to have a method is its
guarantee of being one "the secure path of a science."
6. See the discussion of the foundation of logical truth in
G. H. von Wright, "Form and Content in Logic," in Logical Studies
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 6-7.
7. See the interpretation of the synthetic ^ priori problem developed
by D. P. Dryer, Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics ,
Chapter 1, esp. p. 29: "In asking how metaphysics is possible
as knowledge, he is primarily asking how metaphysics can be
verified, viz. how it can be made out which conclusions in meta-
physics are true and which are false."
§3
8. Near the end of Logik , "Einleitung, " Kapitel II, we find evidence
of Kant’s regard for the Wolffian logic: "The general Logic
of Wolff is the best we possess.” Quoted from Abbott, p. 11.
9. See, for instance, Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: The M.I.T.
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(T) Sf 47
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Quantifiers: V, q, 7- II. 1 & III.l
Functions of Quality: II.
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3
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